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ABSTRACT
An important product of the nominalist-realist de­
bate of the fourteenth century was a renewed interest in the 
theology of grace and merit. For Ockham and his followers, 
since "real" knowledge of God through natural reason was im­
possible, God seemed to transcend his creation so absolutely 
that his ways might become incomprehensible to man. This, 
added to the fourteenth-century interest in voluntarism, led 
to the further inference that God could use his absolute 
power to overrule what he had ordained. Accordingly, all 
man could do was offer his good works to this omnipotent 
Judge in the hope that he might receive mercy. Some nomina­
list theologians even suggested that God could, by his abso­
lute power, elect a sinner whose merits had not been digni­
fied by sanctifying grace. To conservative followers of 
Augustine such as Bradwardine and Wyclif, this was rank Pela- 
gianism. They fought the "Modern Pelagians" so zealously 
that they gravitated to the opposite extreme, contending that 
no act could be truly meritorious without God's direct parti­
cipation through grace. Thus, while the nominalists exalted 
divine omnipotence in order to free man, conservative Augus- 
tinians used the same starting point to argue that God gave
man whatever merits he might have.
There is considerable evidence that the impact of 
this dispute was widespread, notably among the principal 
poets of the time. In the Cotton Nero A.x manuscript, for 
example, Pearl features a debate over grace and merit, with 
the conclusion that God elects the sinner through grace; the 
sinner does not elect God by his own merits. Purity balances 
this with a complementary doctrine, of merit, stressing man's 
responsibility to perform good works if he would be saved.
But Patience illustrates, through the story of Jonah, how 
man is ultimately dependent upon God's absolute power. In 
Sir Gawaln and the Green Knight, a reconciliation of these 
doctrines crystallizes around the hero, who commits serious 
sin but yet is willing, finally, to cooperate with grace and 
reinstate himself in divine favor. Then St. Erkenwald, per­
haps by the same author, relates a legend which elsewhere 
in medieval poetry sanctioned man's power to appeal to God 
by good works alone, but which here confuses the issue by 
stressing man's powerlessness without divine grace.
Piers Plowman treats basically the same problems 
in an extended dialectic in which Will, man's faculty for 
moral action, searches for the means to earn salvation.
The doctrinal issues are defined in the Vislo, especially 
in the pardon scene, and the Vita dramatizes Will's efforts 
to learn how he may reach God in terms of grace and merit.
Chaucer, unlike these other two poets, avoids the 
risks of their often exciting doctrinal experiments and opts 
rather for a moderate view of the God-man relationship.
Both in Trollus and Crlseyde and several important Canterbury 
Tales, he expresses confidence in human nature, though 
stressing the need for divine providence to direct man's 
actions, and assures us that God will not use his absolute 
power to overrule or contradict the covenant with man. 
Chaucer's contribution to the controversy, then, was to show 
that there is a viable alternative between the extremes of 
the Ockhamists and the Augustinians, whereas many writers 
tended to polarize the dispute into these two positions 
alone.
The conclusion that this dissertation seeks to 
support, therefore, is that this great intellectual debate was 
not confined to the universities or the monasteries, but 
stimulated the imaginations of the most distinguished poets 
of the time to produce some of their finest works.
\
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Chapter I: God and Man in the Fourteenth Century
Very little is now known about the development of 
ideas in the fourteenth century, even though an enormous 
amount of medieval scholarship has been accomplished in the 
last hundred years. Most histories of philosophy or theolo­
gy afford this period scant attention, little more than a 
superficial glance at this 11 intermission" between the great 
cultural explosions of the high Middle Ages and the Italian 
Renaissance. The reason for this is not far to seek. Prot­
estant scholars have usually scorned the later Middle Ages, 
with its ecclesiastical corruptions and the decline of scho­
lastic theology, except where they could find a "forerunner" 
of the Reformation to come.1 Catholic philosophers, inspired 
by Leo XII^s famous encyclical Aeteral Patrls ( 1 8 7 9 )» have 
concentrated awesome energy in reconstructing the system 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, with the result that we probably 
understand his works today better than his contemporaries
1For a very lucid overview of the whole historical prob­
lem of the "forerunner," see Helko A. Oberman, Forerunners
the Reformation (New York, 1966), esp. pp. 3-^9•
1
did* Some scholars have also attended to St. Eonaventure, 
Duns Scotus and, more extensively, St. Augustine; hut the 
vanguard of the twentieth-century revival of Scholasticism, 
led hy men like Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and
O
Anton Pegis, has championed St. Thomas. This has produced 
an extreme emphasis on the thirteenth century as a time of 
creative growth, the pinnacle of medieval civilization. 
Conversely, since the most important thinkers of the four­
teenth century criticized and eventually destroyed the 
syntheses of Thomas and Bonaventure, this later period has 
been characterized as a "decline,” promoting the disinteg­
ration of Scholasticism into endless sterile subtleties.3 
In this spirit, one of our most distinguished medievalists, 
Etienne Gilson, has described William of Ockham as an "appr­
entice sorcerer" who unleashed vast destructive powers to 
corrode "the golden age of Scholasticism," without creating 
any positive synthesis of his own.^ Such an attitude,
2I am not minimizing the contributions of such distin­
guished thinkers as Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Blondel, Karl 
Rahner, or Teilhard de Chardin, but they represent reactions 
against the mainstream of modern Catholic thought.
3a notable exception is the great scholarship of the late 
Phllotheus Boehner, O.F.M., who helped to overcome our igno­
rance of Ockham in many important books and articles. See, 
for example, his Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius 
Buytaert, O.F.K. (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1958). A good 
measure of Fr. Boehner*s Influence is the remarkably know­
ledgeable and balanced account of Ockham's philosophy by 
Frederick Copleston, S.J., in the third volume of his 
History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md., 1952).
^History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (N; T. 
195'5)»P."W.
3especially since it is widespread, has fostered little 
interest in the problems, the controversies, the intellec­
tual concerns of the fourteenth century. Yet this very cen­
tury not only destroyed confidence in the past, but also 
made positive contributions of its own, not the least of 
which is a philosophic ground favorable to the growth of mo­
dern science. The fourteenth century also went far beyond 
just dissolving the Thomistic union of faith with reason: 
it promoted the growth of a profound mysticism, a renewal of 
Augustinian thought, and the main doctrinal issues of the 
Reformation. In the following discussion, therefore, most 
of our attention will be directed toward the positive 
aspects of fourteenth-century thought.
The chief issue between the thirteenth- and four­
teenth century schoolmen is over the relation between phil­
osophy and theology, which is in turn part of the larger 
debate between realism and nominalism. Following a tradi­
tion set by Augustine and Anselm, Eonaventure and Thomas 
were realists: they began with the common supposition that 
there—ts an absolute order in extramental reality which the 
mind is capable of understanding, at least in part, by confer 
ming itself to that order. In spite of the differences in 
neo-Platonic or Aristotelian influences on their thought,
these realists all agreed that a man's ideas provided an ac­
curate description of the world around him. Anominalist, or 
conceptualist, such as William of Ockham argued rather that the
mind receives some primitive sense-knowledge from the extra­
mental world, but then the mind orders such data into its 
own patterns, patterns which have no absolute claim on truth, 
but which are nevertheless valuable because they lead to 
probable statements about reality. The implications of this 
innovation in the theory of knowledge are extremely far- 
reaching. If we apply It to our knowledge of God, for 
example, then where the realist has Insisted that he can 
reach certitude about God's existence, the nominalist will 
contend that God's existence Is at best probable. What Is 
at issue here is natural theology itself: whether man can
infer God from examining the structure of his own thought- 
processes, as Augustine claimed, assuming that this leads us 
back ultimately to the God from whom all human knowledge 
originates;5 or whether man can, as Thomas contended, Infer 
God from our experience with the world around us, reaching 
by analogy from secondary causes to the First Cause.^ Great 
as the differences between the Augustinians and Thomists 
often were, both groups regarded such a natural theology 
necessary to Christian philosophy. William of Ockham re­
plied for the nominalists that (1) only those mental proces­
ses which draw directly from sense experience are legitimate,
5»See, for example, the De Maglstro. which is devoted en­
tirely to this process.
^See, for example, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Bk. I, ch.
10 f.
5or at least have a valid claim to being true;^ and (2) God 
and man are so totally different that there can be no mean-
O
ingful analogy between them. By this two-part criticism, 
Ockham cut the believer off from rational demonstrations of 
God’s existence and thus, a fortiori, from the possibility 
of any knowledge of God through human means. With this dis­
mantling of Christian philosophy, faith and reason tended 
more and more to go their separate ways. Faith came to rely 
ever more heavily on Scripture, as with the Lollard movement, 
or to develop its own psychological resources, as with the 
mystics. Season, no longer the dutiful handmaid of theology, 
began a more modest exploration of. natural experience, re­
fining its logical techniques and assisting in the laborious 
birth of modern science.
One of the best illustrations of the consequences of 
the nominalist divorce of faith from reason is fourteenth-
century v o l u n t a r i s m . V o T u r ^ ^  its insistence on
the superiority of will over reason, came as a direct refuta­
tion of Thomistic rationalism. For St. Thomas, man may 
ascend to God through reason. Both God and man share in 
being, and so there is an analogy between them which is suf­
ficient for Thomas to postulate a natural law that binds both 
man and God immutably together. Such a view of the God-man
^Copleston, III, 66 f.
^Copleston, III, 90 f.
6relationship was repugnant to the English Franciscans, 
particularly Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Though him­
self a realist, Duns prepared the way for Ockham by his 
notion of being as unlvocal, in a sense, and not analogous. 
But even more important than this distinction, in terms of 
the direction fourteenth-century thought would afterwards 
take, was Duns* conception of God's will. For Thomas, God's 
will is knowable through the natural law implanted in crea­
tion, though he does allow that there are some few things 
which are revealed exclusively in Scripture. Duns admits 
that God has revealed something of himself in the order of 
his creation, but this does not mean that we can thereby de­
duce God's will from what he has willed. For behind these 
manifestations of God's power, his potentla ordlnata. there 
remains his transcendent will as it is in itself, his poten-
9
tia absoluta, which is by its very nature unknowable to man. 
With Ockham, and even more drastically with his followers, 
these ideas were to take a radical course. For Ockham, as 
we have seen, God can be known only by faith since nominalist 
logic renders the God of philosophy a mere concept, subject 
to the same laws of probability as other concepts. This en­
genders scepticism everywhere in the fourteenth century, a 
scepticism that is deepened by a new approach to God's poten­
tla absoluta. In Ockham's effort to free God's will from
^Copleston, II, pt. 2, 2*14-257.
any restraints whatsoever, he even claims that God's poten-
tla absoluta may override or contradict his potentla ordl-
nata. Acts are no longer good or evil in themselves
according to natural law, as St, Thomas had taught, but
derive their moral value solely from God's will. Thus, God
can overturn the natural law, the product of his potentla
ordlnata. and by his potentla absoluta will that a man
commit murder or adultery. If God were to do this, then
such acts would become morally good, simply because God's
10will is the only criterion for good and evil. The only
action that Ockham considers necessarily evil is not loving
God, for not even God can ask us not to love him without 
11contradiction. Here again, the attitude fostered by such 
reasoning is markedly sceptical: man is cut off from God by 
the very arguments used to exalt the divine nature. By 
asserting that we cannot know either God's existence or his 
will with certainty, the Ockhamists Introduced into the 
fourteenth century a bewildering world of possibilities to 
displace the comforting certainties of the thirteenth 
century.
The next stage of this movement is even more signi­
ficant for medieval culture because it enters the sacred 
realm of theology itself. Their radical stress on God's
10Copleston, III, 116.
•^Quodllbeta. Ill, Q. 13; reprinted by Philotheus Boehner, 
O.F.M., in his edition of Ockham's Philosophical Writings 
(New York, 196**)» PP» 160-163*
freedom forced the nominalist theologians to formulate an 
equally radical explanation of the natufe of man and his 
relation to God. Thus, releasing God from the restrictions 
of traditional moral law implied a similar release for man, 
with the result that just as man was freer than before, so 
also could he be less certain than before about the proper 
(or improper) way to gain salvation. In this new condition 
of uncertainty old questions clamored for new answers: what 
is human merit? how could fallen man be justified? what is 
the relation between divine grace and human freedom? could 
God's potentla absoluta predestine a sinner to glory or a 
righteous man to damnation? These are the great questions 
of the fourteenth, century, and the measure of their signi­
ficance is that they shaped Christian thought, both Catholic 
and Protestant, for the next several hundred years.
II
The orthodox tradition on these questions was first 
firmly established by St. Augustine In the early fifth cen­
tury. In his writings against the Manlchees, Augustine 
sought to vindicate God from the charge that he is respon­
sible for evil in the world. Thus, in De llbero arbitrio,12 
Augustine insists that "all things are to be praised for 
the very fact that they exist; for by the very fact that
^2Trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (New York, 
1964).
they are, they are good" (3.7.71). For to claim that God
could create something that is evil would seem to challenge
either his omnipotence or his love toward his creatures.
The solution, as Augustine later summarized it in his 
13Confessions.  ^ is that evil is not a substance at all:
Therefore, all things that are, are good, and as to 
that evil, the origin of which I was seeking for, it 
is not a substance, since, if it were a substance, it 
would be good. For it would either have to be an 
incorruptible substance (which is the highest form of 
goodness) or else a corruptible substance (which, 
unless it had good in it, could not be corruptible).
(Bfc. VII, ch. 16)
The source of evil, then, is man's perverse will turning 
away from God to the pleasures of this world: from carltas 
to cunldltas. a favorite theme of Augustine*s. In terms 
of human actions, this means that actions are either good or 
evil as they turn toward or away from God, that is, they are 
good or evil in themselves, not because God wills them so. 
Human freedom is necessarily implied in the belief that man 
is morally responsible for his actions, so that man is always 
free to commit sin, though this does not mean that man is 
always or necessarily able to perform meritorious works, 
as we shall see. God gave man free will so that he could 
freely choose God, but Augustine qualifies this by adding 
that sinning is a misuse of such freedom (De llbero arbltrio, 
2.1.5-6). Where, then, does man learn what he ought to 
choose? Augustine answers this with his famous and extremely
^Trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1963).
influential doctrine of illumination. God not only tran­
scends the world in the sense that he does not partake of 
its imperfections, but he has chosen to implant himself in 
some mysterious way in the soul of man. Thus, as the De 
Maglstro extensively argues,1** we find God by withdrawing, 
one stage after another, from the external world and travel­
ling inward. As we proceed away from sense data and pro­
gressively more and more into the realm of abstraction, we 
are moving away from the mutable, corruptible world and to­
ward eternal truths, leading ultimately to the supreme truth 
that is God. In this sense, God is the divine maglster 
who illuminates our minds with his sacred truth. But not 
all men are capable of perceiving this illumination or, 
having perceived it, able to live their lives according to 
it. For just as all good flows from God, so also man cannot 
by his own efforts will any good without God having first 
moved him toward that good.'*'’ And this introduces August- 
ine*s doctrine of grace, which has had such far-reaching 
influence that all subsequent discussions of grace, works, 
freedom justification, and predestination by both Catholic 
and Protestant theologians have been dominated by his form­
ulations.
■^This is one of Augustine’s clearest descriptions of his 
theory of illumination.
1^Confessions. Bk. VIII, ch. 5» £e llbero arblfrrlo. 3*18.
177 and 179; £e doctrlna Christiana. 4.16.33*
Throughout most of his career as bishop of Hippo, 
Augustine was embroiled in controversy with the Pelagians. 
Pelagius, a British monk who spent some time in Augustine’s 
area while on his way to the East, developed a doctrine 
based on the efficacy of works. Though Pelagius himself did 
not go to the extremes of many of his followers, his thought 
was generally interpreted as arguing that man could merit 
salvation by his own good works. For Pelagius, this pre­
supposes that man must have been justified— that is, 
redeemed from utter depravity in original sin— through 
Christ’s coming, but Pelagius contended that from this point 
on man's works could themselves be meritorious, without the 
infusion and continuing habitus of sanctifying grace. Des­
pite the moderation of Pelagius’ views when compared to those 
of some of his followers, his doctrine of works was repug­
nant to Augustine, whose whole experience of sin and conver­
sion contradicted Pelagius. All of Book IX of the Confes­
sions. for example, describes tellingly the agonies of a man 
who desires to love God and do God’s will, yet is unable to 
do so by his own power. Thus, for Augustine, the question 
is not merely that all good works stem ultimately from God, 
as we have already seen, but that a man cannot perform moral­
ly good works without first being moved toward them by grace. 
Everywhere in Augustine grace is a condition sine qua non 
for acts to have merit. Just so, In a long petition to God 
in the Confessions. Augustine remarks that ”if a man recounts
to you all the real merits he has, he is only telling you
of your gifts to him" (Bk. IX, ch. 13); and farther along
he adds the important qualification that "My good deeds are
your work and your gift, my evil deeds are my faults and
your punishments" (Bk. X, ch. *0 • Still more emphatic is
the following passage from the Retractatlones, written at
the end of his long career:
Since, as we have said, all goods--whether great, inter­
mediate, or lowest— are from God, it follows that the
good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered
among the great goods, is also from God. Then I pro­
ceeded to speak of the wretchedness most justly inflic­
ted upon sinners,„from which they can be freed only by
God’s grace; since man could fall by will, that is by
free choice, he could not rise again. To the wretched­
ness of a just condemnation belong the ignorance and 
difficulty from which every man suffers from birth. No 
man can be freed from this evil except by the grace of 
God. By denying (£he effects of] original sin, the Pela­
gians refuse to account for the wretchedness that results 
from man's just condemnation.
One question remains: granting that man's works can merit 
salvation only after receiving grace to elevate them to a 
level fully pleasing to God (meritum de condlgno, in schola­
stic terminology), can man act in such a way as to merit 
this grace (meritum de oongruo)? For Augustine even the 
good works that a man performs, such as praying, in order to 
merit grace are themselves prompted by a precedent grace. 
Here again, the reason for the doctrine is rooted in his own 
experience of sin and conversion, as is quite clear in this 
selection from the Confessions:
*^In Benjamin and Hackstaff, p. 158.
I call upon you, my God, my mercy, who made me and 
did not forget me when I had forgotten you. I call you 
into my soul which you are making ready to receive you 
by the longing which you yourself inspire. Do not for­
sake me now that I call upon you; for before I could 
call upon you at all, you were ahead of me; by all sorts 
of voices and in all kinds of ways over and over again 
you pressed yourself on my attention, so that I might 
hear you from far away and be converted and might call
upon you who were calling me. . . .and in everything I
did that deserved well, you were ahead of me, so that 
you might give the due reward to the work of your own 
hands, the hands that made me.
(Bk. XIII, ch. 1) 
Such a view does require that man perform good works, in 
spite of its stress on God's role in the process. For a
man must cooperate with the first grace given to him
(lnltlum fldei) by showing God through his actions how much 
he desires to merit the further gift of sanctifying grace. 
Thus, there are four stages in this movement ^toward God:
(1) God makes available the grace needed to move a man to­
ward him (gratia gratis data); (2) the sinner may then re­
spond by performing actions that can earn further favor with 
God (meritum de congruo): (3) God may choose to justify him 
by infusing into his soul the habitus of sanctifying grace 
(gratia gratum faclens); and (^) the man may now perform 
works, elevated by such grace, that can fully merit his 
salvation (meritum de condlgno).
These issues continued to be debated even long after 
Augustine's death, but it is a sign of his authority as the 
Doctor of Grace that his views prevailed. They were rati­
fied by the Sixteenth Council of Carthage (14-18), Popes Inno­
cent I and Zoslmus, the definitive Indlcuius of St. Prosper
of Aquitaine, and the Second Council of Orange (529)» whose 
pronouncements were confirmed by Pope Boniface II on Janu­
ary 25. 531» and have been considered the definitive state­
ment of orthodoxy ever since.1? The influence of Augustine 
in each case is clear, as the following example from a decree 
by the Council of Carthage illustrates:
Whoever says that the grace of Justification was given 
to us so that grace could facilitate our fulfilling what 
our free will is ordered to do, as if to say that, if 
grace were not given, it would be possible but not easy 
to obey God's commandments without that grace: let him 
be anathema.
(TCT 529, Denz. 105) 
Soon, a new qualification was Introduced by the semi-Pelagians, 
who proposed that while God's grace is required for meritum 
de condlgno. a man could merit de congruo without being
first prompted by grace. Here again, the official Church
upheld the teaching of Augustine, as in this decree by the 
Second Council of Orange:
If anyone argues that God awaits our will before 
cleansing us from sin, but does not profess that even 
the desire to be cleansed is accomplished through the 
infusion and the Interior working of the Holy Spirit, 
he opposes the Holy Spirit speaking through Solomon: "The 
will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35. Seutuaglnt). 
And he opposes the Apostle's salutary message: "It is God
who of his good pleasure works in you both the will and
the performance? (Phil. 1:13)•
(TCT 5*l4, Denz. 177)
^John Clarkson, S.J., ed. The Church Teaches: Documents 
of the Church in English Translation (St. Louis, 1955)* arts. 
527-5^9 (hereafter referred to as TCT). The Latin originals 
are in Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schonmetzer, ed. Enchi­
ridion Symbolorum. Definltlonum et Declaratlonum de Bebus 
Fidel et Morum, 23rd ed. (Freiburg 1m Breisgau, 19^5)* cited 
hereafter as Denz.
Evidently, then, while medieval thought in other areas is 
generally an amalgamation of diverse elements, in theology, 
the "queen of sciences," the authority of Augustine dominates 
everyone's thinking. This is nowhere more clear than in 
the doctrine of grace.
The teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, as expressed in 
the third book of his Summa Contra Gentiles. and then more 
precisely in the later Summa Theologlae. represents a con­
tinuation of the Augustinian tradition with one important 
qualification. By explaining Augustine's doctrine of grace 
in the context of an Arab-influenced Aristotelian system, 
Thomas seemed to some of his contemporaries to have violated, 
or at least compromised, the traditional teaching. Actually, 
many of these suspicions were unfair, but it is impossible 
to understand the reasons why his critics in the late thir­
teenth and early fourteenth centuries construed Thomas' 
ideas as they did, except in terms of Bishop Etienne Tempier's 
condemnation of various Arabian-Aristotelian propositions
in 1277 as a "correction" of philosophical vagaries at the
1 RUniversity of Paris. The Arabian philosophers who devel­
oped Aristotle's thought during the Middle Ages, particul­
arly Avicenna and Averroes, had frozen his cosmology into 
a rigid hierarchy of causes extending from the First Mover 
to man. This causality was extremely deterministic, even
*®See David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 
(New York: Vintage Books, 196*0, pp. 272-275 and passim.
to the point of denying any freedom whatsoever to man. As 
a consequence, since almost all the texts and commentaries 
on Aristotle had come to Paris from Arabian sources, any ~~ 
attempt to explain man's relation to God in terms of a First 
Mover either was, or at least seemed to be, colored by 
Arabian determinism.
In Thomas' explanation of the need for grace to pre­
cede meritorious works, we therefore see implications that 
go beyond Augustine, resulting from the different metaphys­
ical framework Thomas employed. This is quite evident in
IQ
the following passages from the Summa Theologlae: 7
Man’s nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in 
its integrity, as it was in our first parent before 
sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin 
of our first parent. Now in both states human nature 
needs the help of God, as First Mover, to do or will 
any good whatsoever. . . .But in the state of integ­
rity of nature, as regards the sufficiency of opera­
tive power, man by his natural endowments could will 
and do the good proportioned to his nature, which is
the good of acquired virtue; but he could not do the
good that exceeded his nature, which is the good of 
infused virtue. But in the state of corrupted nature, 
man falls short even of what he can do by his nature,
so that he is unable to fulfill all of it by his own
natural powers.
(Q. 109, art. 2)
and then again,
. . .since God is absolutely the First Mover, it is 
by His motion that everything seeks Him under the 
common notion of good, whereby everything seeks to 
be likened to God in its own way.
(Q. 109, art. 6)
*9proia Anton C. Pegis, ed. Introduction to Saint Thomas 
Aquinas (New York, 1958). All quotations from Thomas will 
be from this edition.
Thomas seems honestly laboring to express Augustine's funda­
mental position on grace and merit, but the form he uses 
carries far different philosophical suggestions. For where 
Augustine makes us aware of the struggle, the anxiety, the 
conflict, Thomas speaks of the sense in which secondary 
causes can become efficient causes only at the instigation 
of the First Cause. And where Augustine writhes in the tor­
ments of a sinner whose deepest experience has taught him 
the paradox of grace and freedom, Thomas reduces this to a 
principle of metaphysics: Quldquid movetur ab alio movetur. 
His contemporary critics diagnosed this as the "infection” 
of Arabian determinism.
But before we look into some of these criticisms and 
reactions, there is another important point in Thomas' 
teaching that warrants attention. On the subject of meritum 
de congruo, Thomas allows greater flexibility than Augustine 
had and thus opens the way for more radical innovations by 
fourteenth-century thinkers. Thomas is, nevertheless, quite 
orthodox in maintaining that a man cannot merit de congruo 
unless he is first moved by grace (ST: Q. 112, art. 2), but 
he opens new possibilities when he argues that a man can, by 
his good works, merit de congruo different proportions of 
sanctifying grace than might be given another man whose de 
congruo merits had been less:
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying 
grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, 
grace joins man to the highest good, which is God. But 
as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less
inasmuch as one may be more perfectly illumined by the 
light of grace than another. And a certain reason for 
this is on the part of him who prepares himself for 
grace; since he who is better prepared for grace receives 
more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the 
first cause of this diversity, since man prepares him­
self only inasmuch as his free choice is prepared by God. 
Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought 
on the part of God, who dispenses His gifts variously, 
in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church 
may result from these various degrees; even as He insti­
tuted the various conditions of things, that the universe 
might be perfect.
(Q. 112, art. I*) 
Though remaining impeccably orthodox, Thomas has introduced 
a new element here in trying to explain how it is that some 
men receive greater measure of sanctifying grace than others. 
While not returning to the semi-Pelagian view that man merits 
sanctifying grace de congruo, Thomas argues that the propor­
tions of sanctifying grace a man receives depend on the woiks 
he performs. Thomas no doubt would have shuddered at some 
of the later developments of meritum de congruo, but he 
could not have denied that his cautious half-step beyond 
Augustine provided the direction for less orthodox departures 
a century later.
Perhaps the most distinguished of Thomas’ early 
critics was the English Franciscan John Duns Scotus. Duns 
attacked Thomistic rationalism and asserted the priority of 
will over reason in both God and man. This led, as we saw 
earlier, to Duns’ distinction between God's' potentla abso­
luta and potentla ordlnata. Thus, because God could, at 
least theoretically, override his ordinances by virtue of 
his absolute freedom, not only was Thomas’ natural theology
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weakened, but also the whole direction of the discussion of
merit, grace, freedom, justification, and predestination
began to change. Actually, Duns himself appears never to
20have explicitly contradicted accepted teaching. He holds, 
for example, that all meritorious actions must be preceded 
by grace I"per adiutorlum gratlae datum”) and rules out even 
the semi-Pelagian exaggeration of man's natural powers
("actio merltorla non est in potestate nostra nec naturali-
21
bus meremur. quod erat error Pelagll.”). But there remains 
an ambiguity in his teaching, unintended perhaps, but an 
ambiguity nonetheless. For if God can reverse his own or­
dinances through his potentla absolute. then God could at 
least conceivably elect a man to glory who had merited de 
congruo but did not have the habitus of sanctifying grace 
required ordinarily for meritum de condigno. It is only 
fair to point out here that Duns himself never raised this 
point; but his followers did, and this is what interests us 
here. Consequently, Duns holds a middle place in the develop­
ment we are tracing: himself orthodox, he prepared the way
for the most unorthodox speculations on grace and merit of 
the fourteenth century.
2°0n the controversy over Duns' orthodoxy, see Charles 
Lawrence Balil, "Duns Scotus," New Catholic Encyclopedia, IV 
(New York, 1967),1102-6.
21J. Riviere, "Merite," Dlctlonnalre de Thgologle 
Cathollaue. X (Paris, 1928), col. 705-
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III
Following Duns Scotus in the first part of the four­
teenth century came his Franciscan confrere William of Ockham, 
a thinker of great power, range, and subtlety, hut one 
whose ideas became so controversial that they have often
been distorted and are not sufficiently understood even to-
22day. The principal source of misunderstanding, even among 
modern scholars, lies, I think, in the methods that Ockham 
employed. For he began as a logician, one of the most 
brilliant of all time, and brought his logical techniques 
to bear in developing his highly original theology. As 
we saw earlier, one of Ockham*s foremost contributions 
was to divorce faith and revelation from the dependence they 
had on reason in earlier Christian philosophy, particularly 
that of St. Thomas. A rationalist theology was the worst of 
impieties, so far as the Franciscan Ockham was concerned.
What I should like to propose here, then, is the thesis that 
Ockham*s often quoted extreme voluntarism is really a bril­
liant reductlo ad absurdum of rationalist theolofey and, as 
such, does not represent Ockham*s true theological position. 
Once he had established his framework of voluntarism, he 
showed (1) how insufficient was the theology of his adver­
saries, and (2) how Insufficient was reason Itself when 
turned loose in areas that properly belonged to faith and
22
Cf. note 3» above.
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revelation. But Ockham had a positive and, on the whole, 
orthodox theology of his own to offer, which has almost 
invariably been ignored or confused with his negative criti­
cism of other men's views.
Specifically, Ockham radically emphasizes the poten- 
tla Del absoluta as so totally free from the present order 
of creation and moral law that God could contradict the laws 
he has ordained in, say, Scripture. If, for example, God 
were to order a man to commit fornication, far from being a 
sin, this would become a meritorious act (Sent.. Ill, q. 12 
MA)?^ Next, Ockham insists that free will is the only real 
determinant of merit because either with or without grace 
what is willed will be good or evil according to the dispo­
sition of the one who is willing (Sent., I, dist. 17, q. 2 C). 
Applying his famous principle of economy— "Ockham's Razor"
(pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate)— he next slices 
away at grace. Grace need not initiate an act for man to 
merit de congruo, as Augustine had argued, because God can 
accept an act which was not subsequent to grace if he so 
wills by his potentla absoluta (Sent.. Ill, q. 8 C). Simi­
larly, in the case of sanctifying grace, God could choose to 
accept a man who had not received this habltus that Augustine 
believed necessary for merltum de condigno for, once again, 
God's potentla absoluta could dispense with such a condition.
2% h e  text I am using is Guillelmus de Occam, O.F.K.,
Opera Plurlma (Lyon, 1^-9^-96; facsimile, 1962, by the Gregg 
Press Ltd., London).
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This was the first article in Ockham’s theology condemned
2bby the papal commission at Avignon in 1326. Finally, and
most reprehensible of all to the commission at Avignon,
Ockham asserted that God’s potentla absoluta could even re-
25ject a man who had done good works and accept a sinner. Up 
to this point, Ockham appears to have violated the official 
and ordinary teaching of the Church on every point. Why, 
then, did Ockham not consider his theology of grace and free­
dom heretical, and how could his fellow Franciscans have re­
garded him with such esteem? In answering this, we must 
bear in mind that the real issue here is whether or not 
Ockham violated orthodox teaching, not how amenable his views 
might be to one or another individual or tradition. The re­
ply, I submit, is that Ockham’s opponents took his arguments 
literally and out of context. He did not contend that God 
ever did or would order a man to commit sin; nor did he ar­
gue that God actually did dispense with grace. Ockham’s ar­
gument that God’s potentia absoluta is indeterminate, in­
finitely free, and unknowable is merely a strategy to expose 
the weaknesses in a rationalist theology, which necessarily 
assumes that God’s absolute power and his ordained power 
are one and the same. Such rationalism was repugnant to the
2b
Reprinted by Auguste Pelzer, in ”Les 51 articles de 
Guillaume Occam censures, en Avignon, en 1326,” Revue 
d ’histolre eoclesiastlque, XVIII (1922), 250-252.
^Article 3; Pelzer, p. 253*
Franciscans, who saw in it an attempt to scale God down to 
human understanding. Asserting the potentla Del absoluta 
was, therefore, simply an emphatic way of dramatizing how 
far God's nature transcended man's puny efforts to reach 
him.
Ockham's technique was so unconventional that it 
was misinterpreted, but his Intentions were manifestly 
orthodox. His argumentative method, the reductio ad absur- 
dum, was so successful that his opponents and even some of 
his followers did not see that his absurd caricature of God 
actually caricatured man's attempts to reach God by natural 
means. Eut to argue, as the maglstrl at Avignon did, that 
Ockham sought to overthrow God's potentla ordlnata and the 
present moral order is to neglect the whole positive side 
of his theology. Fpr Ockham insisted again and again that a 
virtuous will is one that conforms, so far as possible, to 
the divine will. And how may men know the divine will? 
Through God's revelation (potentla ordlnata). From this 
point Ockham goes on to say that while God's will may be 
free from necessity, he has willed that in the present order 
we choose what he has willed. Thus, a wrong act is wrong 
because "it would be elicited contrary to the divine precept 
and the divine will" (Sent., Ill, 8.13 C). And again, an 
act is either evil or it is "Intrinsically and necessarily 
virtuous stante ordlnatlone divina" (Sent., Ill, 8.12 CCC). 
Even when he argues that good works are required for merit,
he Is careful to explain that (1) God is under no compulsion 
to accept them, and (2) this does not exclude a need for 
grace, but only the liklihood that a man could merit salva­
tion by grace without good works (Sent., I, dist. *H, q. 1 B).
Ockham was, however, much more cautious than many 
of his followers. A good example of one of these is Robert 
Holcot (d. 13^9)» another Englishman, who developed some of
the radical tendencies in Ockham*s thought. In his Commen-
2 6tary on the Sentences. Holcot also uses the principle of 
economy to slice out what seems unnecessary to him in the 
doctrine of grace and merit, seen from the perspective of 
God's potentla absoluta. Thus, God could dispense with the 
necessity for sanctifying grace and even accept purely nat­
ural actions as worthy of heavenCSent.. I, q. 1, art. b D). 
Here we see the Ockhamist use of potentla Del absoluta. which 
was by this time becoming conventional, but Holcot went even 
further by claiming that good dispositions and good works 
can by their own merits earn salvation if God chooses to 
accept them (Sent.. I, q. 1, art. 5 G and q. art 3 K). 
Holcot does attempt to protect himself by granting that God 
must accept a man's works in order for them to earn merltum 
de condigno, but this still allows natural actions an Intrin­
sic value that is totally foreign to Augustine or Thomas 
Aquinas. The importance of Holcot's attitude lies in this:
? 6See Gordon Leff, Bradwardlne and the Pelagians (Camb­
ridge, 1957), PP« 216-227 for pertinent passages from this 
text.
while never denying the validity of the present moral order 
or God's potentla ordlnata. he opens the new possibility
that even without grace, the sacraments, or even the Church,
God could elect a sinner if he wished to do so. Moreover,
even when he does return to the potentla Del ordlnata and the
law of revelation, Holcot introduces interpretations that 
would have horrified Augustine. An instance of this is Hol­
cot 's answer to the question, "Can man assisted by grace 
earn eternal life by his own full merit {ex condlgno)?" in 
his Super Llbros Saplentlae:
Now as to the original question, we can answer that 
the statement, man assisted by grace can earn eternal 
life by his own full merit, can be understood in two ways. 
It can be understood according to the natural value of 
man's action or according to its contracted value, Man 
would earn salvation according to natural value if his 
merit were, by its very nature and existence, such that 
eternal life would be suitable payment for it. According 
to contracted value, the value of one's merit would be 
determined by legal arrangement in the way that a small 
copper coin which, in natural value, has not the same 
weight or worth as a loaf of bread is assigned this value 
by the law of the land.
Now if we understand man's merit according to the 
first Interpretation, the natural goodness of our works 
does not earn eternal life fully (de condlgno) but only 
partially (de congruo), since it is appropriate that if 
a man has done all that he can with his finite resources 
God should reward him with His infinite resources.
But according to the second understanding of merit 
we can say that our works are fully worthy of eternal life, 
not because of any merit inherent in the acts themselves 
but because of grace, since our Lord has established that 
he who does good works in a state of grace shall receive 
eternal life. Therefore, through the law and grace of 
our ruler Christ we merit eternal life by our own full 
merit (de condlgno).
It is true, of course, that Holcot carefully preserves the
2?Reprinted in Oberman, p. 1^3*
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need for grace for actions to merit salvation under the 
present contract, but he has introduced qualifications of 
his own here. First, where is Augustine's lnltlum fidei, 
which had been everywhere preserved among orthodox thinkers 
and had, as we have seen, become an article of faith? 
Second, has the emphasis not shifted here from God to man? 
Grace is, to be sure, necessary for merltum de condlgno. 
b^t -the stress here is on the need for good works on the 
part of man. Now while this does not absolutely contradict 
Augustine and orthodox teaching, we can see here the de­
velopment away from grace and toward the efficacy of works 
which Eradwardine was to call "Modern Pelaglanism." This 
tendency is even more obvious when, later on in the same 
work, Holcot asserts that "according to God's established
law the pilgrim who does whatever he can to dispose himself
28for grace always receives grace." Or again, in his Com­
mentary on the Sentences. he claims that a contrite sinner 
can, by his sincere disposition alone, merit justification 
in the sense that God will respond to such human goodness 
by then electing the sinner to glory (Sent.. IV, q. 1, art. 
8 CC).
Still more extreme is the position taken by Adam of 
Woodham, an English Franciscan who studied under Ockham at 
Oxford, and who acclaimed his master as "brother William
2®Oberman, p. 1^9*
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Ockham, a Minor by his Order, but a major by the perspica-
29
city of his genius and the truth of his teaching." Yet 
Adam clearly goes beyond his master in his teaching on merit 
and grace, beginning with the now common proposition of 
God*s transcendently free potentla absoluta. Adam claims 
that this potentla Del absoluta can accept a sinner without 
any supernatural gift of grace preceding such acceptance.
The only thing that matters is that God wills to accept the 
sinner, for whatever reason, not that the sinner does or
3O
does not have sanctifying grace (Sent.. I, dist. 17* q. 1). 
Adam does add that God has ordained the requirement of pre­
cedent grace, but his insistence on divine freedom is so 
strong that it suggests little confidence in any stable re­
lation between God and man. This becomes clear when Adam 
argues that God can exercise his potentla absoluta to accept 
a sinner who, far from just lacking grace, is in a state of 
mortal sin (Sent.. I, dist. 17* q* 3)* On the other hand, 
a man can merit God*s acceptance de congruo because he is 
capable of this by his very nature, independently of grace 
(Sent., I, dist. 1, q. 10). Thus, where Augustine had 
taught that God rewards his own gift in us when we perform 
good works, Adam now claims that God rewards our actions for 
themselves. Adam never formally rejects the traditional
^Quoted by Gilson, p. 500.
•^Original texts in Leff, pp. 2^1-254.
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doctrine of grace as such, but what remains In his system 
is an immediate confrontation of the divine and human wills, 
a confrontation for which the habitus of grace has become 
irrelevant. As in Ockham, then, the attempt to assert God's 
freedom, even over the ordained moral law, has led to as­
serting an equally radical human freedom, a freedom from 
the necessity of grace as man stands alone with his works 
before God.
The growth and popularity of Ockhamlst theology was 
extremely widespread, first In England and at Paris, and 
then elsewhere on the continent. It would be impossible to 
document all of the evidence of this spread, but perhaps
one further example will help to show its pervasiveness.
31Uthred of Bolden (C. 1315-97). a little-known teacher in 
a provincial English priory, was censured by a commission 
appointed by Archbishop Langham for, among other things, 
holding some extreme Ockhamlst views. Uthred had read the­
ology at Oxford and absorbed the ideas and controversies of 
his day, without offering much of his own that was original. 
He probably would never have come to Langham's attention 
except that he became embroiled in a conflict with a Domin­
ican named William Jordan over a novel theory of Uthred's 
on final "clear vision" afforded a sinner before death.
David Knowles, "The Censured Opinions of Uthred of 
Boldon," Proc. Brit. Acad.. XXXVII (1950), 305-3^2.
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When the commission decided to investigate Uthred's ideas, 
however, it saw fit to look into some of his statements a- 
bout God's power, man's freedom, grace, merits, and justi­
fication. As recorded in Article XIV of the commission's 
report, Uthred claimed that grace is not an entity in itself; 
but rather a "relation" between God and man. Further, 
coming more directly to the point, the commission censured 
his opinions that men could merit eternal life ex purls 
naturallbus (Article XVII), that human nature possessed all 
the powers needed for salvation (Article XIX), and that a 
sinner always has the power to regain grace (in the sense 
of a proper "relation" to God) in this life (Article XX). 
These propositions are so clearly unorthodox that it is no 
surprise that they were firmly censured, but it is a sign 
of the pervasiveness of such ideas that Uthred was only in­
vestigated by a local commission. The implication of this 
is obvious: the papal commission at Avignon had time only
for really important and original heresies, not for an ob­
scure monk who taught ideas that were already widespread.
The Church's magisterlum was, nonetheless, clearly 
moving to bring pressure against at least the most extreme 
Ockhamlst tendencies; and the response from orthodox pro­
fessional theologians, scholarly maglstrl at Oxford, was 
not long in coming. It is also quite worth noting, I think, 
that the conservative reaction was essentially a return to
30
Augustinian theology on all fronts. Thus, Richard FitzRalph
(C. 1300-60), who read theology at Oxford during the early
enthusiasm for Ockhamism, remained a solid Augustinian and
later became a defender of conservative theology as the
02
Bishop of Armagh-; On the relation of works to grace, for 
example, FitzRalph criticizes the Scotist-Ockhamist emphasis 
on the role of will in merit and, though not excluding free 
will, he maintains that grace must first move the will to 
seek the good before a man can perform meritorious actions 
(Sent., I, q. 12, 8^ rb). Further, FitzRalph reverses the 
Ockhamlst tendency toward overstressing merltum de congruo, 
arguing that man's free will cannot generate grace by its 
own good actions; only God can create grace in man (Sent..
I, q. 11, a.2, 77 vb). Generally, however, FitzRalph did 
not engage significantly in the controversies over grace 
and merit, nor was he a thinker of great power or original­
ity. For such power and originality we must turn to the 
greatest adversary of Ockhamism in the whole period, Arch­
bishop Thomas Bradwardine (C. 1290-13^9), whose De Causa 
Del contra Pelaglum did more than any other single force to 
reassert the Augustinian doctrine of grace. His place in 
the thought-contest of the age is perhaps best summed up in 
his own description of his days at Oxford during the first
32
The best full-length study, with pertinent passages 
from original texts. Is Gordon Leff's Richard FitzRalph. 
Commentator of the Sentences: a Study in Theological Ortho­
doxy (Manchester. 1963)•
31
surge of Ockhamism:
I was at one time...while still a student of phil­
osophy, a vain fool, far from the true knowledge of God, 
and held captive in opposing error. From time to time 
I heard theologians treating of the questions of grace 
and freewill, and the party of Pelagius seemed to me 
to have the best of the argument. For I rarely heard 
anything said of grace in the lectures of the philoso­
phers, except in an ambiguous sense. But every day I
heard them teach that we are the masters of our own free 
acts, and that it stands in our power to do either good 
or evil, to be either virtuous or vicious, and such like. 
And when I heard now and then in church a passage read 
from the apostle, which exalted grace and humbled free­
will— such, for instance, as that word in Romans, ix.l6, 
"Therefore it is not in him that willeth, nor in him
that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy", I had no
liking for such teaching, for towards grace I was still 
graceless. I believed also with the Manichaians that 
the apostle, being a man, might possibly err from the 
path of truth in any point of doctrine. But afterwards, 
and before I had become a student of theology, the truth 
before mentioned struck upon me like a beam of grace.
It seemed to me as If I beheld in the distance, under a 
transparent image of truth, the grace of God as it is 
prevenient both in time and nature to all good works—  
that is to say, the gracious will of God, which pre- 
cedently wills that he who merits salvation shall be 
saved, and precedently works this merit in him,— God, 
in truth, being in all movements the primary Mover. 
Wherefore also I give thanks to Him who freely gave me 
this grace.33
In rather dramatic fashion, this sums up the conflicting 
forces of a whole age, here battling within the same man. 
Since their effects were so far-reaching, it will be worth 
our while to look at Bradwardine1s views in some detail.
His first point Is that all good works, including 
any a man might perform, come from God and can in no sense
^Quoted fey Herbert B. Workman, in John Wycllf: a Study
of the English Medieval Church. I (Oxford, 1926), 120-1Z1.
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be attributed to man himself (De Causa Del, p. 307)2^ This 
leads quite naturally to the inferences that (1) God is the 
sole agent in effecting a man’s salvation (De Causa Del, p. 
2*17), and (2) God alone moves the elect toward good actions 
since such actions cannot follow from one’s own natural in­
clinations (De Causa Del, p. 319)- Going even further, 
Bradwardine in effect rules out merltum de congruo altoge­
ther: not only are good works performed independently of
God impossible, but even good works prompted by precedent 
grace cannot merit sanctifying grace since for Bradwardine 
this would imply that man could control God (De Causa Del, 
p. 325). There is no half-way point in Justification. A 
man is either accepted by God or he is not: his actions
either merit de condlgno or they do not merit at all. To 
allow man an opportunity to cooperate with God’s first 
grace and thus earn the further gift of sanctifying grace, 
which was the position of Augustine, was out of the question 
for Bradwardine because this would suggest some claim that 
man might have on God. Consequently, in his efforts to vin­
dicate the necessity of grace from the teachings of the 
"Modem Pelagians," Bradwardine violated orthodox doctrine 
by the opposite extreme: where his opponents stressed
merltum de congruo, and therefore free will, over merltum
^All quotations and citations of De Causa Del are from 
the only printed edition, Henry Savile, ed. (London, 1618).
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de condlgno. Bradwardine insisted so heavily on the priority . 
of grace and merltum de condlgno that he excluded merltum 
de congruo altogether, denying any independent value to 
human acts. This may perhaps become clearer with an exam­
ple. Bradwardine*s theology eliminated the value of contri­
tion. If a man committed a sin and, at the prompting of 
God's grace, became genuinely sorry for his sin and prayed 
earnestly for forgiveness and reinstatement in God’s good 
(sanctifying) grace, this in traditional doctrine would be 
meritorious de congruo and likely to lead to God*s acceptance. 
Bradwardine excluded this possibility from his system, 
arguing that this would suggest a proportion between man's 
acts and God's. Only faith, the effect of grace not its 
cause, can justify the sinner; works are irrelevant in Brad­
wardine 's system ("sed sola fide sine onerlbus praecedentl 
sit homo lust us11 £pe Causa Dell] p. 39*0. The importance of 
this innovation has been well assessed by Gordon Leff:
Bradwardine has reached the point in his doctrine of 
grace where its entirely supernatural and unmerited 
character allows of no human action. He marks a break 
in kind, not merely in degree: for it is a logical
extension of his own teaching either to transfer belief 
into a personal and emotional experience, as Luther 
did; or, on the other hand, to establish a theocracy on 
the certainty of God's predetermined will, such as Cal­
vin was to found.35
The more immediate effects were no less profound, as we
shall now see in the controversial careers of Thomas
-^Leff, Bradwardine. pp. 85-86.
Buckingham (c .1300-c .1356) and John Wyclif (d.1384).
Buckingham's early work, represented by his Commen­
tary op the Sentences, shows a radical Ockhamlst tendency
that often goes beyond even Robert Holcot or Adam of Wood- 
36ham. On the subject of works, for example, Buckingham 
claimed that man could be good by nature without any habitus 
of sanctifying grace (Sent., q. 6). He, like the other 
Ockhamlsts, used God's potentla absoluta to destroy any 
fixed moral relation between God and man, but he went fur­
ther than most of the others by arguing that (1) grace and 
sin could coexist in the same soul, and (2) grace does not 
insure charity nor sin demand damnation (Sent., q. 6).
Faced with such indeterminacy, even a man in mortal sin 
could merit salvation de congruo If God chose to accept him 
(Sent.. q. 3* art. 2). This is Ockhamism pushed to the ex­
treme, but Buckingham has not yet said his last word. Soon 
after Buckingham produced this early work, Bradwardine»s De 
Causa Del appeared and transformed the whole debate. One 
way that we can measure Bradwardine»s effect on his contem­
poraries is to note the change in Buckingham's later work,
37the Questions. ,This tract was conceived as a response to
^Original texts of Buckingham's Cornmantft-rv on the Sen­
tences in Leff, Bradwardine. pp. 227-2*H •
•^Original texts of Buckingham's Questions In J. A. 
Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1966); 
see esp. pp. 65-6^.
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Bradwardine, but It quite significantly does not revert to 
Buckingham's earlier opinions. The Questions reveals a very 
moderate Augustinism, carefully rejecting Ockham on the one 
side and Bradwardine on the other. Buckingham now taught 
that grace always precedes merit and that good works cannot 
by themselves satisfy God, but only after they have been 
elevated by grace (merltum de condlgno). Still, he was also 
careful to preserve the value of man's free will, arguing 
that a man's disposition toward grace and the quality of 
his works may merit God's favor de congruo. though they are 
not themselves (naturalIter) sufficient for justification. 
The moderation of these views, therefore, is a tribute to 
the influence of Bradwardine who, though himself as extreme 
in one way as the Ockhamists were in another, so strongly 
reasserted Augustinian theology that he made a via media 
such as Buckingham's possible by the middle of the four­
teenth century.
The last figure we shall consider here was perhaps 
the most vigorous mind of the latter half of the century, 
John Wyclif. Wyclif also participated in the conservative 
response to Ockhamism and, as Thomas Netter of Walder re-
38
ported, "his disciples called him John son of Augustine."^ 
Besides this adherance to Augustine, Wyclif placed great 
value on Bradwardine and FitzRalph, whom he cited often as
-^Quoted by Workman, I, 119»
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contemporary authorities against their common opponents.
his opposition to the "Modern Pelagians" on questions of
grace and merit is accordingly severe, as is evident in the
following passage from De voluclone Del:
Yet it would be heretical and utterly profane to say 
that in God's co-operation with man through his grace, 
man’s acts are naturally prior to and more important 
than those of God through grace; but this is what seemed 
good to the Modern Pelagians to say, that man may pos­
sibly act without God's cooperating with him. And con­
cerning this they suggest that grace is an absolute and 
self-sufficient quality, so that by God's absolute, but 
not by his ordained power, man can merit without it.
And so they are ridiculously compelled to say that a 
man naturally performs meritorious acts before God works 
in him, on the ground that such acts can only be done 
by that man...and so, according to such people, manq 
could act without the grace of God working in him. y
As J. A. Robson points out, "However suspect other features
of Wyclif*s theology might be, his doctrine of grace was im-
40
peccably orthodox.11 The only thing that is "suspect" here 
is the premise from which his doctrine of grace is deduced, 
his extreme predestinarian view of God's relation to man for 
which he has become so famous in doctrinal history.
With Wyclif we come to the end of our examination 
of this long controversy, and it now remains to show how 
widely these ideas influenced the intellectual milieu of the 
fourteenth century as a whole. In such a project, it would 
be wrong to assume that because this was a theological
^Quoted by Robson, p. 211.
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Robson, p. 209•
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dispute, it was therefore too abstruse or too divorced from 
their everyday concerns to interest laymen much, if at all.
We must be careful not to infer a disinterest in technical 
theology in the fourteenth century from our experience of 
such a disinterest in a later age. William of Ockham, in a 
famous protest, once complained that Oxford theologians were 
constantly besieged with arguments and opinions from laymen 
and old women on such questions as necessity, contingency, 
and God's power. These theological disputes were not con­
fined to musty libraries or stuffy lecture halls, but were 
among the most pervasive intellectual interests of the later 
Middle Ages. The following chapters will examine much of 
the best poetry of the fourteenth century, none of which was 
written by Oxford schoolmen, but all of which shows how deep^ 
ly the controversies over grace and merit affected the ideas 
and values of the age.
In
Gulllelml de Ockham Opera Polltlca. Ill, ed. H. S. Offler 
(Manchester, 195^)» 231.
Chapter II: The Pearl-Poet
A decade ago, it might have "been necessary at this 
point to justify the analyses we are about to begin by 
arguing that, at least for medieval poetry, a study of 
theological doctrine is legitimate as literary criticism. 
Perhaps the question of how far a critic may extend his 
sphere into the area of “ideas" has not yet been settled, 
but judging from the kinds of studies of medieval literature 
that have appeared since the early 1950’s, the question no 
longer seems particularly Important, at least to medieva­
lists. Whatever one may think of the exegetical method
* 1developed by Robertson, Huppe, Kaske, and others, it has
excited such lively controversy and renewed such interest 
in the study of patristic and medieval theology among 
literary scholars that The Well Wrought Urn has largely 
been abandoned for the Patrologla Latina, and Archetypal 
Patterns in Poetry for the Vulgate and the Glossa Ordinarla.
■^ This method has been described in, for example, Dorothy 
Bethurum, ed. Critical Approaches to Medieval Literature (New 
York, i960). A recent judicious evaluation may be found In 
Paul Beichner, C.S.C., "The Allegorical Interpretation of 
Medieval Literature," PMLA. LXXXII (March, 1967). 33-38.
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There Is little reason for worry that stylistic criticism 
will he neglected, however, because of the growing interest 
in medieval rhetoric, long the province of a small band of 
scholars armed with the texts in Edmond Faral's Les Artes 
Po^tlaues du XIIe et du XIIIe Siecle, and now available to 
the nonspecialist as a result of the recent translation of 
Geoffrey de Vinsauf*s Indispensable Poetrla Nova.^  Still, 
even writers concerned primarily with stylistic analysis can 
scarcely afford to insulate medieval poets, even for the sake 
of critical method, from the intellectual and cultural 
elements of the medieval synthesis that the poetry struggles 
to articulate,. For poetry, no less than the encyclopedia 
or the summa, reflects the passion of the Middle Ages to 
unite all areas of human experience into a single, compre­
hensive system. This may seem foreign to our twentieth- 
century mind, which attempts to divide experience into 
specialized compartments for scientific analysis, and which 
has labored to divorce art from life, at least in several 
notable cases. But to apply this bias to fourteenth-century 
poetry would render sympathetic analysis impossible. With 
this in mind, the intent of this chapter, as well as of 
succeeding chapters, is to search out the responses in 
several important poems of the later fourteenth century to
 ^(Paris, 192*0.
^Trans. Margaret Nims (Toronto, 1967).
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the controversy over grace and merit described in the first 
chapter.
Most scholars now agree that the Pearl-noet wrote 
all of the poems found in the Cotton Nero A.x manuscript( 
and there is increasing evidence that he may have written
L
St. Brkenwald as well. This makes for a convenient assump­
tion because we can now study these poems as a group, but 
unity of authorship is not absolutely essential to the thesis 
I shall try to prove here. All that is necessary to assume 
is that these five works exhibit a general similarity of 
language and style, and that they are roughly contemporary 
with one another. Beyond this, all five poems provide exten­
sive evidence of interest in the same intellectual problems 
and remarkable agreement on approaches to these problems.
Most interpretations of Pearl in the past have 
focused on such questions as the nature and subject of the 
a l l e g o r y , ^ the genre to which the poem belongs,^ the Jewel
^See especially Henry L. Savage, ed. St. Erkenwald.
(New Haven, 1926), pp. liii-lxv.
-’Useful summaries of various theories regarding allegory 
may be found in E. V. Gordon, ed., Pearl (Oxford, 1953), 
pp.xi-xix and xxvli-xxix; and John Conley, "Pearl and a 
tost Tradition," JEGP. LIV (1955). 332-3^7.
^This is an old controversy which is not yet dead, 
as Dorothy Everett's intelligent analysis shows. See 
the essay on Pearl in her Essays on Middle English 
Literature, ed. Patricia Kean (Oxford, 1955)•
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symbolism, and the rhetorical function of the narrator.
Each of these has proved valuable in helping us to a better 
understanding and appreciation of the complexity and rich­
ness of the poem, and it is not my purpose to challenge any 
of them here. Surprisingly, there has been little discus­
sion of the doctrinal questions raised by the poem, and I 
have not been able to find any thoroughgoing effort to
relate the debate between the dreamer and the pearl-maiden
9
to the contemporary debate over grace and merit.
Many years ago, there was a theory, proposed
10
by Carleton Erown and supported by Walter Greene, that 
the narrator of Pearl is orthodox and the maid heretical 
in their views on the equality of heavenly rewards. Brown 
argued that the poet "is laboring to prove that, since sal­
vation is not a matter of merit but of grace, even a baptized 
child dying in Infancy will receive in the heavenly kingdom
^Robert J. Blanch, "Precious Metal and Gem Symbolism 
in Pearl," in Sir Gawaln and Pearl. Critical Essays 
(Bloomington, 19^6), pp. 86-97.
^Charles Moorman, "The Role of the Narrator in Pearl,1 
MP, LIII (November, 1955). 73-81.
^This is not to say, however, that no one has commented 
on this at all. See the pointed, though general, remarks 
in William H. Schofield's English Literature from the 
Norman Conquest to Chaucer (London. 1906). p. 101; and see 
Dorothy Everett’s essay (cited in note 6, above).
1 0Carleton F. Brown, "The Author of The Pearl. Considered 
in the Light of His Theological Opinions," PMLA,XIX (190^). 
115-153; Walter Kirkland Greene, "The Pearl— A New 
Interpretation," PMLA. XL (1925), 81^-827.
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a reward equal to that of the Christian who has lived a life
1 1of righteousness and holy works.” This is, according to 
Brown, a revival of the Jovinian heresy and represents a 
doctrine strongly opposed by all orthodox theologians of 
the Middle Ages. Interestingly, he uses Bradwardine as 
his standard of contemporary orthodoxy: "It will be ob­
served that the objections raised by the father to the no­
tion that a baptized child will receive equal reward with 
an adult entirely coincide with the views of Bradwardine—
12
in both, even the same verse of Scripture is appealed to."
Thus, the dreamer, who loses his argument with the heretical
maiden, provides a target through which the poet can also
strike Bradwardine.
Soon after Brown published his theory, Jefferson 
13E. Fletcher rejected it, pointing out evidence in the poem 
of a hierarchy in heaven (lines 885-888 and 1119)• Such 
a hierarchy depends on the common distinction between the 
objective reward that is given equally to all the elect and 
the subjective enjoyment of that reward, which differs from 
one individual to another according to their different 
merits. Fletcher sums up his argument by observing that the
1:1Brown, p. 132.
12
Brown, p. 136.
^"The Allegory of the Pearl," JEGP, XX (1921), 1-21. 
Another important defense of the poet's orthodoxy is Rene 
Wellek's "The Pearl: An Interpretation of the Middle
English Poem,." Studies in English. IV (1933)* 1-33*
poet
..........is not coneemed to edit the sooial register of
paradise* He is discussing only one issue in the 
problem of the divine reward of merit, namely, the 
comparative worth for salvation of the vicarious merit 
of Christ*8 sacrifice and of the direct individual 
merit of good works; and he decides in favor of the 
former. The example of the little child, bora in the 
faith and dying after baptism, is simply an extreme. 
cas au vlf of one saved by vicarious merit solely.1^
This seems to have solved the problem for scholars interested
in the Pearl-uoet*s doctrine of grace, if we may Judge by
the absence of any further studies that might have added
new insights into the dispute.
There is, nevertheless, another perspective from 
which we may view the question* Neither Brown nor Fletcher 
allows for an interaction between grace and meritorious 
works; they both split the problem in half, os if grace and 
works were mutually exclusive, and it were possible to 
choose only one or the other. But this is a false dicho­
tomy. Orthodox tradition from Augustine onward recognized 
a connection between grace and works, a connection so 
intimate that one is fruitless without the other. Thus, a 
more satisfactory account of the significance of the debate 
in Pearl will have to begin with the central issue of that 
debate: whether grace or works is more important in
meriting salvation.
*^Fletcher, p. 19*
Of the two, the poet does place greater emphasis 
on grace than on works, but only because the case is extra­
ordinary to begin with. The issue is not whether grace is 
required for salvation— both the dreamer and the maiden 
agree that it is— but whether works are needed to complement 
the power of grace in order to merit God's acceptance de 
condigno. The conclusion that "£e grace of God is gret 
innogh" does not exclude the value of works; it merely 
confirms the Church's traditional teaching that the saving 
grace of baptism (gratia gratum faciens) is sufficient to 
Justify a child who has not yet had the chance to perform
i
good works before dying. We may well ask, however, why 
the poet chose the extreme case that he did. Considering 
the fourteenth-century interest in the relation between 
grace and merit, this question is crucial in understanding 
both the poem and its place in late medieval thought.
Placed in this context, Pearl dramatizes a debate, 
similar to the Scholastic dlsputatlo. between the Ockhamist 
tendencies of the dreamer and the Augustinian conservatism 
of the pearl-maid. His stress on the importance of works 
leads to a doctrine of merltum de congruo. at least in 
some places in the poem, which she, with her overwhelming 
emphasis on grace, tends to Ignore, if not actually to 
eliminate. Further, the contemporary distinction between 
potentia Del absoluta and potentia Del ordinata underlies
k5
the arguments presented on both sides of the debate.
Even before the debate gets under way, moreover, 
there are clues to the dreamer’s Ockhamist leanings. In 
the fifth stanza, for example, he describes the predomi­
nance of his will over his intellect and rational Christian
1 *5teaching, thus introducing us to his voluntaristic scheme: ^
Bifore t»t spot my honde I spenned 
For care ful colde ]?at to me ca^t;
A deuely dele in my hert denned,
•Da 3 resoun sette myseluen sa3t.
I playned my perle fcat fcer wat3 spenned 
Wyth fyrce skylle3 fcat faste fa3t;
■Da 3 kynde of Kryst me comfort kenned,
My wreched wylle in wo ay wra^te.
(*+9-56)
After meeting Pearl, the dreamer assumes, on the basis
of sense experience, that she exists as a physical reality.
This may reflect the empirical bias of Oxford nominalism,
but whatever its source the maid chides him for it:
©ou says fcou trawe3 me in l>is dene,
Bycawse t>ou may wyth y3en me se.
(295-296)
No doubt, these passages can be explained in other ways, 
but when we see the further evidence of the dreamer’s 
Ockhamist tendencies, it seems not too far-fetched to see 
in the lines quoted above a preparation for the theological 
position of the dreamer.
Be this as it may, the Pearl goes on to be much 
more specific in her criticism:
•^All quotations are taken from Gordon’s edition (cited 
in note 5* above).
•I halde t>at iueler lyttel to prayse 
©at leue3 wel J>at he se3 wyth y3e,
And much to "blame and vncortayse 
■Dat leue3 oure Lord wolde make a ly^e,
©at lelly hy3te your lyf to rayse,
©a3 fortune dyd your flesch to dy3e.
3e setten hys worde3 ful westernays 
©at leue3 nofcynk "bot 3e hit sy3e.
And Jjat Is a poynt o sorquydry3e,
©at vche god mon may euel byseme,
To leue no tale be true to try3e 
Bot fcat hys one skyl may dem.
(301-312)
She is, of course, censuring his scepticism again, but this 
time she raises a new point. Is the dreamer, she asks, one 
of those modem! doc tor es who would argue that God is so 
completely free of his contract with man, established de 
potentia Del ordinata, that he cannot be relied on? that 
he could, de potentia Del absoluta, even lie to man? Such 
radical suggestions were not unusual in the fourteenth 
century, as the evidence presented in Chapter I shows.
By way of contrast, she constantly reaffirms the
stability of the present moral order, as in stanzas 26, 29,
38, and k2. She never rejects the concept of potentia Del
absoluta. but at the same time she insists that God would
never in fact violate what he has ordained as the proper
relation between himself and man:
Deme Dry3tyn, euer hym adyte,
Of ]ae way a fote ne wyl he wry£e.
(3^9-350)
Turning this argument to his own advantage, the dreamer 
suggests that her account of her state in heaven implicitly
*7
accuses God of violating the covenant with man, of being
unjust in rewarding the maid as he has:
'That cortayse is to fre of dede,
3yf hyt be soth £at fcou cone3 saye.
Sou lyfed not two 3er in oure fcede;
Sou cowl>e3 neuer God naufcer plese ne pray,
Ne neuer nawfcer Pater ne Crede;
And quen mad on i>e fyrst day!
I:may not traw, so God me spede,
■Dat God wolde wry]?e so wrange away.
Of countes, damysel, par ma fay,
Wer fayr in heuen to halde asstate,
Ofcer elle3 a lady of lasse aray;
Eot a quene! Hit is to dere a date.'
(481-^92)
Confused and upset, the dreamer has three alternatives open 
to him at this point: (1) Pearl is misrepresenting her­
self, though this would be hard to accept when he is faced 
by evidence to the contrary; (2 ) a child who has not earned 
any merit could become a queen in heaven; (3) God has, by
asserting his potentia absoluta over his potentia ordlnata.
overturned the usual standards of Justice. His problem, 
of course, is that he does want to afccept any of these.
In her reply, Pearl reassures him that God's word
and God's justice are absolute:
'£>er is no date of hys godnesse, '
Sen sayde to me i>at worfcy wy3te,
'For al is traw£e £at he con dresse,
And he may do nofcynk bot ry3t.
(^93-^96)
This contrasts sharply with the Ockhamist contention that 
God could, de potentia Del absoluta. even will that a man 
sin against the present moral law. Against Ockham's view 
that God's will is the sole determinant of what is right or
wrong, the maiden insists on a fixed moral order which hinds 
God as well as man. But even Bradwardine never would have 
tolerated such a restriction of God's freedom, though he 
would have agreed with her on the absoluteness of divine 
justice.
To support her case, she next leads into the heart 
of the poem, the parable of the workers in the vineyard.
Just as the men who came to work for the shortest time were 
paid equally with those who labored through the heat of the 
day, so also she, who lived only a brief life on earth, has 
been justly rewarded in heaven along with men and women who 
suffered through long lives. The Important thing, from her 
point of view, is not whether a man does or does not per­
form good works because no man's behavior is sufficiently 
meritorious to meet the full standard of God's justice 
(merltum de condigno) by his own efforts (ex purls natura- 
libus):
'More haf I joye and blysse hereinne,
Of ladyschyp gret and lyue3 blom,
■Ben alle J>e wy3e3 in be worlde my3t wynne 
By be way of ry^t to aske dome.
J (577-580)
While the dreamer cannot very well attack the parable it­
self, he shifts his tactics and produces a Scriptural text 
of his own to support his side:
Then more I meled and sayde apert:
'Me bynk by tale vnresounable.
Godde3 ry3t is redy and euermore rert,
Ober Holy Wryt is bot a fable.
In Sauter is sayd a verce cmerte 
Bat speke3 a poynt determynable:
”Bou quyte3 vchon as hys desserte,
Bou hy3e kyng ay pretermynable."
Now he J>at stod be long day stable,
And bou to payment com hym byfore,
•Benne be lasse in werke to take more able,
And euer be lenger be lasse, be more.1
(589-600)
It is true, as we have seen, that all medieval theologians 
gave some place to man's works in salvation. The real 
difference between Ockham and Bradwardine is not that one 
favored and one opposed the value of works; it is rather 
that Ockham emphasized man's potential for meriting sal­
vation de congruo. while Eradwardine virtually eliminated 
all but merltum de condlgno. In the passage just quoted, 
it is impossible to be certain about which kind of merit 
the dreamer is attempting to describe here. If God 
"quyte3 vchon as hys desserte,” how do we define the con­
ditions under which a man's works may merit such reward? 
What is man's "desserte”? Does the dreamer mean that his 
actions may have intrinsic value such that God will "quyte” 
him for them (ex natura rei deblta). or does God simply 
honor his commitment to reward a man to whom he has given 
the grace to merit heaven (ex debito lusticiae)? The 
dreamer's statements are not entirely clear on this point, 
but we may infer from his interest in the quantitative re­
lation between works and rewards that he is in any event 
unwilling to dispense with works. Furthermore, his
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asstimption that there is, or should be, a balance of pay­
ments between man and God implies that human actions have 
value independently of God's participation or partnership 
in them through grace (auxlllum gratlae), Though the 
dreamer does not appear to realize it, this borders suspi­
ciously on Pelagianism.
Pearl has already taken care to preserve meritum 
de congruo. as against Eradwardine1s tendency to ignore it 
in his system:
■By prayer may hys pyte byte,
Bat mercy schal hyr crafte3 kype.
(355-356)
Eut at the same time, she has also ruled out the possibility
that men's works merit salvation "Ey pe way of ry^t" (580).
While meritum de congruo may be possible, granting the
goodness and mercy of God, only meritum de condigno offers
real security that one will actually be among the elect.
This leads logically to her response to the dreamer:
'Of more and lasse in Gode3 ryche,'
Dat gentyl sayde, 'lys no joparde,
For per is vch mon payed inlyche,
Wheper lyttel oper much be hys rewarde;
For pe gentyl Cheuentayn is no chyche,
Queper-so-euer he dele nesch oper harde:
He laue3 hys gyfte3 as water of dyche,
Oper gote3 of golf pat neuer charde.
Hys fraunchyse is large pat euer dard 
To Hym pat mat3 in synne rescoghe;
No blysse bet3 fro hem reparde,
For pe grace of God is gret inoghe.
(601-612)
What matters here is not that the rewards given to men are 
equal, but rather that God has chosen to give rewards at
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all. Man has no claim on God by "ry3t.,, Only God's free 
gift of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens) can 
justify the sinner and make him acceptable to God. This 
is what Pearl shares with those who have been saved after 
having lived much longer than she: justifying grace alone
raises man out of the massa perdltlonls. This is proved 
from the fact that even those who have this gift of grace
are constantly slipping back into sin. If God were to
judge men by their works alone, no one would be saved.
Thus, she claims, the dreamer's objection is not to the 
point:
Eut now fcou mote3, me for to mate,
©at I my peny haf wrang tan here;
©ou say3 fcat I J)at com to late 
Am not worfcy so gret fere.
Where wyste3 fcou euer any bourne abate,
Euer so holy in hys prayere,
©at he ne forfeted by sumkyn gate
©e mede sumtyme of heuene3 clere?
“And ay fce of ter, fce alder t>ay were,
©ay laften ry3t and wro3ten woghe.
Mercy and grace moste hem ]?en stere,
For fce grace of God is gret inno^e.
(6 1 3- 621#-)
It is impossible that there be any real congruity between 
man's faltering actions and God's Justice, and so it is 
necessary that man be elevated to a state of grace (habitus 
gratlae) in which he may meet the standards that God has 
committed himself, de potentia Del ordinata, to accept as 
full (de condlgno) merit
In the following three stanzas, the maiden describes
how man first fell through Adam’s sin, thus requiring the 
justification brought about by Christ in order to be cap­
able of meritum de condlgno. She is quite careful to point 
out that, even now, God's good will is necessary for such 
merit to be achieved at all, thereby excluding semi-Pela- 
gianism:
Now is t>er no3t in fce worlde rounde 
Bytwene vus and blysse bot £at he wythdro^,
And £at is restored in sely stounde;
And fce grace of God is gret innoghe.
(657-660)
Even so, she is willing to allow a place to meritum de
congruo. A man in the state of sin may, through contrition
and repentance, perform well enough that God will send
him grace (gratia gratis data) to prepare himself for the
sacramental grace of penance that will restore the sinner
to God's friendship (gratia gratum faclens):
Grace innogh J>e mon may haue
©at synne3 fcenne new, 3if hym repente,
Bot wyth sor3 and syt he mot hit craue,
And byde fce payne £erto is bent.
Eot resoun of ry3t fcat con not raue 
Saue3 euermore fce innosent;
Hit is a dom Jsat God neuer gaue,
Bat euer fce gyltle3 shulde be schente.
Be gyltyf may contryssyoun hente 
And be bur3 mercy to grace 3?ry3t.
(661-670)
Here, as well as in the following stanza, Pearl disting­
uishes between two kinds of sinners: (1) those adults who, 
having committed sins by their free will, may only be admit­
ted back into saving grace through God's generosity, not 
by right; (2) those children who, though they share in the
general fallen state of man, have not performed any evil 
works by the time they die and are, therefore, "ay saf by 
ry3t" (68U). The point is that the "innocents" of the 
second group are in a special class of their own, one to 
which it is irrelevant to apply the question of merit at 
all. The maiden presupposes that, having been Justified 
by the purifying waters of baptism, such children have all 
that is required for salvation. Any merits on their part, 
were they capable of meritorious works, could not do any
more toward their being saved than baptism has already
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done, de potentia Dei ordlnata. This may take care of her 
own situation, but her function in the poem takes her much 
further. She has not only to convince the dreamer of the 
Justice of God's ways of dealing with man; she has also 
to teach a doctrine of grace and merit that will include 
him as an adult as well.
For a man who is not one of the "innocents," it 
is possible that he cooperate with God's will, as this has 
been described for man, de potentia Dei ordlnata. Thus, 
the man who wishes to be among the righteous should do what 
he can to avoid sin:
'The ry3twys man also sertayn 
Aproche he schal ipat proper pyle,
©at take3 not her lyf in vayne,
Ne glauere3 her nie3bor wyth no gyle.
(685-688)
But she also qualifies this, once again, by pointing to the 
impossibility of a man, even a very good man by ordinary
human standards, earning a heavenly reward by his own
merits alone:
'Anende ry3twys men 3et sayt3 a gome,
Dauid in Sauter, if euer 3e sy3 hit:
"Lorde, by seruaunt dra3 neuer to dome,
For non lyuyande to be is Justyfyet."
Forby to corte quen bou schal com 
©er alle oure cause3 schal be tryed,
Alegge be ry3t, b°u may *>e innome,
Ey bis like spech I haue asspyed.
(697-70^}
This is a doctrine so important in her theology that the 
maiden does not seem to tire of repeating it: man has no 
claim on God, but God has chosen to extend to his wayward 
creatures the free gift of sanctifying grace. Even though 
man may apply for divine mercy by offering his works as a 
sign of his good will, these may not Justify him. Only 
the grace which God has committed himself to provide to the 
righteous man is sufficient to merit heaven (ex deblto 
iusticlae rather than ex natura rei debita). Thus, though 
she has been careful to allow some place to works in the
salvation of adult Christians, the exigencies of her subject
lead her to give far greater emphasis to grace than to works. 
In order to defend her own state in heaven, she has had to 
argue that grace may save a baptized Christian independently 
of works. Now, the logic of her position forces her to ad­
mit the same of adult salvation: works have some place, 
ill-defined though it may be, but in the Judgment of God 
grace alone suffices.
The dreamer, however, is either unable or unwilling
to accept this teaching. For after seeing a vision of the 
New Jerusalem, he tries to swim the river separating him­
self from the heavenly city. This is a direct attempt to 
seize salvation by an act of the human will, which is out- 
and-out Pelagianism. Only after he has failed does the 
dreamer finally recognize the folly of his action. Man's 
works are— not only in theory, but also in practice— incap­
able of earning what does not belong to him by right. Only 
by humbly submitting himself to God's will, which has already 
expressed its gratuitous liberality toward man, may the 
dreamer have genuine hope of reward:
To J>at Prynce3 paye hade I ay bente,
And kerned no more ben wat3 me gyuen,
And halden me ber in trwe entent,
As be perle me prayed bat wat3 so frryuen,
As helde, drawen to Godde3 present,
To mo of his mysterys I hade ben dryuen;
Eot ay wolde man of happe more hente 
■Den mo3te by ry3t vpon hem clyuen.
Derfore my ioye wat3 sone toriuen,
And I kaste of kythe3 bat laste3 aye.
Lorde, mad hit arn bat agayn be stryuen,
Ober proferen be cnt agayn by paye.
(1189-1200)
The dreamer has at last come around to Pearl's point of 
view. Works are, in spite of the prevailing Ockhamist 
teachings of the day, ultimately irrelevant if it is not 
the "Prynce3 paye.”
In all this, then, there is clear evidence of the 
poet's response to the fourteenth-century debate over grace 
and merit. Though it would surely be a grave injustice to 
the poet to reduce his marvelous poetry to a prosaic dis-
cussion of theology, it is not possible to understand the 
dialectic tension which organizes the poem except through 
its central doctrinal theme. Nor would it be possible to 
understand how Pearl is itself a significant contribution 
to the controversy, steering as it does a course between 
the extremes of Ockham and Bradwardine. Like both of these 
thinkers, the Pearl-poet stresses the ultimate power and 
authority of the divine will: but unlike Ockham, he rejects 
works as either justifying in themselves or even likely to 
evoke God's acceptance, de potentia absoluta: and unlike 
Bradwardine, he is willing to grant limited value to 
meritum de congruo. The poem is nevertheless, basically 
conservative in its overriding emphasis on God's grace, 
though this may be attributed partly to the subject of the 
poem and not to the poet himself, as his other poems show.
Norman Davis claims that Pearl "differs conslder-
16ably" from the other poems in the manuscrlpt-group, and 
he is quite right if we consider stylistic matters alone. 
But an investigation of the thematic content of these poems 
reveals a striking coherence in the development of the 
doctrine of grace and merit through them all. The rest of 
this chapter, therefore, will examine the ways in which 
the doctrine presented in Pearl receives further qualifi­
cation and refinement in Purity. Patience. Sir Gawaln and 
the Green Knight, and, because of mounting evidence of 
common authorship, St. Erkenwald.
1^J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon* ed. Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1967], pT TxlTl.------
The old interpretation of Purity as a collection 
of poetic glosses on several disconnected Biblical narra­
tives has long since been overturned by Gollancz and Menner,1? 
but the full extent of the poem's thematic unity has yet 
to be understood. Among others, one of the most important 
themes in the poem is its doctrine of works, which nicely 
balances the doctrine of grace in Pearl. But even though 
the poet places a greater emphasis on works in Purity than 
in Pearl. it is also clear here that such good works derive 
their motive and value from prevenient grace. Thus, while 
Pearl develops the theme "be grace of God is gret innogh," 
Purity complements it by dramatizing the importance of man's 
response to God, thereby preserving a delicate balance 
between the two.
Accordingly, in the parable from Matthew describing
the guests at the wedding feast, the poet finds in the
clothes of the guests a symbol for the good works a man
must "wear" if he is to be acceptable to God:
Wich a m  benne by wede3 bou wrappe3 be inne,
©at schal schewe hem so schene, schrowde of be best?
Hit arn by werke3 wyterly, bet bou wro3t haue3»
& lyued wyth be lykyng bet ly3e in Ipyn hert,
©at bo be frely & fresch fonde in by lyue,
& fetyse of a fayr forme to fote & to honde,
& syben alle by*i ober lyme3 lapped ful clene;
•Denne may bou se by sauior & his sete ryche.
(169-176)
17Israel Gollancz, ed. Cleanness (London, 1921), p. xv.
R. J. Menner argues the same view in his edition, Purity (New 
Haven, 1920). All quotations from the poem will be from 
Gollancz's text.
This is not yet sufficiently precise for us to determine 
whether these good works that the Christian must "put on" 
in order to be acceptable to God are (1) merita de congruo, 
prompted by gratia gratis data and generously accepted (ex 
natura rel debita), or (2) merita de condigno, possible 
only through gratia gratum faciens and accepted according 
to the divine contract with man (ex deblto lustlolae).
The poet begins to clarify his position for us
further on when, commenting on the Flood, he remarks that
good works are valueless unless a man has been lifted out
of sin by grace:
For is no segge vnder sunne so seme of his crafte3,
If he be sulped in synne bat sytte3 vn-clene;
On spec of a spote may spede to mysse
Of be sy3te of be souerayn bat sytte3 so hy3e.
(5^9-552)
Absolute sinlessness is necessary for divine acceptance and, 
since a man in sin might merit de congruo but not de condigno, 
the poet is evidently commenting on the requirement for man 
to meet the full standard of God's justice only through 
meritum de condigno.
In the very next section of the poem, however, the 
poet hastens to protect himself from the extreme of Brad­
wardine, pointing out that a man may also merit de congruo. 
For at least in certain cases when one's heart is "honest 
and hoi," God may choose to extend his generosity to the 
sinner:
& bere he fynde3 al fayre a freke wyth-lnne 
Wyth hert honest & hoi, bat habel he
and again,
A lie pyse ar teches & tokenes to trow vpon 3et,
& wittnesse of pat wykked werk, & pe wrake after 
■©at oure fader forperde for fylpe of pose ledes:
©enne vch wy3e may wel wyt pat he pe wlonk louies.
& if he louyes clene layk pat is oure lorde ryche,
& to be coupe in his courte pou coueytes penne,
To se pat semly in sete & his swete face,
Clerrer counsayl con I non, bot pat pou clene worpe.
(10^9-56)
The poet follows this up, clarifying his doctrine of meritum 
de congruo even further, by drawing an analogy with Jean 
de Meun's section of the Roman de la Rose, How should a 
man behave in order to win God’s grace? He should act to­
ward God as a lover does toward his lady in order to win 
her favor: try to imitate her actions so that she will 
love her suitor for his likeness to herself. So also with 
God, who is likely to reward a "suitor” who strives to 
imitate the behavior of Christ:
For so Clopyngnel in pe compas of his clene Rose,
©er he expoune3 a speche, to hym pat spede wolde,
Of a lady to be loued,— loke to hir sone
Of wich beryng pat ho be , & wych ho best louyes,
& be ry3t such in vch a bor3e of body & of dedes,
& fol3 pe fet of pat fere pat pou fre haldes;
& if pou wyrkkes on pis wyse, pa3 ho wyk were,
Hir schal lyke pat layk pat lyknes hir tylle.
If pou wyl dele drwye wyth dry3tyn penne,
& lelly louy py lorde & his leef worpe,
©enne confourme pe to Kryst, & pe clene make,
©at euer is polyced als playn as pe perle seluen.
‘ ' (1057-68)
It is important to notice here that there is no reference
to God’s cooperation with man during the process of the
"courtship;” nor is there evidence that a man’s behavior
could have a full claim on God's acceptance. In terms of 
the analogy itself, God's will is, like a beautiful 
woman's, the sole determinant of success in the relationship. 
All a man may do is to offer his sincere efforts, which 
are meritorious de congruo. and hope that the divine will 
may prove less capricious than a lady's.
Carrying this doctrine a step further, the poet 
argues that even Christians who have lost sanctifying grace 
through their own sinful actions are not altogether lost.
A repentant sinner, by virtue of his sorrow for his past
behavior, may merit (de congruo) the grace (gratia gratis 
data) to motivate him to receive the sacrament of penance.
If he so chooses, this will restore him to God's friendship 
(gratia gratum faclens) and permit him to earn merit (de 
condigno) toward his salvation:
Hov schulde pou com to his kyth bot if pou clene were?
Nov ar we sore & synful & sovly vch one;
How schulde we se, pen may we say, pat syre vpon throne?
3is, pat mayster is mercyable, pa3 pou be man fenny,
& al to-marred in myre whyle pou on molde lyuyes;
©ou may schyne pur3 schryfte, pa3 pou haf schome 
serued,
& pure pe with penaunce tyl pou a perle worpe.
(1110-16)
This is, moreover, completely a matter of man's free choice. 
There is none of Bradwardine's or Wyclif’s predestinarlan 
theology in Purit.v: man's ultimate election or rejection 
by God is simply not an issue here. What is significant, 
according to the poet, is that man is, de potentia Dei ordi- 
nata. free either to apply for God's mercy or to turn away
toward "ober goddes" (1161-68 and 1225-32)* Yet even this 
freedom, one of the absorbing interests of the poet, does 
not obviate his belief that all goods, including meritor­
ious works, flow ultimately from God in some mysterious 
fashion:
Who-so wolde wel do, wel hym bityde,
& quos deth so he de3yred, he dreped als fast;
Who-so hym lyked to lyft, on lofte wat^ he sone,
& quo-so hym lyked to lay, wat3 lo^ed bylyue.
(16^7-50)
Thus, the poet may not escape the fourteenth-century volun­
tarism that balanced an emphasis on man’s will with an even 
greater stress on God’s will, the final criterion of all 
value. With this in mind, the poet ends his work with a 
prayer for grace, which he implies is a condition sine qua 
non for a man to do well:
©at we gon gay in oure gere, his grace he vus sende, 
©at we may serue in his sy3t, be** solace neuer blynne3
(1811-12)
Such was the pressure on religious thinkers of the time
that such a poem as Purity, concentrating as it does on
man's response to God through works, had to conclude with
this reassurance that the poet's attitudes toward grace
were, after all, thoroughly orthodox.
1 ATurning now to Patience, we see still another 
representation of the late medieval conflicts over God’s
l®Edited by Israel Gollancz (London, 1913)* All quota­
tions are from this edition.
will, man's freedom, grace, and merit. For Jonah, the prin­
cipal character in the poem, is a rehel, again and again 
questioning the ways of God toward men. Consequently, while 
Pearl presents the case for justifying grace and Purit.v for 
good works, Patience explores the complicated theology of 
divine willing— the grand passion that sooner or later 
seduced all the best minds of the fourteenth century.
In the first part of the narrative, Jonah seeks to 
escape the power of God's will by fleeing his responsibili­
ties. Then, when God searches him out even on the high 
sea, far from his native land, and thrusts him into the "hell" 
of the whale's stomach, Jonah finally turns submissively 
toward God, praying for release. Such a release, however, 
involves nothing less than God, de potentia absoluta. over­
ruling his just punishment of Jonah, which had been willed 
de potentia ordinata. For the poet clearly states that, to 
save Jonah from inevitable death, God must suspend natural 
law:
For nade fce hy^e heuen-kyng, £ur3 his honde my3t,
Warded J>is wrech man in Warlowes gutte3,
What lede mo3t lyue bi lawe of any kynde,
©at any lyf my3t be lent so longe hym wyth-inne?
(257-260)
It may be, as I shall argue here, that this section of 
Patience is an allegory of man's relation to God; or more 
specifically, an allegory of the sinful man requiring 
justification. Man has chosen to alienate himself from 
God's friendship, and God has justly abandoned him to the
’’hell" of the whale's belly. The only hope that man has 
left is to pray that God might withhold vengeance, over­
ruling the ordinary standards of divine justice:
& per he lenged at pe last, & to pe Lede called:—
'Now, Prynce, of py prophete pite pou haue!
■Ba3 I be fol & fykel, & falce of my hert,
De-woyde now py vengaunce, pur3 vertu of rauthe;
Tha3 I be gulty of gyle, as gaule of prophetes,
©ou art God, & alle gowde3 ar graypely pyn owen;
Haf now mercy of py man & his mys-dedes,
& preue pe ly3tly a lorde in londe & in water.'
(281-288)
Realizing that his own merit cannot measure up to the stan­
dard of God's expectations, Jonah beseeches God to assert 
his potentia absoluta to "de-woyde" his punishment. Thus, 
according to the poet, the sinner may be condemned de poten­
tia Del ordlnata. yet his situation is never hopeless so 
long as he can appeal to the potentia Dei absoluta:
& 3et I sayde, as I seet in pe se-bopem,—
"Care-ful am I kest out fro py cler y3en,
& deseuered fro py sy3t, 3et surely I hope 
Efte to trede on py temple, & teme to py seluen."
(313-316)
And even more pointedly, he is sure that such an appeal
will be granted by the all-merciful God:
•Bou schal releue me renk, whil py ry3t slepe3#
■Bur3 my3t of py mercy, pat mukel is to tryste.
(323-32*0
Without further qualification, this could well be the Pela­
gian doctrine that Bradwardine accused the Ockhamists of 
holding. For it is fundamental to Ockhamist theology, as 
we have seen in Chapter I, that works which could at best 
only merit de congruo could be accepted de potentia Del
6U>
absoluta if God were favorably disposed toward the sinner.
But the poet here guards Patience against such a charge 
by almost immediately adding that works without grace (habi­
tus gratlae) are incapable of rising above sin:
I haf meled wyth hy maystres mony longe day,
Bot now I wot wyterly, fcat hose vnwyse ledes 
•Dat affyen hym in vanyte & in vayne fcynges.
For blnk hat mountes to no3t, her mercy forsaken.
(329-332)
Jonah is only saved, presumably, because he sees the error 
of his disobedience and the need to repent. Still, the 
doctrine of grace is somewhat ambiguous. Does the poet 
suggest that even those whose lives are dedicated to "vanyte" 
might, like Jonah, also appeal to the ultimate court of God's 
mercy and potentia absoluta? The poet does not explicitly 
say so, but the logic of his position thus far would seem 
to commit him to such a notion of meritum de congruo in 
spite of his effort to affirm his orthodoxy on grace.
In the next major section of the poem, Jonah tempor­
arily repudiates what he has Just learned from his own 
experience with God's infinite mercy. For when the people 
of Nineveh, who have incurred the divine wrath, make the 
same prayer that Jonah had made earlier— that they be saved 
from God's Judgment against them— they appeal to the potentia 
Dei absoluta. Thus, their king argues,
What wote ofcer wyte may, 3if he vyje lykes,
Dat is hende in |>e hyot of his gentryse?
I wot his my3t is so much, 1»3 he be mysse-payed,
Dat in his mylde amesyng he mercy may fynde.
& if we leuen he layk of oure layth synnes,
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& stylle steppen in pe sty^e he sty3tle3 hym seluen,
He wyl wende of his wodschlp, & his wrath leue,
& for-gif vus pis gult, 3if we hym God leuen.1
(397-W)
The people then respond to their king's urging, and we may
measure the success of their good works of "penaunce" (not
the sacrament, since this is an Old Testament event) by
the following comment:
■Denne al leued on his lawe & laften her synnes;
Par-formed alle pe penaunce pat pe prynce radde;
& God pur3 his godnesse forgef as he sayde;
•Da 3 he dper bihy3t, wyth-helde his vengaunce.
(405-^08)
This is, as in the case of Jonah's rescue from the whale, 
an explicit affirmation of the doctrine that meritum de 
congruo may so appeal to God's generosity that he may elect 
sinners, de potentia absoluta. Whether this is actually 
Pelagian is, for our purposes here, less important than 
the fact that conservatives like Eradwardine and Wyclif 
Interpreted it as such. Furthermore, as we have seen 
earlier, this combination of meritum de congruo with the 
emphasis on God's potentia absoluta— that is, God's freedom 
to transcend even his own ordinances and judgments— was 
characteristic of the Ockhamist theologians of the four­
teenth century.
Jonah demonstrates that he has not yet learned his 
lesson, however, and rages against God for being merciful 
toward the sinners of Nineveh. The final section of the 
poem, then, serves to teach Jonah once again not to question
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God*s will and reiterates Jonah*s own moral responsibili­
ties. Accordingly, God chastizes him:
"Herk, renk, is bis ry3t so ronkly to wrath.
For any dede J»at I haf don o|>er demed J>e 3et?*
-if.32)
God's infinitely powerful, infinitely free will, whosa ways 
so far transcend man*s understanding that it is idle to 
question them, is the sole criterion of value, the sole 
determinant of what is right or wrong. This is the teaching 
of Ockham and, a century and a half later, of Luther a6 
well. While Patience seems dwarfed in the company of these 
two giants in Western thought, it nevertheless contributed, 
however modestly, to the tradition that linked the two.
At first reading. Sir Gawaln and the Green Knight, 
the final poem in the manuscript, may not appear to fit in­
to the thematic development we have been tracing through 
the other poems. Sir Gawaln is the greatest courtly romance 
in English, and our interest in its vivid action, its 
remarkable descriptive imagery, its skillful adaption of 
Old French rhetorical patterns, its "lnf-danger," and its 
famous plot construction, which is perhaps unsurpassed by 
anything else in medieval literature except Dante's 
Cftimnedla— »all these have obscured the serious theological 
implications in the poem. Only recently have scholars 
begun to explore such problems as the two confession
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s c e n e s ,-19 the precise nature of Gawaln's sin,^® and. the
? 1problem of grace and merit, though this last point has 
not yet received sufficient attention. It seems appropri­
ate, therefore, to continue the work of these scholars by 
investigating the relation of Sir Gawaln to the contempo­
rary dispute over will, merit, and grace.
Before proceeding to this theme, which is really 
secondary in Sir Gawaln in a way that it was not in the 
other poems in the manuscript, it is necessary first to 
understand what I take to be the primary theme of the poem, 
the moral conflict between carltas and cupldltas. This 
conflict takes place on three levels: (l) the supernatural
powers of the Virgin and Morgan la Fey, both struggling to 
win Gawain; (2) the materialistic values of courtly society 
in opposition to the moral idealism of Christianity; (3) 
the contradiction within Gawain himself, produced by his 
having uncritically accepted irreconcilable value systems, 
which he only gradually becomes aware of in the poem. All 
three are, of course, related in the sense that their com­
mon point of reference is Gawaln himself, but it is
^John Burrow, "The Two Confession Scenes in Sir Gawaln 
and the Green Knight.'1 MP, LVII (1959). 73-79.
20David Farley Hills, "Gawaln's Fault in Sir Gawaln and 
the Green Knight." RES. N.S., XIV (1963), 12^131.
21
Larry S. Champion, "Grace Versus Merit in Sir Gawaln 
and the Green Knight." MLQ. XXXVIII (December, I967), 513- 
525.
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important for us to recognize also that the poet goes beyond 
the psychological limits of Gawain’s personality to a cri­
ticism of the value-structure of the late medieval world.
For Gawain, thus understood, is everyman, or at least what 
everyman might be, granted Gawain’s intelligence, sensiti­
vity to moral issues, and experience.
Shortly after being welcomed into Bercilak's castle,
Gawain is escorted to a bed chamber whose lavish decoration
22signals the temptation to cupidity to come:
. . .  a bry^t boure, per beddyng watz 
noble,
Of cortynes of clene sylk wyth cler golde hemmez,
And couertorez ful curious with comlych panez 
Of bry^t' blaunner aboue, enbrawded bisydez,
Rudelez rennande on ropez red golde ryngez,
Tapitez ty^t to pe wo3e of tuly and tars,
And vnder fere, on pe flet, of fol3ande sute.
(853-859)
During the three temptation scenes, which are set in this 
"bry^t boure,1' Gawain slowly comes to understand the con­
flict between the values of "cortaysye" and charity (e.g., 
920-927 and 177^-76). It is important to recognize here 
that there are two really distinct temptations: (1) the
beheading game, instigated by Morgan la Fey to humiliate 
Arthur through his most chivalrous knight; (2) the sexual 
temptations by Lady Bercilak, who was prompted by her hus­
band to try to seduce Gawain, as we learn at the end of the 
poem (2358-63). These two plots account for Gawain’s two
22A11 quotations are from the Tolkien and Gordon edition, 
as revised by Davis; see note 15, above.
sins, his virtual adultery with his host's wife and his 
'cowarddyse and couetyse" in taking the green girdle and 
breaking the pact with Bercilak. Further, as we shall ex­
amine in greater detail later, the two plots also necessi­
tate the two confessions, one to the priest for his sin 
against chastity, and the other to Bercilak-Green Knight 
for his "sin" against the chivalric code. Both of these 
plots thus describe Gawain seduced to cunldltas. what 
Augustine defined as an excessive concern for one's physi­
cal state here in this world, but only the bedroom scenes 
involve any direct violation of the Christian code as such. 
The importance of this has been generally overlooked in the 
past, and since the moral issue in these scenes will be 
crucial to our study of grace and merit in the poem, let 
us glimpse briefly Into the actions and implications of this 
plot.
Contrary to common Christian teaching, Gawain sins
against chastity by allowing himself to be exposed to the
proximate occasion of sin on the second and third mornings. 
On the first day, Gawain may be excused on the ground that
he could not have known that Lady Bercilak was coming to
his chamber, but this is not true on the succeeding mor­
nings. Gawain is trying to play a dual role here: he
strives to avoid actual physical intercourse with her, yet 
at the same time his vanity over his "cortaysye" will not 
permit him to send her away. When he goes so far as to
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actually kiss and embrace her as the two lie together in 
his bed on the third day, special grace from the Virgin 
Mary— and this grace alone— keeps Gawain from culminating 
the affair. But what is essential to keep in mind here, 
what virtually never has been recognized in print, is that 
such action on Gawain’s part is itself mortally sinful; in­
deed, it is scarcely less sinful than the physical act of
adultery would have been, according to the standards of the
23time as represented in Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale.  ^Perhaps 
even more significant, however, is the dubious morality of 
the host and his wife. They cannot claim immunity from 
criticism by claiming to have been under Morgan’s influence 
in this plot, for it was their own idea to test Gawain's 
chastity. Bercilak and his lady are, in the moral structure 
of the work as a whole, a court panderer and his courtesan 
trying to destroy a Christian soul under the guise of love 
and openness. It is not possible to investigate all of the 
implications of this here. All we may conclude at this 
point is that the poem is organized around a searching 
analysis of the contradictory values that existed side by 
side, usually without question, in late medieval society.
The primary theme is in turn related to a secondary 
one, the problem of grace and merit. For just as all of 
the major action of the poem dramatizes the conflict
23See especially the Remedlum contra pecoatum luxurie,
* * Ge?ffrey
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between carltas and cupldltas. so also now we must ask how 
a Christian may avoid sin and merit salvation. Furthermore,
we must try as well to discover the relationship between
Sir Gawain and the other poems in Cotton Nero A.x in terms 
of this same theme.
Despite Gawain*s ability to act as an ideal
Christian knight, seen again and again in the poem, we are
never permited to overlook his dependence on God. In many
cases, this is done simply by little reminders that Gawain
is only capable of such success "as God wyl" (5^9. 592-593.
737-739. 773-776, 1063. 1967. 2208-9, 2480). Eut more
significant, to take one example, is the following passage
describing Gawain*s prayer for deliverance from the wintry
wilderness through which he has been traveling:
And perfore sykyng he sayde, *1 beseche pe lorde,
And Mary, pat is myldest moder so dere,
Of sum herber per he3ly I my^t here masse,
Ande py matynez to-morne, mekely I ask,
And perto prestly I pray my pater and aue
and crede.’
He rode in his prayere,
And cryed for his mysdede,
He sayned hym in sypes sere,
And sayde 'Cros Kryst me spede!'
Nade he sayned hymself, segge, bot prye,
Er he watz war in pe wod of a won in a mote,
Abof a launde, on a lawe, loken vnder bo3ez 
Of mony borelych bole aboute bi pe diches:
A castel pe comlokest pat euer kny3t a3te.
(753-767)
The poet is obviously suggesting an almost automatic cause- 
effect relationship between the prayer and God*s response.
Presumably, Gawain might have wandered all night amid the 
snow drifts and icicles if he had not called upon God's 
mercy.
Far more important, however, is the divine inter­
vention, through Mary since Gawain is her knight, in the 
third bedroom scene. In this case, the poet is quite 
Insistent that Gawain could not have saved himself by his 
own effort. He has allowed his passion such liberty that 
only a special act of potentla Del absoluta can save him 
from further sin:
Gret perile bitwene hem stod,
Nif Mare of hir kny3t mynne.
(1768-69)
Again, when his guide tempts him not to go to the green 
chapel to keep his appointment, Gawain reaffirms his com­
plete dependence on the absolute will of God:
Ful wel con Dry3tyn sehape 
His seruauntez for to saue.
(2138-39)
Such an attitude is quite reminiscent of Patience, with its 
concern for how God controls the destinies of his creatures 
so absolutely that he may even overturn his own laws to 
save them if he wishes. Gawain expresses the same faith 
here, faced as he is with the extraordinary threat of the 
Green Knight, as did Jonah, who was also threatened by an 
unusual peril in the whale's belly. Gawain even repeats 
his affirmation of faith in God's potentia absoluta before 
arriving at the green chapel:
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*Bi Goddez self,' quop Gawayn.
*1 wyl nauper grete ne grone;
To Goddez wylle I am ful bayn.
And to hym I haf me tone.*
(2156-59)
So far. his own actions do not seem to count for much, at
least In contrast to God's omnipotent will.
This does not mean, however, that Gawain has no
responsibility of his own. The poet reminds us at several
crucial points that Gawain must work to merit the grace he
needs. No one knows the ways of the divine will; all a man
can do is to try to do well. By thus offering his good works
to God, a Christian may hope for some reward:
i)e kny3t mad ay god chere,
And sayde, *Quat schuld I wonde?
Of destines derf and dere 
What may mon do hot fonde?*
(562-565? cf. 2208-11)
Gawain is not talking here about a blind, impersonal Fortune,
but rather about man's need to act in order to try to shape
his own destiny, as far as possible. This is more clearly
defined, and more clearly related to merltum de congruo. in
the description of how God preserved Gawain from death or
injury during his Journey:
Nade he ben dujty and dry3e, and Dry3tyn had serued, 
Douteles he hade ben ded and dreped ful ofte.
(72^-725)
To be sure, God does assist Gawain, and without that assis­
tance Gawain would not have survived. But we also learn 
that Gawain's own actions merited that assistance, even 
that the divine aid would not have come at all had it not 
been for his efforts. The same point comes up once more in
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his initial rejection of any presents from the lady:
And he nay |»t he nolde neghe in no wyse 
Naufcer golde ne garysoun, er God hym grace sende 
To acheue to t>e chaunce }>at he hade chosen fcere.
(1836-3 8)
The fact that he later does accept the girdle is irrelevant 
to the doctrine presented here. The poet's point is that, 
while Gawain's success depends on God's grace, this grace 
itself depends on Gawain proving himself worthy of it, or 
merltum de congruo.
Later, when he is about to leave Bercilak's castle
to seek the Green Knight, Gawain speaks of how a man must
act in order to earn his heavenly reward:
3if £ay Tor charyte cherysen a gest,
And halden honour in her honde, J>e hat>el hem ^elde 
■Dat haldez l>e heuen vpon hy^e, and also yow alle!
(2055-57)
This speech, part of his expression of gratitude for the 
hospitality he has received, could well be taken as a 
gloss on the parable of the Good Samaritan. He interprets 
his hosts' motive as charity, and whether it was that or 
not is beside the point. Charity, he reasons, has a claim 
on God, who will reward it with salvation— or at least this 
is what Gawain hopes. Thus, in this as in the preceding 
cases, the poet promotes a doctrine of merltum de congruo. 
based on the belief In man's ability to perform good works 
and God's willingness to accept them.
The corolary to this is, of course, that man can 
also use his freedom to fall from grace. An instance of
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this occurs on the evening of the second day. Gawain now 
cannot help but know the lady's intention to seduce him, 
but he is willing to play his game of "cortaysye" with her 
nonetheless:
Such semblaunt to bat segge semly ho made
Wyth stille stollen countenaunce, bat stalworth to 
plese,
-Dat al forwondered watz be wy3e, and wroth with 
hymseluen,
Bot he nolde not for his nurture nurne hir a^aynefc,
Bot dalt with hir al in daynt£, how-so-euer pe dede 
turned
towrast.
(1658-63)
Disturbed though his moral sensibilities are, Gawain chooses 
to continue in his courtly role no matter what the conse­
quences might be.
Finally, the poet clearly seems to intend that we 
admire Gawain as a model Christian knight, one in whom we 
may see homo viator struggling along the perilous route to 
the heavenly Jerusalem. Just as the doctrine of works in 
Purity balances the insistence on grace in Pearl, so also 
the view we have of man's will in Sir Gawain complements 
the overwhelming significance of God's will in Patience.
This does not mean that the Gawain-poet has polarized the 
doctrine of works and grace into a two-valued option, imply­
ing that man can function altogether without grace. Man's 
will, in Sir Gawain. may choose evil by virtue of its free­
dom (liberum arbltrlum).,but it cannot likewise choose the 
good without some assistance from God. This is somewhat
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complicated because God’s assistance, in the form of grace, 
differs in kind and function at different points in the 
poem. In the early action, before the second and third 
temptation scenes, Gawain enjoys a state of sanctifying 
grace (gratia gratum faclens). in terms of which his actions 
may merit God's attention de condigno. Eut after Gawain, 
fully realizing the consequences of his action, turns toward 
satisfying his own desires in opposition to charity, the 
only grace available to him— the only grace that could 
coexist with sin— is a free gift by which God prods the 
sinner to repent (gratia gratis data). The poet does allow 
considerable scope to meritum de congruo: more than in
Pearl, though perhaps less than in Purlty and Patience.
The only problem that remains, so far as this anal­
ysis is concerned, is with the two confession scenes. Some 
have argued that the first (sacramental) confession is 
false, ^  but this assumes that Gawain's cowardice with the 
green girdle is mortally sinful, thereby invalidating his 
confession to the priest (l8?6-84). This assumption is not 
supported by the text, however, since there is no mention 
whatsoever of the content of Gawain's discussion of his 
sins with the priest. Judging from his relief after receiv­
ing the sacrament (1885-88), and from the poet’s statement 
that the priest "asoyled" the knight (1883)* it seems more
^For example, see Champion, p. 423.
reasonable to believe that the confession includes at least 
all mortal sins that the knight had committed. From what 
we have seen, these would include his behavior with his 
host’s wife on the second and third mornings. But would 
he have had to confess taking the girdle? Two factors 
argue against it: (1) his confession would not seem to be 
valid if a serious sin were omitted, yet his subsequent 
actions show that he consistently resolves to use the 
girdle; (2) there is no necessary reason to conclude that 
such an act was a serious violation of the Christian moral 
code. Gawainfs "sin" in using the girdle is more under­
standably a violation of the knightly code of honor, an 
interpretation which is borne out by the fact that he con­
fesses this "sin" to a fellow knight rather than to a priest 
(237^-88). Furthermore, the Green Knight clearly recognizes 
it as such when he "absolves" Gawain (2393-9*0# and this 
makes it easier to understand the otherwise puzzling amuse­
ment at Arthur's court when Gawain relates his experience 
to them. Would the court have laughed so heartily over 
Gawain's admission that he had committed a mortal sin and 
then made a mockery of the sacrament of penance? Would 
Gawainfs fellow knights have decided to wear green s&shes 
to memorialize such blasphemy? Confronted with these ques­
tions, it seems reasonable to conclude that (1) Gawain 
sinned with the lady, even though he had grace available to 
him; (2) God freely chose to save Gawain from further sin,
even when the knight did not in any sense merit that grace; 
(3) Gawain did cooperate with God's grace, except during 
the second and third "bedroom scenes; (ty) he restored himself 
to God's favor through sacramental confession; (5) he did, 
nevertheless, "break his social contract with Bercilak, 
though Bercilak's action toward him was really far worse;
(6) Gawain and Bercilak resolve this difficulty by mutually 
confessing to each other at the end.
Turning from Sir Gawain. which is impeccably ortho~ 
dox even by Bradwardlne1s rigid standards, to St. Erkenwald. 
we find ourselves confronted with a most perplexing doctrine 
of grace and merit. I do not wish to enter into the author­
ship question here, and I am not taking up St. Erkenwald 
because of any conviction that its poet was the same as the 
one who wrote the poems in Cotton Nero A.x. It is enough 
that the work was composed in the same dialect area at 
roughly the same time as the others, since this by itself 
provides Interesting room for comparisons of doctrinal 
themes. Also, the poem raises an argument which nicely com­
plements those we have already seen, and which Very strik­
ingly parallels a vital point in Piers Plowman, which is 
the subject of the next chapter.
St. Erkenwald relates the story of a good pagan 
who is saved even though he is outside the Church, the 
usual avenue of salvation. This would seem to be a case 
of merltum de congruo. which is accepted as justifying the
sinner, de potentia Dei absoluta. though there is some 
question about this. In spite of the fact that the narra­
tive takes place in England, its source was apparently the 
Trajan-Gregory story, which will be analyzed in some detail 
in Chapter III. Nothing could have been more explosive in 
the fourteenth century, for this is precisely the sort of 
thing that Bradwardine and other conservatives were howling 
against as ‘'modern PelagianlSm." The poet does take some 
steps to guard against this charge, especially by using 
the miracle to glorify God's omnipotence rather than man's 
natural abilities.
When the citizens of London encounter the miracul­
ously preserved corpse, they call for their bishop, St. 
Erkenwald. Erkenwald prays for the grace to learn the sec­
ret of the miracle, which obviously could come about only 
through a suspension of the potentia Del ordinata, and for
25
his piety and persistence he receives this grace (126-127).
The bishop uses the opportunity to teach his people about
the potentia Del absoluta:
'Hit is meruaile to men, i>at mountes to litelle 
Toward fce prouidens of fre Prince Jjat Paradis weldes, 
Quen hym luste to vnlouke J>e leste of his my3tes.
Bot quen matyd is monnes my3t, & his mynde passyde,
And al his resons are to-rent, & redeles he stondes,
«Den lettes hit hym ful litelle to louse wyt a fynger 
■Dat alle }>e hondes vnder heuen halde my3t neuer.
26All references are to Israel Gollancz, ed. SJb. Erken­
wald (London, 1922)•
©ere-as creatures crafte of counselle oute swarues,
©e comforthe of fce creatore byhoues £e creature take.
& so do we now oure dede, deuyne we no fyrre;
To seche £e sothe at oure-selfe, 3ee se fcer no bote;
Bot glew we alle opon Godde, & his grace aske,
©at careless is of counselle, vs comforthe to sende.
(160-172)
Contrary to what we might expect, Erkenwald sounds like 
Bradwardine here. Works, he claims, have absolutely no 
intrinsic value, and man's salvation depends on the divine 
will, which is not only infinitely powerful but infinitely 
incomprehensible to man's feeble understanding. All we 
may do is to pray that we are among the elect and then hope 
that God has been generous to us, undeserving though we are.
When the corpse begins to speak, it accounts for
its marvelous condition by assuming that God must have
willed the miracle because he loves the justice that the
magistrate practiced in life:
'Nay, bisshop,' quofc fcat body, 'enbawmyd wos I neuer,
Ne no monnes counselle my clothe has kepyd vnwemmyd;
Bot ]?e riche kynge of reson, t>at euer rl3t alowes,
& loues al |>e lawSs lely J>at longen to trouthe;
& moste he menskes men for mynnynge of ri3tes,
©en for al ]?e meritorie medes J>at men on molde vsen;
& if renkes for ri3t fcus me arayed has,
He has lant me to last fcat lojtes ry3t best.'
(265-272)
There is a peculiar inconsistency here, which is character­
istic of the poem as a whole. On the one hand, the corpse 
claims that God has exercised his potentia absoluta to pre­
serve the body and, further, that God did so because he 
"loues ry3t best." On the other hand, however, man's actions
seem incapable of earning God's favor ex natura rel debita. 
Yet if this is so, what is the source of that "ry^t" which 
attracted God's mercy? The poet seems to affirm and deny 
the possibility of merltum de congruo at the same time.
The difficulty is partly overcome when Erkenwald, 
interested in the possibility that this righteous pagan 
might have been saved, asks where his soul now is. The 
corpse replies that its soul is suffering in the outer 
reaches of hellj it had not been released when Christ har­
rowed hell because the man in life had not been redeemed 
through baptism (283-300). Then the corpse excludes the 
possibility of merltum de congruo altogether, at least for 
unbaptized men:
Quat wan we with oure wele-dede bat wroghtyn ay ri3t, 
Quen we are dampnyd dulfully into be depe lake,
& exiled fro bat soper so, Ip&t solempne fest,
©er richely hit a m e  refetyd bat after right hungride?
(301-30*0
this does much more than simply reject the radical tenden­
cies implied in, say, Patience. The corpse, whom we may 
take as the poet's spokesman, virtually denies the possi­
bility of man approaching God at all except through 
merltum de condlgno. This is underscored by the saving 
effect of the baptism in Erkenwald's tears (321-332), a 
device which serves as a rather artificial deus ex machlna 
and only compounds the doctrinal confusion.
In attempting to teach a doctrine of grace that 
allows, like Bradwardine, only for merltum de condlgno. the
poet has made a very poor choice in his exemplum of St. Erk­
enwald. The nature of the story Itself, with its associa­
tions with the Trajan-Gregory myth, was to uphold the pos­
sibility of meritum de congruo even for a good pagan as a 
glorification of God’s infinite mercy and absolute power. 
Thus, the very material itself was intractable, considering 
the purpose to which the poet tried to put it. Whether or 
not he could also have written the great poems in Cotton 
Nero A.x is perhaps an unanswerable question; at least the 
evidence we have seen here is not conclusive. What is 
important is that St. -Erkenwald represents an extremely 
conservative reaction against Ockhamist theology and, i* 
its somewhat confusing use of the Trajan-Gregory motif, pre­
pares us for the eminently more successful handling of the 
same problems, both doctrinal and artistic, in Piers Plowman.
Chapter III: Piers Plowman
Piers Plowman has long stimulated scholarly efforts 
to settle its authorship and editorial problems, but after 
many years most of the same controversies are still with us, 
and it does not appear likely that they will be solved in 
the near future. In the past few years, more and more 
scholars have turned rather to the poem as a poem, especi­
ally to its complex structure, rhetoric, and doctrine. Of 
these three, doctrinal questions have attracted most atten­
tion since Piers Plowman is primarily, if not exclusively, 
a religious poem.
Various theories about theological content have 
emerged: the Wells-Coghill-Chambers argument that Dowel,
Dobet,.and Dobest correspond to the ictive, contemplative,
*1
and mixed lives defined in popular mystical writings;-1 the
j
Neroney-Donaldson theory that the three "lives11 are rather
2
the mystic’s purgative, illuminative, and unitive states;
enry W. Wells, "The Construction of Piers Plowman,"
PMLA. XLIV (1929), 123-liK); Nevill Coghill, "The Character 
of Piers Plowman Considered from the E-text," Medium Aevum.
II (1933)• 108-135; w * Chambers, Man's Unconquerable Mind 
(London, 1939), PP. 88-171.
^Howard Meroney, "The Life and Death of Longe Wille," ELH. 
XVII (1950), 1-35, E. Talbot Donaldson, Piers Plowman, the 
C-Text and Its Poet (New Haven, 19^9), esp. pp“ 15b-161.
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R. W. Frank's rejection of all such elaborate "parallels” 
in favor of reading the development from the Visio through
O
the Vita as the Christian pilgrimage toward salvation; and 
Morton Bloomfield's attempt to show in the poem a monastic 
philosophy which promoted an apocalyptic view of life, 
rather than either mysticism or concern with salvation as
L
such. As a result of these and other less well known 
studies, we have learned a great deal about the poet whom, 
for the sake of convenience, I shall call William Langland 
here, and about his spiritual and intellectual responses to 
the stormy religious life of the fourteenth century. But 
so far as I know, no one has yet placed Langland or his poem 
in the context of the debate we have been following for the 
last two chapters, and yet I feel that the relation between 
grace and merit is the central doctrinal theme of Piers 
Plowman.
In this chapter, I shall argue that Will, man's 
faculty for action, takes part in a complicated moral 
struggle in which the Christian soul seeks salvation. The 
poem is not, however, an allegory of salvation as such 
because Will has not completed his journey at the end of 
the poem. But he has learned how he may be saved. In 
the Visio, Will has learned how to act to gain Piers'
^Piers Plowman and the Scheme of Salvation (New Haven, 195% 
U
Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse (New 
Brunswick, N. J., 1961).
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pardon, though the pardon itself raises the most puzzling 
questions of the poem. In an effort to answer these ques­
tions, he turns inward, as Augustine taught, to examine his 
various faculties and spiritual resources. After long 
wrangling over the problem of grace and merit, the problem 
of how to do well raised by Piers' pardon, Will learns com­
plementary doctrines from Imagination and Patience, which 
show how a Christian must act in order to do well. From 
this point on, Will learns how to live an even more perfect 
life by modelling his life, with God's grace, on Christ's 
life of true charity. Finally, Will investigates how it is 
best for a Christian to live, to carry out one's charitable 
mission in union with others in the Church. Throughout the 
poem, then, the most important question is always how a man 
may merit salvation, that is, what works he should perform 
and how God's grace may influence them.
The field full of folk pictures the active life of 
the bustling, workaday world. As such, it introduces that 
section of the poem most explicitly concerned with the per­
formance of good works. In Passus 1,^ Holy Church sets 
forth a doctrine of works in response to Will's question, 
"How I may saue my soule" (13.1.8*0, which provides a doctri­
nal basis for the Visio as a whole. In traditional
5The text I am using for this analysis is the E-version 
as printed in Walter W. Skeat, ed. The Vision of William 
concerning: Piers the Plowman, in Three Parallel Texts. 2 vdls.
c ©xf ord, i s m r
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Augustinian fashion, Holy Church points out that God begins ~ 
the process of man's salvation by providing the initial 
grace which prompts man to seek him (B.I.136-14^ and 3 61- 
16*4-). Seemingly good works are valueless, therefore, unless 
one first has the grace of charity (E.I.178-187)• But where 
does a man first acquire charity? Holy Church replies that
For-thi this wordes • ten wryten in the gospel,
Date et dabltur vobls • for I dele 3ow alle.
And that is the lokke of loue-« and lateth oute my 
grace,
To conforte the careful • acombred with synne.
Loue is leche of lyf • and nexte owre lorde selue,
And also the graith gate • that goth in-to heuene; 
For-thi I sey as I seide • ere by the textis,
Whan alle tresores ben ytryed • treuthe is the beste.
(B.I.198-205)
This is quite Augustinlan. What we give out of charity 
returns to God what he first gave us, the initial grace to 
seek him, perform meritorious works, and earn further grace: 
"Date et dabltur vobis.n To sum up, prevenient grace 
prompts charitable works, which in turn "lateth oute" fur­
ther grace to "conforte the careful • acombred with synne."
In terms of the fourteenth-century controversy over 
grace and merit, Langland in the first passus strikes a 
traditional balance between works and grace, which prepares 
us for what will follow. For in the remainder of the Visio 
he will concentrate chiefly on one side of the scale, that 
of works, and the doctrinal importance of Passus I is to 
acquaint us with both sides of the balance, so that his 
emphasis on works in the next six passus may not be
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interpreted as Pelagian.
In Passus II Meed appears, dressed out in all the
brilliant finery of cuplditas;
Purfiled with pelure • the finest Vpon erthe,
Y-crounede with a corone • the kyng hath non better. 
Fetislich hir fyngres • were fretted with golde wyre, 
And there-on red rubyes . as red as any glede,
And diamentz of derest pris • and double manere 
safferes,
Orientales and ewages • enuenymes to destroye.
Hire robe was ful riche • of red scarlet engreyned, 
With ribanes of red golde • and of riche stones;
Hire arraye me rauysshed • suche ricchesse saw I 
neuere. (B,II.9-17)
The contrast between Meed and Holy Church appears quite 
clearly in the following lines in which Holy Church des­
cribes herself:
Mi fader the grete god is • and grounde of alle 
graces,
0 god with-oute gynnynge • and I his gode dorter,
And hath 3oue me mercy • to marye with my-self;
And what man be merciful • and lelly me loue,
Schal be my lorde and I his leef • in the hei3e 
heuene.
And what man taketh Mede • myne hed dar I legge,
That he shal lese for hir loue • a lappe of caritatis.
(B.II.29-3D
These two figures represent opposing value systems, parallel 
to Augustine's two cities, which introduce the allegorical 
struggle for control of man, both as an individual and as 
he lives in comminity with other men
Interpretations of Passus II through IV have usually 
explored the social, political, and topical aspects of the 
allegory, and it is not my intention here to displace or 
devalue any of these. The temptation to search for
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contemporary allusions is great and sometimes rewarded, 
but I wish to focus rather on the psychological allegory 
in these passus. For just as the struggle for the king’s 
favor has broad political and social significance, this 
same struggle mirrors the tensions within everyman as he 
tries to work out his salvation.
On the ’'level" of psychological allegory, the king 
represents man's will, free to turn one way or another, free 
to choose good or to choose evil. Against Meed and her par­
ty Langland places Conscience and Reason, whose partnership, 
he suggests, is absolutely necessary if the will is to have 
sound guidance (B.Ill.282-283 and IV.4-5, 42-43, 190-195)- 
Neither one is complete without the other, but together they 
can reveal Christian values and recommend to the will good 
works over the falseness and cupidity of Meed. Further, 
the allegory here stresses man’s natural abilities to deal 
with temptation and overcome sin, though this is not 
Langland’s final word on this matter. Up to the conclusion 
of Passus IV, Langland has been working out an answer to 
Will’s question asking Holy Church hew he might discover 
Truth: "3et mote 3* kenne me better,/By what craft in my
corps • it comseth and where" (B.I.136-137)• Will has now 
learned that man’s natural powers to discover truth and 
avoid sin are Conscience and Reason. Yet these are by them­
selves insufficient to earn salvation, as we shall see more 
clearly later on. To conclude that Will could find the
fullness of grace through Reason and Conscience alone would 
be out-and-out Pelagianism.
In Passus V, the poet presents the confession of 
the seven deadly sins, deservedly one of the most famous 
passages in Middle English literature. Reason prepares for 
the confession by explaining how man's perverse will may 
choose evil and thus draw down God's wrath (B.V.12-20).
Yet even this must be qualified. In the confession of 
Avarice we learn, as in Patience, that God's potentia abso­
luta can overrule even the just punishment due a man for 
committing deadly sin (B.V.286-291 and ^53-^55)• Here, again, 
is evidence of the fourteenth-century insistence on divine 
freedom, a freedom even to override the Law, which by impli­
cation makes God's supremely free will the only criterion 
of value.
Next comes the resolution to seek Truth, a journey 
that all the folk realize must be aided by Grace (B.V.517- 
519) since "there was wy3te non so ays • the wey thider 
couthe" (E.V.520). After rejecting a pilgrim as a guide, 
the crowd meets Piers, who stresses the need for good works 
in meriting salvation:
'Peter!' quod a plowman • and put forth his hed,
'I knowe hym as kyndely • as clerke doth his bokes; 
Conscience and Kynde Witte • kenned me to his place,
And deden me suren hym slkerly • to serue hym for 
euere,
Bothe to sowe and to sette * the while I swynke myghte.
I haue ben his folwar • al this fifty wyntre;
Bothe ysowen his sede • and sued his bestes,
With-inne and with-outen • wayted his profyt.
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I dyke and I delue • I do that treuth hoteth;
Some tyme I sowe • and some tyme I thresche,
In tailoures crafte and tynkares crafte • what Treuthe 
can deuyse,
I weue an I wynde • and do what Treuthe hoteth.
For thou3e I seye it my-self • I serue hym to paye.
Ich haue myn huire of hym wel • and otherwhiles more;
He Is the prestest payer • that pore men knoweth;
He ne with-halt non hewe his hyre • that he ne hath 
it at euen. (B.V.5^-559)
Such emphasis on works could he quite misleading if this 
speech were divorced from its place in the passus as a whole. 
For Piers next describes "Truth’s path," which Involves an 
inward Journey, as in Augustine and Bonaventure, away from 
the world of external action, along a path that leads to 
Truth's palace where Grace is the gatekeeper (B.V.604).
Only if Grace grants an entrance may one travel into the 
innermost recesses of his own soul to find Truth (E.V.6!^- 
617). Still, even if a man does discover Truth, he may 
not be perfectly secure in his possession while yet in this 
life because he always has the freedom to choose a lesser 
good than God. If a man were to make such a choice, he 
would be cut off from Truth and Grace, without the power 
to reenter the palace unless God, through a special act 
of divine will, elected to extend grace to the sinner 
(B.V.618-626). Once again, this is an instance of Langlandte 
interest in the absolute power of God, repeated soon after­
ward (B.V.638), which becomes still more important in the 
discussion of grace and merit later on in the Vita de Dowel. 
Here, too, we may see an early example of another theme
that will prove increasingly important as the poet develops 
his doctrine of grace, the misuse of indulgences. At the 
end of Passus V, a pardoner and a prostitute, unwilling to 
trust in Christ and Mary's mercy, go to fetch a box of 
indulgences (B.V.6^8-651)• This is, as the context shows, 
a futile attempt to compel God's grace, even in the absence 
of good works. Such a view of man's relation to God, was, 
as we saw in Chapter I, what prompted foruteenth-century 
voluntarists, radical Ockhamlsts and conservative Augustin- 
ians alike, to insist on the transcendence of potentia Del 
absoluta over potentia Dei ordinata. Despite their opposi­
tion on other points, both groups joined in censuring the 
assumption that man could get some “hold" on God in order 
to achieve salvation.
In Passus VI, Fiers offers to act as guide for the 
pilgrims seeking Truth, but he first insists on working his 
field and asks that they help him. Though not claiming that 
works are sufficient in themselves, Piers underscores their 
importance as preparation for a journey to God. Eefore 
leaving his family, however, he first makes out his will.
The will is rather ordinary, except for the disposition 
that “he shal haue my soule « that best hath yserued it" 
(B.VI.89). How can God be said to have deserved a man's 
soul? This could mean either that God has "won" man*s soul 
by the atonement or that man, represented here by Piers,
t
may condescend to award his treasure to a worthy God.
It may be that Langland Intended neither of these, though 
the first is obviously more likely than the second. Inter­
estingly, the same line in the C-text clarifies the point:
"He shal haue my soule • that alle soules made" (CJX.96). 
Such a change sharpens the doctrine of man's relation to 
God, a procedure which is, as Donaldson and others have 
shown, typical of the C-poet*s caution in doctrinal matters.
The Visio ends with the much disputed pardon scene, 
which Chambers has called "the most difficult thing to un­
derstand in the whole poem."^ The pardon "a pena et a culpa* 
is actually granted by Truth at the beginning of Passus VII:
Treuthe herde telle her-of • and to peres he sent,
To taken his teme • and tulyen the erthe,
And purchaced hym a pardoun • a pena et a culpa 
For hym, and for his heires • for euermore after.
And bad hym holde hym at home • and eryen his leyes,
And alle that halpe hym to erie • to sette or to sowe, 
Dr any other myster • that my3te Pieres auaille,
Pardoun with Pieres plowman • treuthe hath ygraunted.
(E.VII.1-8)
The pardon that Truth has "purchaced" is man's redemption 
through Christ's atonement. As a result of the grace which 
Christ has made available to man, a man may now merit sal­
vation by performing good works. Since this could, however, 
be interpreted as semi-Pelagian, Langland goes on to point 
out that a charitable man is merely paying back what God 
had first given him (B.VII.80), and the man who thus merits 
does so, at least in this context, as a Christian in the 
state of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens):
^Chambers, p. 118.
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.Alle lybbyng laboreres • that lyuen with her hondes, 
That trewlich taken • and trewlich wynnen,
And lyuen in loue and in lawe • for her lowe hertis, 
Haueth the same absolucioun • that sent was to Peres.
(B.VII.62-65; italics mine)
Lest there be any further doubt here, Langland in this 
passage is discussing merltum de condlgno. though his over­
riding emphasis on the value of works might lead the unsus­
pecting reader to think that merltum de congruo were really 
the subject.
Next comes an actual reading of the pardon, which
is composed of two lines from the Athanasian Creed:
Et qul bona egerunt. ibunt in vitam eternam;
Qul vero mala, in lgnem eternum.
CE.VII.111-112)
The priest comments that this is not a real pardon at all 
because it does not follow the formula prescribed for such 
a legal document, and Piers "for pure tene • pulled it 
atweyne" (E.VII.116). At this point, most critics side with 
Piers, arguing that the ensuing dispute between Piers and 
the priest illustrates how shallow, vain, and pretentious 
this priest is— a symbol of the empty legalism in the late 
medieval Church. Some, siding with Coghill,^ claim that 
Piers' anger is directed against the pardon itself. The 
point is a vital one, chiefly because one's reading of this 
passage will determine how the rest of the poem may be in­
terpreted. For the issues that arise here provide the
?Nevill Coghill, "The Pardon Scene of Piers Plowman.11 
Proc. Brit. Accad.. XXX ( 1 9 W ,  303-357.
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motive behind the various discussions in the Vita de Dowel, 
as we shall see later on.
What most readers seem to ignore is that Langland
goes on to side with the priest:
And al this maketh me • on this meteles to thynke;
And how the prest preued • no pardoun to Dowel,
And demed that Dowel • indulgences passed,
Biennales and triennales • and bisschopes lettres,
And how Dowel at the day of dome • is dignelich 
vnderfongen,
And passeth al the pardoun • of seynt Petres cherche.
(E.VII.167-172)
Here is no criticism, none of the scorn that we see in 
those passages in which Langland excoriates a corrupt clergy. 
Thus, to infer that Piers' anger is directed against the 
priest is to ignore the evidence of the poem itself. If 
such were the case, if the priest were the object of the 
plowman's "tene," then we must conclude that Piers has lost 
Langland's sympathy at this point, perhaps even that he 
is being satirized here. But this, too, contradicts the 
evidence. What about the obvious sincerity of Piers' 
resolution to do well in the future? Is this confused?
No, we must clearly look elsewhere for the target. Eut 
what about the pardon itself? Surely Piers is disappointed 
with it? Such a view is tempting, but it fails to account 
for the absurdity of making Piers angry with the Athanasian 
Creed and for Piers' subsequent resolution to follow it.
Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation would be 
that Piers is angry with himself for misunderstanding the
95
true nature and value of the pardon. Up to the priest's 
reading of it, Piers has assumed that he has acquired a 
legal document which will assure him of salvation. The 
document itself, however, simply explains the consequences 
of doing well or of doing evil, which is merely to remind 
Piers of his relation to God. The whole section of the 
creed, from which the lines in the pardon were taken, reads 
as follows:
As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God 
and man are one Christ, He died for our salvation, 
descended to hell, arose from the dead on the third 
day, ascended into heaven, sits at the right hand of 
God the Father almighty, and from there he shall come 
to Judge the living and the dead. At his coming all 
men are to arise with their own "bodies; and they are 
to give an account of their lives. Those who have 
done good deeds will go into eternal life; those who 
have done evil will go into everlasting fire.
This is the Catholic faith. Everyone must believe 
it, firmly and steadfastly; otherwise, he cannot be 
saved.8
Clearly, any prescription to do good works which is extrac­
ted from this Creed must also allow for the Creed's insis­
tence on grace. This, then, explains the reference to the 
pardon having been "purchaced" by Truth: "He died for our
salvation." Such a reminder makes Piers, we may suppose, 
painfully aware of both his ambiguous insistence on works 
and his assurance that the pardon gave him some legal "hold" 
on God's acceptance. His quotation from the psalm, as his
Q
The Athanasian Creed, in The Church Teaches: Documents
of the Church in English Translation, ed. John F. Clarkson, 
S.j. (St. Louis, 1955)* P*
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’’tene’1 is vented, reaffirms the need for grace as a condi­
tion for God’s friendship and protection. The works he now 
resolves to perform are quite different from those involved 
in plowing his half-acre:
'I shal cessen of my sowyng,1 quod Pieres . ’and 
swynk nou3t so harde,
Ne about my bely-loye • so bisi be namoref 
Of preyers and of penaunce • my plow shal ben herafter, 
And wepen whan I shulde slepe • though whete-bred me 
faille. (E.VII.117-120)
Previously, Piers' works were good ex purls naturallbus.
with no clear relation to grace or merit as such. Now, he
decides to perform acts of piety which are more clearly
suited to saving his soul, that is, to merltum de condlgno.
Toward the end of the passus, Langland goes to 
great lengths to explain how doing well is much more impor­
tant than accumulating indulgences since without good works 
such indulgences are worthless:
Thelgh 3e be founde in the fraternete . of alle the 
foure ordres,
And haue indulgences double-folde • but if Dowel 30W 
help,
I sette 3owre patentes and 30wre panctounz • at one 
pies hele! (B.VII.192-19*0
Much better were it for man, according to Langland, to seek
God’s assistance in the hope that God may then accept him,
permitting works capable of meriting de condigno. This is
only possible, however, if God first gratuitously chooses
to extend grace to the sinner (gratia gratis data):
For-thi I conseille alle Cristene • to crye god mercy, 
And Marie his moder • be owre mene bitwene,
That god gyue vs grace here • ar we gone hennes,
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Suche werkes to werche • while we hen here,
That after owre deth-day • Dowel reherce,
At the day of dome • we dede as he hi3te.
(E.VII.195-200)
As the Vlslo ends, we can already see the direction 
the Vita will take as the exposition of Dowel, Dobet, and
Dobest. Both Piers and Will have learned that (1) works may
be valuable in attracting grace (merltum de congruo), but 
(2) such works are insufficient by themselves without an 
infusion of divine grace, and (3) Dowel (merltum de condlgno) 
supersedes any puny human effort to bind God in a legal 
contract which would force him to elect a sinner regardless 
of actual merit. Yet for all that. Will still does not 
know how a Christian may do well. This now becomes his 
next goal.
Following Piers* example, Will turns away from the 
active, external world and begins an Inward jouney to find 
out what help his various faculties and spiritual resources 
may be able to provide. Before he begins this journey, 
however, he first meets two Franciscan Friars, Masters of 
Theology such as those who dominated Oxford in the fourteenth 
century. Will debates these masters on the question of how 
man may avoid sin, thus Introducing one of the main themes 
of the Vita de Dowel. The friars argue that although no 
man may avoid eaamittlng lome' veftial sins, God's grace will 
help a good man to keep from mortal sin. A man may, never­
theless, choose sin and cut himself off from God because
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he has been created free, free even to misuse his freedom:
God wole suffre wel thi sleuthe • 3if thy-self lyketh. 
For he 3af the to 3eres3yue • to 3eme wel thi-selue,
And that is witte and fre wille • to euery wy3te a 
porcioun,
To fleghyng foules • to fissches & to bestes.
Ac man hath moste thereof • and moste is to blame,
But if he worche wel ther-with • as Dowel hym techeth.
(B.VIII.51-56)
So far as this goes, there is nothing clearly unorthodox in 
the friars' teaching. It does, however, seem to give greater 
prominence to man's will than to grace in the scheme of 
salvation. Grace is a "help" in avoiding serious sin, but 
willing good works is a condition sine qua non for positive 
merit. Will does not understand all the implications of 
this yet, and so he cannot be said to learn much from the 
friars. But he has been introduced to the problem that 
will occupy him through the next seven passus.
The first figure that Will meets in his inward 
journey is Thought, who represents merely the ideas that 
Will has already developed up to this point. Little wonder, 
then, that Thought cannot be of much service in directing 
Will to Dowel. Accordingly,
Thanne Thou3t in that tyme • seide thise wordes,
•Where Dowel, Dobet • and Dobest ben in londe,
Here is Wille wolde ywyte • yif Witte couthe teche hym, 
And whether he be man or no man • this man fayne 
wolde aspye,
And worchen as thei thre wolde • this is his entente.'
(B.VIII.122-126)
Wit, man’s natural faculty of intelligence, carries Will 
somewhat further by outlining the nature of man as created
by God (Kynde):
And that is the castel that Kynde made • Caro it hatte, 
And is as moche to mene • as man with a soule;
And that he wrou3t with'werke • and with worde bothe, 
Thorugh my3te of the aaieste : man was ymaked.
Inwit and alle wittes • closed ben ther-inne,
For loue of the lady Anima • that Lyf is ynempned;
Ouer al in mannes body • he walketh and wanareth,
Ac in the herte is hir home • and hir moste reste.
Ac Inwitte is in the hed • and to the herte he loketh, 
What Anima is lief or loth • he lat hir at his wille; 
For after the grace of god • the grettest is Inwitte.
(B.IX.48-58)
While Wit never loses sight of the importance of grace, as 
in the last line of the passage quoted here, his primary 
interest, an analysis of human nature, leads him to concen­
trate principally on man's natural faculties, especially 
Inwit. This sets the tone for Wit's definition of Dowel, 
Dobet, and Dobest (B.IX.94-97) as very practical activities 
which evoke a loving response from God:
To alle trew tidy men • that trauaille desyren,
Owre lorde loueth hem and lent . loude other stllle, 
Grace to go to hem • and agon her lyflode.
(E.IX.104-106)
Wit does not explain such a relation to God as merltum de 
congruo, but this is, by definition common among all late 
medieval thinkers, precisely what he has introduced here.
No mention is made here of prevenient grace, only God's 
pleasure with the efforts of "alle trew tidy men." Nor does 
Wit explain whether God has, de potentla ordinata, committed 
himself to reward man's behavior in any form of legal con­
tract. So far, it is impossible to tell whether or under 
what conditions a man might merit de condigno; or, indeed,
whether man may not be faced with the uncertainties of 
potentla Dei absoluta such as the "modern Pelagians" des­
cribed.
In an effort to clarify these questions, if not 
fully to answer them, Wit tells Will at the end of Passus 
IX that
Dowel, my frende, is « to don as lawe techeth.
To loue thi frende and thi foo • leue me, that is Dobet. 
To 3iuen and to 3emen • bothe 3onge and lode,
To helen and to helpen • is Dobest of alle.
And Dowel is to drede god • and Dobet to suffre,
And so cometh Dobest of bothe • and bryngeth adoun the 
mody,
And that is wikked Wille • that many werke shendeth,
And dryueth away Dowel • thorugh dedliche synnes.'
(E. IX.199-206)
Unfortunately, the doctrine set forth here is not as care­
fully stated as we might wish. What, for example, is the 
"lawe" that governs Dowel? Is this the law described in 
Scripture, by the Church, natural law, or perhaps all three? 
Even assuming that Will can learn what law to follow, is 
doing well merely following a set of legal prescriptions?
Is love, or charity, reserved exclusively for Dobet? If so, 
as seems suggested here, does this mean that a Christian 
may be saved without charity, that is, by doing no more 
than avoiding those sins proscribed by the law? Finally, 
if a "wikked Wille" can perform mortal sin. and thereby 
"dryueth away Dowel," does this imply that Dowel can be 
achieved by a good will that follows the law? To this last 
question, at least, there is an answer implicit in Wit's 
speech. For if Dowel is driven away by "dedliche synnes,"
then it must presuppose a state of grace of some sort 
(auxlllum gratlae). But what sort of grace is this, gratia 
gratis data, which might permit meritum de congruo. or 
gratia gratum faciens, through which God would accept Dowel 
as merltum de condigno? These are not idle questions nor 
vain sophistry. On the answers to these questions would 
depend the whole issue of orthodoxy or heresy in fourteenth- 
century theology.
Happily for Will, who might otherwise have been 
left in this befuddlement, Wit has Study for a wife. She 
launches into a diatribe against intellectual pride that 
seeks to question God:
I haue yherde hiegh men • etyng atte table,
Carpen as thei clerkes were • of Cryste and of his 
mi3tes,
And leyaen fautes vppon the fader • that fourmed vs 
alle,
And carpen a3eine clerkes • crabbed wordes;—
"Whi wolde owre saueoure suffre • suche a worme in his 
blisse,
That bigyled the womman • and the man after,
Thorw whiche wyles and wordes • thei wenten to helle, 
And al her sede for here synne • the same deth suffred? 
Here lyeth 3owre lore11 • thise lordes gynneth dispute, 
"Of that 3e clerkes vs kenneth • of Cryst by the gospe];
Flllus non portabit lnlaultatem patris. &c.
Whi shulde we that now ben • for the werkes of Adam 
Roten and to-rende? • resoun wolde it neuere; 
Vnusaulsque portabit onus suum, &c."
(B.X.101-112)
Dame Study goes on to cite Augustine, arguing that a man 
ought not question the ways of God; he should rather submit 
himself humbly to the ultimately inscrutable divine will and 
praise what he cannot understand:
For alle that wilneth to wyte • the weyes of god al- 
nd^ty,
I wolde his eye were in his ers • and his fynger after, 
That euere wilneth to wite • whi that god wolde 
Suffre Sathan • his sede to higile,
Or Iudas to the Iuwes • Iesu bytraye.
Al was as thow wolde • lorde, yworschiped be thow,
And al worth as thow wolte • what so we dispute!
(B.X.122-128)
It hardly need be pointed out, after what we have already 
seen in the first two chapters, that this is yet another 
instance of the fourteenth-century tendency to denigrate 
reason in matters of faith, the pure credlbilia that tran­
scend human comprehension and depend ultimately on potentla 
Dei absoluta. Here, too, we should note the predestinarian 
Implication in Study*s speech: all human events, even those
which we condemn, have been ordained by God. Since no 
Christian should, according to Study, question God's will, 
this means that the divine will becomes the sole criterion 
of value— a concept familiar in much of the radical theology 
of the time. Above all, the study of theology does not lead 
to scientific statements of fact; its sole value lies in 
its ability to communicate values, especially the value of 
charity:
Ac Theologie hath tened me • ten score tymes,
The more I muse there-inne • the mistier it semeth,
And the depper I deuyne • the derker me it thinketh;
It is no science for sothe • forto sotyle inne;
A ful lethy thinge it were • 3if that loue nere.
Ac for it let best by Loue • I loue it the bettre;
For there that Loue is leder • ne lacked neuere grace.
(B.X.180-186)
Study, like Wit, does not have the answer that Will is 
seeking, but she can at least set Will on the right path.
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Man's natural Intelligence and its application in study may 
not discover Dowel by themselves, and so the lady sends 
Will on to Clergy and Scripture.
Shortly after Will has introduced himself to them, 
Clergy points out that many points of faith, such as the 
doctrine of the Trinity, cannot be grasped by human reason, 
not even by so learned a man as Augustine (B.X.2^5-2^8)•
This has the effect of reinforcing Study's teachings as 
well as precluding any exaggerated expectations Will might 
have of the insights Clergy and Scripture can provide. But 
Will, we soon learn, is really less interested in what they 
teach him than in making a point of his own. When Scripture 
explains how difficult it is for a rich man to be saved,
Will rises in argument:
'Contra.' quod I, 'bi Cryste • that can I repreue.
And preue it bi Peter • and bi Poule bothe,
That is baptized beth sauf • be he riche or pore.'
(B.X.3^5-3W
This begins a discussion of grace and merit which will ex­
tend on through the rest of this passus and will not be re­
solved until the end of Passus 3(IV. Since it is the ful­
crum on which the whole poem balances, it will deserve 
rather close attention.
The point Will is making, in the style of the 
Scholastic dlsputatio. is that baptism and mere membership 
in the legal framework of the Church are sufficient to 
merit the grace required for salvation. Such a narrow,
legalistic doctrine of grace seems "based, at least partly, 
on Wit’s teaching that Dowel is “to don as lawe techeth," 
which we have already seen above. Scripture responds that 
the law alone does not Justify sinful man:
Ac Crysten men withoute more • may nou3t come to heuen^
For that Cryst for Cristen men deyde • and confermed 
the lawe,
That who-so wolde and wylneth • with Cryste to aryse,
Si cum Christo surrexlstls. etc.,
He shulde louye and leue • and the lawe fulfille.
That is— "loue thi lorde god * leuest aboue alle.
And after, alle Crystene creatures • in commune, eche 
man other;"
And thus bilongeth to louye • that leueth to be saued.
(B.X.253-259)
The law which Christ "confermed" is nothing so simplistic 
and mechanical as Will, here a medieval Pharisee, would 
construe it to be. The law is the law of love, and it is 
this that a Christian must live if he would be saved.
Against this, Will next leads forth the old argument that 
extra ecclesla nulla salus. This is an ancient doctrinal 
formula, used continually by popes and councils throughout 
the Middle Ages and preserved by the Councils of Trent, 
Vatican I and, in our own time, Vatican II— though with 
differences in interpretation.9 pQr his part, Will inter­
prets it literally, pointing to the cases of Solomon and
«
Aristotle, both of whom are damned even though they were 
good men:
^See, for example, Vatican II*s Dogmatic Constitution on 
the Church, cap. 2, a. 1^; and cf. Vatican I's Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church of Christ, cap. 6 and 7.
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For Salamon the sage • that Sapience tau3te,
God gaf hym grace of witte • and alle his godes after, 
To reule the reume • and riche to make;
He demed wel and wysely • as holy wrltte telleth. 
Aristotle and he • who wlssed men bettere?
Malstres that of goddls mercy • techen men and prechen, 
Of here wordes thei wissen vs • for wisest as In here 
tyme,
And al holicherche • holdeth hem bothe ydampned!
(B.X.379-386)
This is a telling point, and he hastens to reinforce It 
by showing how certain great sinners were saved because 
they received the grace to draw them into the Church 
Triumphant:
On Gode Frldaye I fynde • a feloun was ysaued,
That had lyued al his lyf • with lesynges and with 
thefte;
And for he biknewe on the crosse • and to Cryste 
schrof hym,
He was sonnere saued • than seynt Iohan the baptiste, 
And or Adam or Ysaye • or eny of the prophetes,
That hadde ylelne with Lucyfer • many longe 3eres.
A robbere was yraunceouned • rather than thei alle, 
With-outen any penaunce of purgatorle • to perpetuel 
blisse.
Thanne Marye Magdaleyne • what womman dede worse?
Or who worse than Dauid • that Vries deth conspired?
Or Poule the apostle • that no pitee hadde,
Moche crystene kynde • to kylle to deth?
And now ben thise as souereynes • wyth seyntes in 
heuene,
Tho that wrou3te wikkedlokest • in worlde tho thei 
were.
And tho that wisely wordeden • and wryten many bokes 
Of witte and of wlsdome • with dampned soules wonye.
(B.X.414-429)
The reason for Will's adherence to the law as a means to 
salvation is now becoming clear. Man lives in a world of 
uncertainties: good men go to hell and sinners go to hea­
ven, if God so chooses. Faced by such a prospect, Will 
cleaves to the law because it has been instituted de
potentla Del ordlnata and offers a measure of security, 
though even this security is threatened:
There aren witty and wel-libbynge • ac her werkes 
t>en yhudde
In the hondes of almi3ty god • and he wote the sothe 
Wher for loue a man worth allowed there • and his lele 
werkes,
Or elles for his yuel wille • and enuye of herte,
And be allowed as he lyued so.
(B.X.^31-^35)
Angry and confused, Will ends this passus with a long 
anti-intellectual tirade (E.X.W2.ff,), which signifies 
how little he has accomplished toward reaching some genuine 
understanding of Dowel. This anxious, frustrating search, 
Anselm's "fldes quaerens lntellectum.11 should not be passed 
over quickly by the modem reader, who is eager to get on 
to something more suited to his twentieth-century taste. 
Langland would not have devoted so much of his energy to 
writing this account of Will's perplexed quest for Dowel 
were it not that this is, doctrinally at least, the heart 
of the poem.
At the beginning of Passus XI, Scripture upbraids 
Will for his arrogance: "multi multa sclunt. et selpsos 
nesclunt" (B.XI.2). Will has gone too far. He has assumed 
that because he cannot fully grasp the mysterious workings 
of grace, all theology is therefore nonsense. This is a 
reversal of the way intellectual pride usually operates: 
in order to condemn human reason, Will uses his own reason 
as an absolute standard. Accordingly, Scripture abandons 
him for a while to Fortune. Will eventually sees the error
of following Fortune and her ladies, but when he goes to
confession he returns to his old argument concerning baptism
as a guarantee of salvation, though now admitting the value
of contrition:
Baptizyng and burying • bothe ben ful nedeful,
Ac moche more merytorie • me thynketh it is to baptize. 
For a baptized man may * as maistres telleth,
Thorugh contrlcioun come • to the heigh heuene;
Sola contriclo delet peccatum.
Ac a bame withoute bapteme • may nou3t so be saued;
Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua. &c.
Loke, 3e lettred men • whfether I lye or do nou3te.
(B.XI.78-83)
At this point, Lewte enters and, in his function as Good 
Faith,10 leads Will back to Scripture, who preaches on the 
text about the many who were called but few chosen. This, 
predictably, once again raises 'Will's anxiety over the ques­
tion of predestination, and we now learn that he insists on 
baptism and church membership as conditions sine qua non 
for salvation (extra ecclesia nulla salus) in order to re­
assure himself that he is one of the elect:
Al for tene of her tyxte • trembled myn herte,
And in a were gan I waxe * and with myself to dispute, 
Whether I were chosen or nou3t chosen; • on Holicherche 
I thou3te,
That vnderfonge me atte fonte • for one of goddis 
chosen;
For Cryste cleped vs alle • come if we wolde,
Sarasenes and scismatikes • and so he dyd the Iewes,
0 vos omnes sclcientes. venite, &c.;
And badde hem souke for synne • saufly at his breste, 
And drynke bote for bale • brouke it who so my3te.
'Thanne may alle Crystene come,1 quod I • 'and 
cleyme there entre
10See J. F. Goodridge's helpful commentary in his edition 
of the poem (Penguin Books, rev., 1966), p. 288, n. 11.
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BJr the t>lode that he bou3te vs with • and thorugh 
baptesme after,
Qul credlderit & baptlzatus fuerit, &c.
For though a Crystene man coueyted • his Crystenedome 
to reneye,
Ri3tfulliche to reneye • no resoun it wolde.
(B.XI.110-121
Significantly, this goes "beyond any similar claims that 
Will has made thus far. Not only does baptism serve to 
clear a man's way to salvation, but we now find that, once 
baptized, it is impossible for a man not to be saved. A 
Christian may commit many sins, but by virtue of his baptism 
his reason and conscience will eventually lead him to seek 
God's mercy. Though he may be "in purgatorie to brenne"
(B.XI.128) as punishment for his sins, even "to the daye 
of dome" (E.XI.129), his soul will not be damned.
Will's emphasis on man's contractual relation to 
God seems to bind the divine will, de potentla Dei ordlnata. 
and to limit man's freedom. A Christian may perform evil 
works such that he will merit punishment, but he is not free 
to choose his own damnation. On God's side, man is predes­
tined by the divine will to heaven if he is a baptized 
Christian, regardless of what works he may perform. In 
terms of grace and merit, this means that merltum de congruo 
is virtually eliminated and merltum de condlgno is assured 
by contract. Such a position, however, violates much that 
was dear to the fourteenth-century religious mind. While 
Bradwardine or Wyclif, for example, would agree with Will 
in his doctrine of predestination and his virtual exclusion
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of merltum de congruo, even they would not allow God's will 
to "be bound in such a servile fashion. Much less the mod­
ern!. doctores!
Langland cannot, therefore, allow Will's argument 
to go by unopposed, and almost immediately an adversary 
arises who throws the whole discussion into a turmoil once 
again. Replying to Will's and Scripture's use of authori­
ties, Trajan bursts in:
'3ee! baw for bokesf 'quod one • was broken oute of 
helle,
Hi3te Trolanus, had ben a trewe kny3te • toke witnesse 
at a pope,
How he was ded and dampned • to swellen in pyne,
For an vncristene creature; • — 'clerkis wyten the 
sothe,
That al the clergye vnder Cryste • ne mi3te me cracche 
fro helle,
Eut onliche loue nad leaute • and my lawful domes.
Gregorie wist this wel • and wilned to my soule
Sauacioun, for sothenesse • that he selgh in my werkes.
And, after that he wepte • and wilned me were graunted
Grace, wyth-outen any bede-byddynge • his bone was 
vnderfongen,
And I saued, as 3e may se • wlth-oute syngyng of masses
Ey loue, and by lerynge • of my lyuyng in treuthe,
Erou3te me fro bitter peyne • there no biddyng my3te.'
(E.XI.135-3^7)
Here is a clear exception to Will’s generalizations about 
baptism and the Church. Trajan, in a situation rem&irkably 
similar to that in St. Erkenwald. is granted a special grace 
sufficient to save him even after he had died and his soul 
gone to hell. No doubt, St. Gregory's prayers had the ef­
fect of bringing Trajan's case up for appeal before God, 
but Trajan makes quite clear that his good works, not the 
prayers of any pope, were sufficiently meritorious to evoke
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God’s mercy:
’Lo, 3e lordes, what leute did • by an emperoure 
of Rome,
That was an vncrystene creature • as clerkes findeth 
in bokes.
Nou3t thorw preyere of a pope • but for his pure 
treuthe
Was that Sarasene saued • as seynt Gregorie bereth 
witnesse.
(B.XI. 14-8-153 )
Contrary to Will’s earlier argument, then, this proves the 
efficacy of merltum de congruo in attracting God's genero­
sity. Trajan's good works were good in and of themselves 
and thus earned (ex natura rel debita) merits which, though 
not meeting the full standard of divine justice (de condign c). 
God could accept by virtue of his potentla absoluta. Con­
versely, it is equally true that even for those within the 
legal framework of the Church, salvation is not guaranteed 
without good works on the part of man: "Lawe with-outen
loue. . .leye there a bene" (B.XI.165).
Lewte next steps in to support and expand Trajan’s 
argument in a long speech (B.XI. 14-8-310), adducing still 
more evidence, as in the following lines:
For what euere clerkis carpe • of Crystenedome or elles,
Cryst to a comune woman seyde • in comune at a feste,
That fldes sua shulde sauen hir • and saluen hir of 
alle synnes.
(B.XI.210-212)
This emphasis on faith and love prepares us for the resolu­
tion of the problem, which begins in the next passus.
It would be difficult to determine which is the 
most important passus in the poem, but a very good case
could be made out for Passus XII. Imagination, the mind's 
synthetic power in medieval psychology,is the principal 
speaker here and represents the highest authority within 
man to guide Will. Imagination's Importance has already 
been established by Study, who foretold that he is the one 
who will finally sort out Will's intellectual problems (B. 
X.115), particularly those dealing with grace and merit.
Imagination begins by noting the limitations of 
the human mind, compared with the great power of God's 
grace:
Clergye and Kynde Witte • comth of si3te and techynge,
As the boke bereth witnesse • to buirnes that can 
rede,
Quod sclmus. loaulmur; ouod vidimus. testamur.
Of quod sclmus cometh clergye • and connynge of heuene,
And of quod vidimus cometh kynde witte • of si3te of 
dyuerse peple.
Ac grace is a gyfte of god • and of gret loue spryngeth;
Knewe neuere clerke how it cometh forth • ne kynde 
witte the weyes,
Nesclt allquls vnde venlt. aut quo vadit, etc.
T e .XII.66-73 )
This does not, however, have the same anti-intellectual 
intent that we saw in Will's discouraged speech at the end 
of Passus X. Imagination wishes only to stress the over­
riding significance of grace and man's inability ever to 
understand its workings. But he goes on to qualify this, 
as Will had not done, pointing out that learning is necessaiy 
in order to know how to do well:
1Bloomfield, pp* 170-3?^.
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Al-though men made bokes • god was the maistre,
And seynt spirit the saumplarye • and seide what men 
sholde write.
And ri3t as sy3te serueth a man • to se the heighe 
strete,
Ri3t so ledeth letterure • lewed men to resoun.
And as a blynde man is bataille • bereth wepne to fi3t^ 
And hath none happ with his axe • his enemye to hitte, 
Namore kan a kynde-witted man • but clerkes hym teche, 
Come for al his kynde witte • to Crystendome and be 
saued;
Whiche is the coffre of Crystes tresore • and clerkes 
kepe the keyes,
To vnlouken it at her lydynge • and to the lewed peple 
3yue mercy for her mysdedes • if it wole aske 
Boxomelich and benygneliche • and bidden it of grace.
(B.XII.l03-l1*O
Learning, then, is a necessary adjunct to grace. No man
may find his way to the faith of the Church, there to find
the treasures of grace needed to merit salvation de condlgna
unless he first has learned the way from the books that
clerks have written under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
Toward the end of this speech, however, Imagination's claim
that the Church is "the coffre of Crystes tresore" seems to
agree with Will's earlier argument that extra ecclesla nulla
salus. But it is important to note that Imagination does
not say that a non-Christian cannot be saved, only that the
man who comes "to Crystendome" can thereby receive saving
grace.
Imagination clarifies his position be referring to
the case of the Good Thief:
The thef that had grace of god • on Gode Fryday as thow 
speke,
Was (saved), for he 3elte hym creaunt to Cryst on the 
crosse • and knewleched hym gulty,
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And grace axed of god • that to graunten it is redy
To hem that boxomeliche biddeth it • and ben in wille
amenden hem.
(B.XII.192-195)
The Good Thief was, of course, not a baptized Christian,
nor was he one of the righteous Jews of the Old Testament.
God chose to elect him simply because he "boxomeliche"
asked for forgiveness for his sins and "ben in wille to
amenden hem." This is a clear case of merltum de congruo.
Because of the intrinsic goodness of his actions, the Good
Thief has been accepted de potentla Del absoluta. Still,
he had the special opportunity, not afforded to many other
good non-Christians, of being physically present with Christ
and able to seek his mercy directly. What, however, of the
case of Trajan? Imagination answers this by pointing out
that Trajan, too, merited God’s favor de congruo:
And ri3t as Troianus the trewe kny3t • tilde nou3t depe 
in helle.
That owre lorde ne had hym ll3tlich oute • so leue I 
the thef be in heuene.
(B.XII.210-211)
Significantly, the two scriptural texts that Imagination
cites to support his position are "aula reddlt vnlculque
luxta opera sua" (B.XII.213) and "Quare placult. aula volult?1 
12
(B.XII.216). The first explains how, according to the
Psalmisti God rewards men justly according to their works, 
and the second, used by Imagination as a gloss on the first,
*^In the Vulgate these are Ps. 51: 13 and Ps. 13^: 6.
Both texts are slightly changed by Langland, though he does 
preserve the essential meaning.
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voices the Psalmist's humble submission before God, whose 
will is supreme in all things. Of all the passages in 
Scripture he might have quoted here, these perhaps most 
clearly illustrate the influence of fourteenth-century 
voluntarism on Langland's poem.
Even so, the cases of Trajan and the Good Thief had 
already been reviewed earlier, and it is therefore not 
surprising to find Imagination supporting the view offered 
by Lewte. Eut Imagination does not stop here. He goes so 
far as to suggest that even Aristotle, Socrates, and Solomon 
could have accumulated such merltum de congruo as to be 
raised up to heaven, de potentia Dei absoluta:
'And where Aristotle be sauf or nou3t sauf • the 
sothe wote no clergye,
Ne of Sortes no of Salamon • no scripture can telle.
Ac god is so good, I hope • that sitth he gaf hem 
wittis
To wissen vs weyes there-with • (that wissen vs to be 
saued,
And the better for her bokes) • to bidden we ben holden.
That god for his grace • gyue her soules reste;
For lettred men were lewed men 3ut • ne were fore of 
her bokes.1
(E.XII.268-27*0 
Predictably, Will balks at such an argument;
'Alle thise clerkes,' quod I tho • 'that on Cryst 
leuen,
Seggen in her sarmones • that noyther ne Iewes,
Ne no creature of Cristes lyknesse • with-outen 
Crystendome worth saued.’
(B.XII.275-277)
Considering the medieval respect for authority and tradition^ 
this would seem, perhaps, to conclude the dispute. Still,
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Imagination presses on,
Contra* ' quod. Ymagynatyf tho • and cornsed for to 
loure,
And seyde, 'saluabltur vlx lustus in die ludlcl.1.
Ergo saluabltur.1 quod he • and seyde namore Latyne.
'Troianus was a trewe kny3te • and toke neuere Cristen- 
dome,
And he is sauf, so seith the boke • and his soule in 
heuene.
For there is fullyng of fonte • and fullyng in blod- 
shedynge,
And thorugh fuire is fullyng • and that is ferine bileue; 
Aduenlt ignis diulnus. non comburens. sed 
lllumlnans. fete.
Ac trewth that trespassed neuere • ne transuersed 
a3eines his lawe,
Eut lyueth as his lawe techeth • and leueth there be 
no bettere,
And if there were, he wolde amende • and in suche wille 
deyeth,
Ne wolde neuere trewe god • but treuth were allowed;
And where it worth or worth nou3t • the bileue is 
grete of treuth,
And an hope hangyng ther-inne • to haue a mede for his 
treuthe.
(B.XII.278-289)
Two points are especially noteworthy in this speech. First, 
Imagination draws the inference from 1 Peter k: 18 that
since the Just man will scarcely (vix) be saved on Judgment 
Day, this means that the Just man— that is, one whose works 
and motives are good, but who has not received a gift of 
grace— will be saved. Langland lends additional authority 
to this inference by placing it within the Scriptural quota­
tion ("Ergo saluabltur"). even though it does not appear in 
the Vulgate from which the rest of the text is taken!^ por
^The Vulgate reads, "Et si. Justus vlx salvabltur. lmplus. 
et peccator ubl parebunt?" Actually, St. Peter's point is 
the opposite of what Langland makes it out to be.
readers who were not careful enough to check the source, 
however, this would seem unimpeachable evidence to support 
Imagination's argument. His second major point is that 
there is a special kind of baptism, a "fullyng" of fire, 
that comes from believing in and following the truth re- . 
vealed to a man, whether this be Christian truth or not.
So long as a non-Christian believes that his own law is good 
and that there is none better, God will, according to 
Imagination, reward such a man. The alternative is unthink­
able: it is not possible that a "trewe god" would not
extend to the righteous non-Christian "a mede for his 
treuthe."
With this speech Langland ends Passus XII and Imagi­
nation vanishes. To sum up what progress has been made in 
defining a doctrine of grace and merit, we can recognize in 
Imagination's teaching a strong emphasis on merltum de 
congruo. based on the premise that good acts deserve some 
reward (ex natura rel deblta) from a just God, and on God's 
willingness to elect a man who has not fulfilled all the 
literal requirements of ordained law. Imagination had al­
ready protected himself in advance by stressing the impor­
tance of grace (B.XII.66-71; quoted above p. Ill), but this 
is virtually lost now in the overwhelming emphasis in the 
latter part of the passus on man's natural ability to merit 
God's acceptance. As it stands, this position is, if not 
outright Pelagianism, at the very least strongly colored by
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the Ockhamist tendencies In much fourteenth-century theology*
But though Imagination may have said his last word, 
Langland has by no means said his. The remainder of the 
Vita de Dowel should be read, I feel, as a qualification of 
Imagination's partial discription of Dowel. By himself. 
Imagination has given us only half of the truth about God's 
relation to man, expressed in terms of grace and merit, 
and Langland now goes on to present Haukyn, the active man, 
in order to explain the discipline a Christian must ordinar­
ily undergo if he wishes to win divine favor.
In Passus XIII, Will encounters Conscience and Pa­
tience, whom Conscience decides to Join in a pilgrimage to 
find Dowel. Together Patienoe and Conscience meet the per­
sonification of actlva vita, one Haukyn, and point out to 
him how his clothes are covered with the filth of the seven “ 
deadly sins, which are then described at considerable length. 
Prevailing upon him to repent. Patience agrees to explain 
the good Christian life to him in Passus XIV. Thus, as 
Imagination had earlier explained the value of a man's good 
works in meriting salvation, so now Patience goes a step 
further by showing how an active life may, or may not, lead 
to merit. Haukyn represents the everyday Christian who, 
though blessed with the grace of baptism as Aristotle and 
Trajan were not, has not lived up to his obligations to Co 
God and, through his love for God, to be charitable
toward his neighbor. Haukyn has devoted himself instead 
to satisfying selfish desires, but he is not entirely 
or irredeemably lost. He may yet be saved if he renounces 
cupiditas for carltas. according to Patience in a famous 
speech on the meaning of poverty:
1Paupertas,1 quod Pacience • ' est odibile bonum.
Remoclo curarum. possessio sine calumpnla.
donum dei. sanltatis mater:
Absque sollcitudlne semita. saplencle temperatrlx.
negoclum sine dampno:
Incerta fortuna. absque, solicltudine felicitas.
(E.XIV.275 ff.)
Poverty is not so much an economic state, as we would use 
the term in modern times, but rather a spiritual state.
It is truly a "donum del" in directing the vision of the 
Christian to see that the things of the world, though not 
evil in themselves, tempt him to turn inward, to glut his 
own selfish tastes as Haukyn had done, rather than Inspire 
him to lead a Christian life of love for others. Thus, to 
live a life of patient poverty does not imply living from 
hand to mouth in a dreary slum area, dressed in filthy 
rags; nor is it the poverty that the friars falsely claim 
to live amid actual splendor. True poverty, taken here as 
a Christian virtue, the epitome of Dowel, is a proper regard 
for the things of the material world as things to be used 
but not coveted. The Christian should always aspire to 
charity, which is actually man's loving return to God of 
the grace that God first extended to him. This is Patienee*s
119
argument, then, an argument derived from Augustine’s doc­
trine of the two loves in De Genesl ad litteram (XI.xv.20) 
and De civitate Dei (XIV.28).
In terms of grace and merit, Passus XIII and XIV 
set forth an exposition of how a man in active life may, 
though living in a state of mortal sin, receive the free 
gift of grace (gratia gratis data) that will prompt him to 
repent (meritum de congruo). seek reentry into a state of 
sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens). and thereby live 
the virtuous life of patient poverty that will earn God's 
acceptance (meritum de condlgno). In spite of whatever 
radical tendencies may have sprouted from time to time in 
Langland’s mind, he was quite careful to balance them by 
such securely orthodox doctrine as we see here.
Passus XV is transitional. Anima appears to warn 
Will against intellectual pride again, perhaps as a correc­
tive against taking Imagination too seriously:
’Thanne artow inparfit,' quod he • 'and one of Prydes 
kny3tes;
For such a luste and lykynge • Lucifer fel fram heuene: 
Ponam pedem meum in aaullone. et slmllls ero 
altlsslmo.
It were a3eynes kynde,1 quod he • ’and alkynnes resoun,
That any creature shulde kunne al • excepte Cryste one.
(B.XV.50-53)
This caution becomes even more specific further on in the 
same speech (B.XV.68-77)» when Anima directs the accusation 
of intellectual pride against those priests— "freres and 
fele other maistres"— who are more interested in the
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abstractions of theology than in practicing Christian values. 
By this time, Will asks what charity is (B.XV. 1*1-5)» and the 
discussion which ensues extends through the whole of the 
Vita de Dobet
Anima informs Will that, first of all, God's grace 
is necessary for a man to live a life of charity (B.XV.2k$). 
Next, Anima shows how the Church has been corrupted and is 
in a state of decline (B.XV.337-3^8)» such that faith alone 
may now have to save the common people: “That sola fldes
sufflclt • to saue with lewed peple" (B.XV.382), though the 
Church is still the proper means of conveying charity and 
grace to men:
And so it fareth by a barne • that borne is of wombe, 
Til it be crystened in Crystes name • and confermed of 
the bisshop,
It is hethene as to heueneward • and helpelees to the 
soule.
(£.XV.*f*f8-*f50)
Aside from the question of the proper means for transmitting
grace, however, Anima is quite insistent that grace must
assist man if he is to ascend to God:
Whan the heye kynge of heuene • sent his sone to erthe, 
Many miracles he wrou3te • man for to turne;
In ensaumple that men schulde se • that by sadde 
resoun
Men mi3t nou3t be saued • but thoru3 mercy and grace, 
And thoru3 penaunce and passion • and parfit bylef;
And by-cam man of a mayde • and metropolltanus,
And baptised and bishoped • with the blode of his herte 
Alle that wilned, and wolde • with inne-wit by-leue it.
(E.XV. 539-5*1-6)
Man's own efforts ("sadde resoun") may not earn heaven; 
only through mercy, grace, and faith can a man be Justified.
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Anima's teaching, therefore, expresses a clear doctrine 
meritum de condigno, which seems to serve no purpose 
in the larger context of the poem as a whole other than 
providing, or restoring, a balance between merlta de congruo 
and de condigno.
Anima does not, however, fall into the trap of
gravitating to the extreme of Bradwardlne in his reaction
against Ockhamist theology. Free will is clearly given
an important role in salvation in the description of the
Tree of Charity in Passus XVI. Charity, Anima points out,
grows In man at the instigation of grace, and man's soul,
the "land” in which the Tree of Charity is planted, is
leased to Liberum-Arbltrlum (B.XVI.13-17). The tree is
protected by three supports (”pyles"): the power of God
the Father, the Passion of Christ, and man's free will,
which is the "lieutenant” of the Holy Spirit (B.XVI.46-47).
Thus, while the tree of grace may first have been planted
by God, it must now be cultivated by man. For when man is
threatened by temptation, he must use Liberum-Arbltrlum to
reach for the grace of the Holy Spirit that will help him
to avoid sin and lead a good life:
Ac whan the Fende and the Flesshe • forth with the 
Worlde
Manasen byhynde me • my fruit for to fecche,
Thanne Liberum-Arbltrlum • laccheth the thridde plante, 
And palleth adown the pouke • purelich thorw grace 
And helpe of the holy goste • and thus haue I the 
maystrie.
(B.XVI.48-52)
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Anima does not have thfe same Ockhamist tendencies that Lewte 
and, even more so, that Imagination displayed. Instead, 
Anima preserves the need for a helping grace from God ' 
(gratia gratis data) more clearly than they, hut without 
polarizing the dispute by insisting that man's efforts are 
Irrelevant.
In the remainder of Passus XVI and throughout Passus 
XVII, Will meets the three theological virtues that enable 
a man to Dobet— Faith9 Hope, and Charity. He learns that 
Faith and Hope are useless without Charity (E.XVII.88-93)» 
through which the Christian may be justified by the grace 
of Christ's passion and death (B.XVII.9^-101). Then, the 
Samaritan, who represents ideal charity, presents analogies 
to explain what man must do in order to earn this justifying 
grace. The Holy Spirit (caritas increata) will only ignite 
with the flame of grace (caritas creata) those men who have 
proved themselves worthy (B.XVII.217-230 and 2*j4-256). No 
man is completely worthy of meriting salvation (de condlgno) 
without God's assistance, and the good works that a man does 
offer to God only return the gifts that God had already 
given him (E.XVII.266). On the other hand, man's actions 
can, if sins against charity, "quench'1 the grace of the Holy 
Spirit in the sense that man has been created free to will 
even his own moral destruction (B.XVII. 269-275). Yet for 
all this, there is always the possibility that God might
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choose, de potentla Del absoluta. to save a sinner whose 
merits were only partial (de congruo) and themselves In­
capable of reaching the full standard of God's justice 
(de condigno):
*1 pose I hadde synned so • and shulde now deye,
And now am sory, that so • the seint spirit agulte, 
Confesse me, and crye his grace • god, that al made,
And myldliche his mercy axe • my^te I nou3te be saued?' 
'3us,' seide the Samaritan • 'so wel thow my^te repente, 
That ri3twlsnesse thorw repentance • to reutn my3te 
torne.
(B.XVII.293-298)
So strong is the fourteenth-century Interest in preserving 
God's potentla absoluta that even in an orthodox discussion 
of grace and meritum de condigno it is impossible for 
Langland not to allow, In extreme cases, the possibility 
that God will supersede his ordinances to save a sinner.
The Vita de Dobet ends after Langland's masterful 
handling of the Harrowing of Hell in Passus XVII, which 
dramatizes the role of Christ in man's justification. This 
leads logically into the final question of where man may 
obtain the needed grace, the principal subject of the Vita 
de Dobest. While fully admitting the deficiencies of the 
institutional Church, Langland suggests that Dobest is 
ideally the life of grace and charity in the Church. For 
after Christ arose from the dead and showed himself to the 
apostles, he explained to them the life of Dobest:
And whan this dede was done • Dobest he tau3te,
And 3af Pleres power. • and pardoun he graunted 
To alle manere men • mercy and for3yfnes,
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Hym my3te men to assoille • and of alle manere synnes, 
In couenant that the! come • and knowleche to paye,
To Pieres pardon the Plowman • redde quod debes.
"TbTxIX.178-182)
Even more emphatically, Grace (the Holy Spirit, or gratia 
increata) goes on to explain the precise nature of this new 
contract between man and God, claiming that all “grace com- 
eth of my 3ifte“ (B.XIX.248), and conferring legal steward­
ship upon the Church, represented here by Piers:
For I make Pieres the Plowman • my procuratour and 
my reve,
And regystrere to receyue • redde quod debes,
My prowor and my plowman • Piers shal ben on erthe,
And for to tuyle treuthe • a teme shal he haue.1
(B.XIX.253-256)
Grace then gives Piers four sturdy oxen, the four evange­
lists, and four large bullocks, the four great Western 
Fathers, for his “teme.11 Eut all is not well. The Anti- 
Christ appears in Passus XX, and the Church is unable to 
protect itself against his onslaught because of weakness 
and dissension within. Finally, Conscience goes in search 
of Piers, praying for grace, as the poem ends:
•Bi Cryste,1 quod Conscience tho • 'I wil bicome a 
pilgryme,
And walken as wyde • as al the worlde lasteth,
To seke Piers the Plowman • that Pryde may destruye, 
And that freres hadde a fyndyng • that for nede 
flateren,
And contrepleteth me, Conscience; • now Kynde me 
auenge,
And sende me happe and hele • til I haue Piers the 
Plowman!’
And sitthe he gradde after grace • til I gan awake.
(B.XX.378-384)
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Taken as a whole, Piers Plowman is a long investi­
gation of the relationship between God and man. In the 
course of the poem, Langland takes up several subjects which 
are not pertinent to this analysis, but the doctrine of 
grace and merit is, as we have seen, one of his main con* 
cerns. Langland does not opt for one extreme pole or the 
other in the fourteenth-century controversy between conser­
vative Augustinians and radical Ockhamists, nor does he try 
to avoid the problem altogether or pass it off in a few 
facile lines. The poem may perhaps be read as an extended 
dialectic in which various positions are allowed to present 
themselves and to oppose one another, with the hope that 
out of this opposition would come some resolution of the 
problem of grace and merit. Though it would be unrealistic 
to push It too far, the general outline of this dialectic 
seems to follow a definite pattern. The Vislo serves to 
define the doctrinal problem and to raise the questions 
that the Vita will attempt to answer. After the issue of 
Piers* pardon, the search for Dowel is basically a search 
for ways in which a: man may merit salvation, with meritum 
de congruo getting most of the attention. In the section 
on Dobet, the search concentrates more heavily on meritum 
de condigno. though the value of man*s will and his works 
are also accounted for. Finally, Dobest represents how 
man may ideally merit salvation (de condigno) through the
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offices of the Church, whose power has been extablished de 
potentla Del ordinata. Piers Plowman is thus not only an 
important Middle English poem: it is just as significantly
a contribution to late medieval thought.
Chapter IV: Chaucer
Many scholars have studied Chaucer's philosophical 
and religious thought, but their labors have generally been
confined to three areas: his use of Boethius' Be consola-
1
tlone phllosophlae. his possible sympathy with Wyclif and 
2
the Lollards, and his indebtedness to certain Church 
Fathers for some of his poetic themes and for the tech­
niques of patristic exegeses.^ no one has yet investigated 
in detail Chaucer's relation to the great intellectual cri­
ses of his own time, however, and the much-needed study of
^-Among the most prominent studies are Bernard L. Jeffer­
son, Chaucer and the Consolation of Philosophy (Princeton* 
1917); Howard R. Patch, The Tradition of Boethius: A Study
of His Importance in Medieval Culture iNew York, 1935); 
Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences, 2nd 
ed. (New York, I960); Theodore A . Stroud, "Boethius' Influ­
ence on Chaucer's Troilus," MP,XLIX (:'951“52), 1-9» and 
Eruce L. Grenberg, "The Canon Yeoman's Tale: Boethian Wis­
dom and the Alchemists," Chaucer Review. I (Summer, 1966), 
37-54.
2There is an excellent summary of this controversy in 
Roger S. Loomis, "Was Chaucer a Laodicean?" in 5ssays and 
Studies in Honor of Carleton Brown (New York, 1 940), pp. 
129-1^8. See also W. A. Pantin, The English Church in the 
Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1955).
^For this approach in general, see the references listed 
in Chapter II, note 1. For two of its most successful 
applications to Chaucer, see D.W. Robertson, Jr., A Preface 
to Chaucer (Princeton, 1963) and Bernard F. Huppe, A Read­
ing of the Canterbury Tales (Albany, 1964).
12?
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his place In fourteenth-century thought remains to he writ­
ten.
Virtually everyone claims that Chaucer is securely 
orthodox, though at the same time frequently critical of 
various malpractices in the late medieval Church. This 
judgment is confirmed when we examine his position on grace 
and merit. He avoids the stimulating speculations of the 
Pearl-uoet and Langland, which are sometimes perilously 
close to heresy, and seems reluctant to question traditional 
doctrines, though he often makes use of them in his poems.
If we wished to compare him with an important fourteenth- 
century philosopher or theologian, we could probably find 
no one more suitable than Richard FitzRalph. For like Fitz- 
Ralph, Chaucer avoids the extremes of either the Ockhamists 
or the conservative Augustinians in favor of a safe middle 
ground between the two. This does not mean, of course, that 
Chaucer followed FitzRalph's teaching on any specific issue 
to which we can point with confidence, but rather that both 
men succeeded in contributing to the great debate over 
grace and merit without becoming directly involved with the 
principal disputants or proposing creative new positions of 
their own.
The aspect of the problem of grace and merit that
seems to have interested Chaucer most is the question of
future contingents. This had long been an issue in medieval 
philosophy, one which Chaucer was evidently familiar with
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through reading Augustine and Boethius, but it took a novel 
turn in the fourteenth century. Basically, the question 
asks what the relation is between God's foreknowledge, from 
all eternity, of every action that man will perform and 
man's capacity to act as a free moral agent. In terms of 
grace and merit, the issue is whether man's merits are de­
termined by God's grace or, conversely, man may in some 
fashion merit salvation by excercising free moral choice. 
Bradwardine and Wyclif, as might be expected, insisted on 
a strict doctrine of predestination, virtually excluding 
any real merit on man's part, because they considered this
necessary to preserve their doctrines of divine omnipotence
h
and the absolute requirement of grace for salvation. On 
the other side, the Ockhamlsts chose to soften the tradi­
tional insistence on divine foreknowledge in order to pro­
mote their doctrines of God's absolute power, including the 
power to change his mind about how future events should work 
out, and of man's hope for salvation through meritum de con- 
gruo. Although Ockham himself never went so far, some of 
his followers, such as Buckingham and Adam of Woodham, spe­
culated that God did not know all future events with abso­
lute certainty.^
**Xeff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, pp. 103-109; Rob­
son, pp,201-20?.
-*Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. pp. 23^2^0, 250- 
25^.
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We could assume a priori that a man of Chaucer’s 
learning and interests would have been aware of this contro­
versy, but the point is put beyond question by his own 
statement in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale:^
But what that God forwoot moot nedes bee,
After the opinioun of certein clerkis.
Witnesse on hym that any parflt clerk is,
That in scole is greet altercacioun 
In this mateere, and greet disputisoun,
And hath been of an hundred thousand men.
But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren 
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn,
Or Boece, or the Blsshop Bradwardyn,
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng 
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng,—
"Nedely" clepe I symple necessitee;
Or elles, if free choys be graunted me 
To dp that same thyng, or do it noght,
Though God forwoot it er that I was wroght;
Or if his wityng streyneth never a deel 
But by necessitee condieioneel.
(VII.323^-50)
Though in the very nest line he refuses to take a stand of 
his own— "I wol nat han to do of swich mateere” (VII.3251) —  
the passage quoted is sufficient to prove both that Chaucer 
knew of the fame of this debate and that he clearly under­
stood its implications. Still, it is one thing to be aware 
of a well-known dispute, even to have some knowledge of the 
various positions, but it is quite different to be fully 
familiar with the actual writings of the men involved. One
has only to think of how many of our own contemporaries com­
ment, apparently with great erudition, on such subjects as
^All quotations are from F. N. Robinson, ed. The Works 
of Geoffrey Chaucer, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1957TI
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existentialism, Freudian psychology, or Bonhoeffer’s theo­
logy who have never read any primary texts by an existen­
tialist, Freud, or Bonhoeffer. Similarly, it is impossible 
for us to know how much first-hand acquaintance Chaucer had 
with the works of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Ockham, Buckingham, 
and other controversialists of the time. Very little has 
actually been done on this subject by modern scholars, ex­
cept for the brief, random comments such as we find in
7
Patch's and Bloomfield's articles on Trollus and Crlseyde. 
Since Chaucer himself makes no further specific allusions 
beyond the one quoted above, we must go to his works them­
selves to see what evidence they may yield.
The question of divine providence and human freedom, 
another way of stating the problem of grace and merit, comes 
up again and again in Chaucer. In the Knight's Tale, for 
example, after Palamon has been released from prison, Arcite 
tries to assuage his grief at his own plight in the follow­
ing speech:
Allas, why pleynen folk so in commune 
On purveiaunce of God, or of Fortune,
That yeveth hem ful ofte in many a gyse 
Wei bettre than they kan hemself devyse?
Som man desireth for to han richesse,
That cause is of his mordre or greet siknesse;
And som man wolde out of his prisoun fayn,
That in his hous is of his meynee slayn.
Infinite harmes been in this mateere.
^Howard R. Patch, "Troilus on Predestination," JEGP XVII 
(1918), ^06-^10; Morton W. Bloomfield, "Distance and Predes­
tination in Troilus and Crlseyde." PMLA, LXXII (1957), 2 3.
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We witen nat what thing we preyen heere:
We faren as he that dronke is as a mous.
A dronke man woot wel he hath an hous,
But he noot which the rlghte wey is thlder,
And to a dronke man the wey is slider.
And certes, in this world so faren we;
We seken faste after felicitee,
But we goon wrong ful often, trewely.
(1.1251-67)
Man, Arcite argues, may wish one thing or another, and he 
may sometimes achieve and sometimes fail in his expectations. 
But man is "blind to what is truly "best for himself; this 
can "be decided by God alone. Already we may see a sugges­
tion of the kind of realism we usually associate with Augus­
tine and his many followers in the Middle Ages. All things 
are known eternally in the divine mind, and what happens 
here on earth is simply the working out of what has existed
as idea in God, who is outside of time.
But such a position inevitably leads to conplica- 
tlons, and Chaucer does not fail to point these out. Pala- 
mon, though free to return to his own country, may not re­
main to seek Emelye’s love. Thus, for him, the seeming good 
of his liberty is actually evil:
Thanne seyde he, ”0 crueel goddes that governe 
This world with byndyng of youre word eterne,
And writen in the table of atthamaunt
Youre parlement and youre eterne graunt,
What is mankynde moore unto you holde 
Than is the sheep that rouketh in the folde?
For slayn is man right as another beest,
And dwelleth eek in prison and arreest,
And hath siknesse and greet adversltee,
And ofte tymes giltelees, pardee.
What governance is in this prescience,
That giltelees tormenteth innocence?
And yet encresseth this al my penaunce,
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That man is bounden to his observaunce,
For Goddes sake, to letten of his wille,
Ther as a beest may al his lust fulfille.
And whan a beest is deed he hath no peyne;
Eut man after his deeth moot wepe and pleyne,
Though in this world he have cate and wo.
VJithouten doute it may stonden so.
(I.1303-22
This raises a new problem: if God’s foreknowledge is the
ultimate cause of all events in his creation, then God would 
appear to be the source of evil. Augustine had writhed in 
uncertainty over this same point, the biggest single factor 
impeding his conversion to Christianity for several years.
O
He records his anxiety in the Confessions. and the solution
o
he offered in De llbero arbltrlo. written shortly after he 
embraced the faith, remained the orthodox standard in the
Church throughout the Middle Ages and even beyond. However,
the problem was raised anew by the conservative Augustinlans 
in the fourteenth century, as it was to be raised again in 
the seventeenth century "by conservative Augustinlans. For 
if, in order to combat the Ockhamists, Bradwardine's "modern 
Pelagians," it seemed necessary for conservatives to stress 
the overwhelming power of divine grace, then the consequent 
lessening of human freedom placed the responsibility for 
evil back on God. This is the significance of Falamon’s 
comments on God’s "eterne graunt," which causes "greet
^Especially in Bk. V, ch. 10; Bk. VII, ch. 3 and ch. 12. 
9See 3.7-71; 1.16.115; 2.19.199.
134
adversitee" for even "giltelees” men. Some might reply that 
Palamon is, after all, a pagan and could not be expected 
to achieve Christian insight „nto the problem. Eut such a 
reply would not explain the obviously Christian reference 
to punishment in the afterlife toward the end of the pas­
sage. Such punishment is inexplicable if God is the source 
of evil, and if man is incapable of acting as a free moral 
agent. Far from being "pagan,” this is a very neat reductio 
of Bradwardine’s doctrine of grace. Still, Chaucer refuses, 
as in the Nun1s Priests Tale, to press his point any fur­
ther:
The answere of this lete I to dyvynys,
But wel I woot that in this world greet pyne ys.
(1.1323-24)
This is an interesting instance of Chaucer’s strategy when 
advancing arguments that might prove theologically contro­
versial. He seems to withdraw in favor of the "dyvynys,” 
but at the same time he has clearly articulated the outlines 
of his argument.
Finally, we come to the famous speech of Theseus at 
the end of the tale. This has long been associated with the 
alleged "influence" of Boethius on Chaucer, a relationship 
that I feel has been greatly exaggerated and perhaps just 
as greatly misunderstood. Chaucer does indeed fairly closely 
paraphrase part of the De consolatlone phllosophlae in this
speech,as he also does In several other poems, "but this 
is not sufficient ground for inferring that Chaucer was al­
ways approving of what he found in his source, or that he 
was slavishly following Boethius' ideas without seeing in 
them fourteenth-century implications which Boethius could 
not have foreseen. It is difficult, for example, to see 
how Chaucer could have missed the significance for his own 
times of the following lines from Theseus' speech:
What maketh this but Juppiter, the kyng,
That is prince and cause of alle thyng,
Convertyng al unto his propre welle 
From which it is dirryved, sooth to telle?
And heer-agayns no creature on lyve.
Of no degree, availleth for to stryve.
(1.3035-40)
Theseus then goes on to recommend a very specific course of 
action for man to follow, which closely parallels Bradwar­
dine 's doctrine of grace and meritum de condigno:
Thanne is it wysdom, as it thynketh me,
To maken vertu of necessitee,
And take it weel that we may nat eschue,
And namely that to us alle is due.
And whoso gruccheth ought, he dooth folye,
And rebel is to hym that al may gye.
(1.3041-46)
Man may be at times so perverse that he "gruccheth," but his 
salvation rests in his passive submission to God's will. 
There is no suggestion here of man's own merits, only of the
power of God's grace. This is even more evident in Theseus'
conclusion:
iOEoethius, ii, m. 8; iv, pr. 6; m. 6; 111, pr. 10
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What may I conclude of this longe serye,
But after wo I rede us to he merye,
And thanken Juppiter of al his grace?
(1.3067-69)
None of Chaucer's alert contemporaries could have been de­
ceived by the reference to Jupiter in the context of such 
a discussion. This is clearly the Christian God we are 
dealing with: the Lord of History, who works all things
to his will by virtue of his grace, who has known all things 
from all eternity, and who may freely choose to extend his 
grace to whom he wishes. This is the God of Archbishop 
Bradwardine.
The Knight1s Tale, however, is still a fairly early 
work in the Chaucer canon, and his views on grace and merit, 
providence and freedom, expanded and became more complex as 
his understanding of the problem deepened. In Troilus and 
Crlseyde. which comes from roughly the same period in Chau­
cer's career, we already see some diversity in his approach 
developing. The most famous discussion of the problem of 
providence and necessity comes in Book IV, after Troilus has 
learned of his reversal of fortune. Pandarus, ever sanguine, 
tries to reason his friend out of his despair by arguing 
that man does have some control over his own destiny:
Thenk ek Fortune, as wel thiselven woost,
Helpeth hardy man to his enprise,
And weyveth wrecches for hire cowardise.
(IV.600-602)
Pandarus is for action, which of course implies a certain 
measure of freedom with which action could be meaningfully
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performed. Not long after, however, Troilus responds with 
his speech on necessity, perhaps the most often quoted pas­
sage in the poem.
Troilus begins by presenting his own position before
going on to consider possible objections and alternatives:
"For al that comth, comth by necessitee:
Thus to ben lorn, it is my destinee.
"For certeynly, this wot I wel,"he seyde,
"That forsight of divine purveyaunce 
Hath seyn alwey me to forgon Criseyde,
Syn God seeth every thyng, out of doutance,
And hem disponyth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothly for to be,
As they shul comen by predestyne.
(IV.958-966)
As with the Knightfs Tale. Chaucer is once again following 
a passage from Eoethius rather closely,11 but this should 
not blind us to the fact that Chaucer was writing such a 
passage in the fourteenth century. In his own historical 
context, Chaucer could not have written Troilus* speech 
without understanding its implications as a comment on the 
fourteenth-century debate over grace and merit, no matter 
what his literary "source" may have been. This is unmistak­
able as Troilus goes on to say,
"Eut natheles, alias! whom shal I leeve?
For ther ben grete clerkes many oon,
That destyne thorugh argumentes preve;
And som men seyn that, nedely, ther is noon,
But that fre chols is yeven us everychon.
0, welaway! so sleighe arn clerkes olde,
That I not whos opynyoun I may holde.
(iv.967-973)
11Eoethius, v, pr. 2 and 3 .
Aside from the rhetorical deception (Chaucer knows full well 
which "clerkes" Troilus will favor in this dispute), Troi­
lus does extablish two sides to the argument. The first 
side, that of the predestinarian theologians such as Brad­
wardine and Wyclif, is set forth as follows:
"For som men seyn, if God seth al biforn,
Ne God may nat deceyved ben, parde,
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworn,
That purveiance hath seyn before to be.
Wherfore I sey, that from eterne if he
Hath wist byfom oure thought ek as oure dede,
We han no fre chois, as thise clerkes rede.
"For other thought, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere mo,
Hath feled byforn, withouten ignoraunce.
For yf ther myghte ben a variaunce 
To writhen out fro Goddls purveyinge,
Ther nere no .prescience of thyng comynge,
"Eut it were rather an opynyoun 
Uncerteyn, and no stedfast forseynge.
(IV.97^-989)
The real motive behind this argument is a desire to preserve 
the doctrine of God's eternal omniscience, to protect God 
from the moderai. even if this means eliminating "fre 
chois." It is well for us to recall here that some of the 
more extreme Ockhamists, notably Buckingham and Adam of 
Voodham, were willing to take the other half of the God-man 
relationship, limiting God's foreknowledge in order to pre­
serve man's freedom. The next lines could not, perhaps, 
be a more explicit condemnation of their position unless 
Troilus had identified them by name— which surely would have 
been odd for an ancient Trojan warrior to have done:
And certes, that were an abusioun,
That God sholde han no parfit cler wytynge 
More than we men that han doutous wenynge 
Eut swich an errour upon God to gesse 
Were fals and foul, and wikked corsednesse.
(IV.990-99*0
Thus does Troilus dispatch the problem of future contingents. 
Chaucer, of course, enjoys the protection of the rhetorical 
device of using Troilus to voice these opinions. No one 
could accuse this amiable diplomat of holding a potentially 
dangerous opinion in his own time, nor can we in ours 
facilely attribute the same to the poet behind the character 
in the poem. Still, Chaucer’s contemporaries, at least 
those who were well read and sensitive to the chief ideas 
of the time, must have recognized his cunning adaptation of 
the debate over grace and merit to the artistic structure 
of his poem.
Another problem remains, however, since both the 
Knight’s Tale and Troilus and Crlseyde deal with pagans.
We might well ask how grace and merit can be considered a 
serious doctrinal theme in these poems if their central 
characters are never represented as having direct knowledge 
of the Christian faith, and if, as unbaptised heathen, they 
might not receive the grace ordinarily required for salva­
tion. In St. Erkenwald and Piers Plowman, as we have seen, 
the issue of good pagans was sometimes raised in the context 
of the debate over grace and merit. Some thinkers could 
appeal to the potentla Del absoluta to accept the de congruo
merit of a righteous pagan as sufficient for salvation, but 
such a teaching at least bordered closely on Pelagianism. 
Chaucer skillfully avoids the problem by neither awarding 
his good pagans heaven nor condemning them to hell, thus 
safeguarding his religious orthodoxy and not alienating 
his readers' sympathy for these characters at the same time. 
This is the compromise of the tactful artist, not the bold­
ness of the searching critic. Such, on this level at least,
is the difference between Chaucer and Langland.
Toward the end of the Knight's Tale, for example,
we meet the following account of Arcite*s death:
His spirit chaunged hous and wente ther,
As I cam nevere, I kan nat tellen wher.
Therfore I stynte, I nam no divinistre;
Of soules fynde I nat in this registre,
Ne me ne list thilke opinions to telle
Of hem, though that they writen wher they dwelle.
Arcite is coold, ther Mars his soule gye!
(1.2809-15)
Chaucer refuses to discuss the issue, even to present the 
opinions of others on the subject of the final disposition 
of souls. He merely consigns Arcite's soul to Kars, rather 
than to one of the angels, and retreats behind his now famil­
iar rhetorical pose: "I nam no divinistre." Still, he does
allow that God will send his love, or grace, to those who 
merit it, observing that this is the reason for Palamon's 
final happiness wf :h Emelye:
And God, that al this wyde world hath wroght,
Sende hym his love that hath it deere aboght;
For now is Palamon in alle wele,
Lyvynge in blisse, in richesse, and in heele,
And Emelye hym loveth so tendrely,
And he hire serveth al so gentilly,
That nevere was ther no word hem bitwene 
Of jalousie or any oother teene.
(I.3099-3306)
Palamon has not simply earned Emelye; he has merited God's 
favor (de congruo), and God in turn has elected to reward 
Palamon with "Lyvynge in blisse." It would be tempting to 
take this suggestion and apply it to Arcite as well, arguing 
that if one can merit God's good will, perhaps the other 
might also. This could, I suppose, admit the inference that 
God would, de potentla absoluta. possibly elect Arcite on 
the basis of meritum de congruo— except that Chaucer has 
already refused to entertain this possibility himself.
The case of Troilus and Crlseyde is rather different. 
A great deal has been written about Chaucer's contrast be­
tween earthly and heavenly love, especially by critics try­
ing to reconcile the structural problem in the poem. The 
first four and a half books of Troilus seem, according to 
this view, to represent one ethos, while the "palinode'1 at 
the end suggests quite another. This seems to be the famil­
iar theme of caritas versus cupldltas. which pervades so 
much medieval literature.12 In spite of Its popularity in 
recent years, this attempt to explain the poem remains quite 
unsatisfactory because, even though Chaucer does define the 
limits of human love by contrast with God's love, he never 
12See Augustine's De Genes1 ad lltteram. 11.35*20; and 
also De civitate Dei. XIV, 28.
condemns Troilus for loving as he did, nor does he categori­
cally condemn earthly love per se. After all, for Troilus 
at least, human love is more than the "feyned" emotion that 
Chaucer contrasts with Christian charity, Troilus operates 
within the only context he knows, and for him, unlike Cri- 
seyde, Pandarus, or Diomede, love has a spiritual quality 
that transcends sexual experience alone, Troilus* concep­
tion of love comes, in fact, as close to the Christian con­
cept of caritas as was theologically tenable without a spe­
cial infusion of grace from the Holy Spirit,
In terms of a theology of grace and merit, this high, 
though non-Christian, ideal of love has several very inter­
esting Implications, First, Chaucer uses the Christian 
doctrine of God's conversion of man through grace as a model 
to emphasize the dignity of Troilus1 love» In Book III, as 
a comment on the Joyous union between Crlseyde and himself, 
Troilus celebrates the cosmic power of love:
"Love, that of erthe and se hath governaunce.
Love, that his hestes hath in hevenes hye,
Love, that with an holsom alliaunce 
Halt peples Joyned, as hym lest hem gye,
Love, that knetteth lawe of compaignie,
And couples doth in vertu for to dwelle,
Bynd this acord, that I have told and telle.
"That that the world with feith, which that is 
stable,
Dlverseth so his stowndes concordynge,
That elementz that ben so discordable 
Holden a bond perpetuely durynge,
That Phebus mote his rosy day forth brynge,
And that the mone hath lordshlpe over the 
nyghtes,—
Al this doth Love, ay heried be his myghtesi
"That that the se, that gredy is to flowen, 
Constreyneth to a certeyn ende so 
His flodes that so fiersly they ne growen 
To drenohen erthe and al for evere mo;
Al that now loveth asondre sholde lepe,
And lost were al that Love halt now to-hepe.
(111.1744-64)
It Is hard to see how this could he either ignored or ex­
plained away as cupldltas in any serious, thoroughgoing 
analysis of the poem. Troilus, pagan though he may he, has 
a distinctly spiritual understanding of love as the great 
cosmic force that hinds all the diverse elements of the 
universe into a coherent whole. Further, he goes on to 
point out that God extends his love to all his creatures in 
order to convert them hy its power and hind them in a new 
moral relationship:
"So wolde God, that auotour is of kynde,
That with his hond Love of his vertu liste 
To cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde,
That from his hond no wight the wey out wlste;
And hertes colde, hem wolde I that he twiste 
To make hem love, and that hem liste ay rewe 
On hertes sore, and kepe hem that hen trewe!"
(III.1765-71)
The sentiment expressed here, though paraphrased from a 
passage in Boethius,1^ has its roots in Augustine and the 
Platonic tradition. Here is Augustine*s God, who seeks out 
his creatures because of his perfect love for them, so that 
he might "cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde." According­
ly, Chaucer and his fourteenth-century readers could scarce­
ly have failed to recognize the implicit conception of grace
13Cf. note 10, above.
In Troilus* '•hymn.11
Next, the narrator goes on to reveal how Troilus,
as a result of his internal, spiritual conversion, has "been
energized to perform meritorious works:
In alle nedes, for the townes werre,
He was, and ay, the first in armes dyght,
And certeynly, but if that bokes erre,
Save Ector most ydred of any wight;
And this encrees of hardynesse and myght 
Com hym of love, his ladies thank to wynne,
That altered his spirit so withinne.
(III.1772-78)
These actions are, of course, to be expected of a knight 
who lives up fully to the chivalric code, and as such they 
might seem by themselves to have little moral value, at 
least from a Christian point of view. But these are not 
the only manifestations of his conversion. Even more sig­
nificantly, the narrator also observes that
And moost of love and vertu was his speche,
And in despit hadde alle wrecchednesse;
And douteles, no nede was hym biseche 
To honouren hem that hadde worthynesse.
And esen hem that weren in destresse.
(111.1786-90)
Besides these clearly charitable attitudes and actions, we 
even learn how Troilus has now become able to purge himself 
of sins
And though that he be come of blood roial,
Hjjrm liste of pride at no wight for to chace;
Benigne he was to ech in general.
For which he gat hym thank in every place.
Thus wolde Love, yheried be his grace.
That Pride, Envye, and Ire, and Avarice 
He gan to fie, and everich other vice.
(III.1800-6)
1^4
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even learn how Troilus has now become able to purge himself 
of sin:
And though that he be come of blood roial,
EJm liste of pride at no wight for to chace;
Benigne he was to ech in general.
For which he gat hym thank in every place.
Thus wolde Love, yherled be his grace,
That Pride, Envye, and Ire, and Avarice 
He gan to fie, and everich other vice.
(III.1800-6)
1^5
The Christian doctrine of grace is so obvious in this pas­
sage that it hardly need be pointed out. According to or­
thodox tradition, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the 
sinner may be reclaimed by God's loving grace (gratia gratis 
data), in terms of which the man may perform naturally good 
works that merit God's further favor, ex natura rel debita, 
in the form of Justifying grace (gratia gratum faclens) 
with which the converted sinner can perform supematurally 
good actions. In the passage Just quoted, Troilus does per­
form such supematurally good actions for, as Augustine 
constantly pointed out, he could not avoid sin without the 
llbertas that comes only from God's special infusion of 
grace.^ This raises a rather disturbing problem since 
Chaucer has attributed to Troilus actions that could not,
according to orthodox doctrine, be performed by anyone who
\
had not already been baptized. To argue that Troilus could 
do so without the sacrament is Pelagian; to argue that he 
received a special dispensation, de potentla Del absoluta. 
as did the magistrate in St. Erkenwald and Trajan in Piers 
Plowman, is to agree with the Ockhamlsts that a good pagan 
could earn Justifying grace through merltum de congruo. 
Chaucer, as we might expect, refuses both alternatives. He 
sidesteps the whole issue, or at least the responsibility 
for answering it, by attributing these passages to his
I**
Enchiridion. 30-32.
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literary source: at the very end of the section, he lays
it all in the hands of "myn auctour" (III.1837).
At the end of the poem, finally, Chaucer reminds
us of the orthodox position on grace and merit: only through
union with Christ, presumably in the Church, may we aspire
to God's love and respond by works that may acheive meritum
de condlgno:
0 yonge, fresshe foldes, he or she.
In which that love up groweth with youre age,
Repeyreth horn fro worldly vanyte,
And of youre herte up aasteth the visage
To thilke God that after his ymage
Yow made, and thynkethed. nys but a faire
This world, that passeth soone as floures faire.
And loveth hym, the which that right for love 
Upon a crois, oure soules for to beye,
First starf, and roos, and sit in hevene above;
For he nyl falsen no wight, dar I seye.
That wol his herte al holly on hym leye.
And syn he best to love is, and most meke.
What nedeth feynede loves for to seke?
(V. 1 8 3 5 - W
There is nothing original here, nor, perhaps, do we have a 
right to expect some startling new doctrinal speculation 
from Chaucer at this point. Against the Ockhamists he 
expresses confidence in the potentla Del ordlnata: God will 
not, as some of the radicals claimed, use his potentla abso­
lute to overturn or contradict what he has ordained because 
"he nyl falsen no wight." At the same time, Chaucer draws 
a contrast between carltas and cupldltas. between Christ's 
redemption and "feynede loves." He reinforces this distinc­
tion by condemning the religious rites of the pagans of 
ancient Troy:
1^7
Lo here, of payens corsed olde rites,
Lo here, what alle hire goddes may availle;
Lo here, thlse wrecched worides appetites;
Lo here, the fyn and guerdon for travallle 
Of Jove, Appollo, of Mars, of swlch rascallle!
(V.18^9-53)
Many critics have recognized the problem with this "pali- 
node," some arguing that It Introduces an Inconsistency In 
the ethical stance of the poem as a whole*'* and others re­
plying that such a moral Judgment as Chaucer makes at the 
end Is Implicit in the poem from the very beginning.1** 
Neither group manages to solve the difficulty altogether and 
so, while I have no pretensions to answering the question to 
everyone*s satisfaction here, I would like to put it in a 
different light than has usually been offered.1^
It seems inconsistent with the high conception of
Troilus* spiritual love that we saw earlier to argue that
this, like the obviously "feynede loves" of Criseyde and 
Diomede, is rank cupidity and deserves Chaucer's ccndemnatlon
15For example, C# S. Lewis' famous comment in The Alle­
gory of Love (Oxford, 1936): "We hear the bell clang; and
the children, suddenly hushed and grave, and a little frigh­
tened, troop back to their master" (p. 4-3).
16A good example is Eugene E. Slaughter, "Love and Grace 
in Chaucer's Troilus." in Essays In Honor of Walter Clyde 
Curry. Vanderbilt Studies in the Humanities, II (Nashville,vm pp• 6i-?6.
17rMy interpretation is similar to Slaughter's and the 
excellent study by T. P# Dunning, "God and Man in Troilus 
and Criseyde." in English and Medieval Studies Presented 
to J . R . R. Tolkien on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birth­
day, ed. Norman Davis and C. L. Wrenn (London, 1962), pp. 
T35-182.
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at the end. The same patristic tradition that censured 
cupidity also recognized that the pagans were, like Chris-: 
tians, under divine providence and sometimes showed remark­
able witness to God through philosophical insight or leading 
excellent lives. Augustine, for example, carefully allowed 
that some of the pagans might even be a source of divine
revelation, though obviously of not equal authority with
18the Scripture. And so there was a clear precedent for 
Chaucer, if he wished to follow it, to glorify the high 
spiritual values of a good pagan while at the same time 
lamenting that same man*s inability to share in the Church 
Triumphant. Chaucer achieves this delicate balance, I thinly 
by a very subtle rhetoric.
After the "palinode," Chaucer neatly dodges respon­
sibility for applying its sententia to Troilus by once again 
retreating behind his literary source:
Lo here, the forme of olde clerkis speche 
In poetrle, if ye hire bokes seche.
(V.18 5*K55)
By this device, Chaucer may disavow any charge that he has 
personally censured the love of the very man whom he had 
earlier praised so highly. Further, it is interesting to 
note the final disposition of Troilus* soul, which is here 
so specifically described, and contrast it with the Indefi­
niteness of Arcite*s afterlife in the Knight * s Tale. Tfcbilhs,
*®De doctrlna Christiana. 2.18.28.
1^9
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unlike Arclte, Is much more clearly a moral hero as well as
a valorous knight, Pandarus even says of him that he might
become a great saint, using language which has obvious
Christian reference:
Lat nat this wrecched wo thyn herte gnawe,
But manly sette the world on six and sevene;
And if thow deye a martyr, go to hevenef
(IV.621-623)
But Chaucer, as a Christian who wishes to preserve his or­
thodoxy, may not send Troilus to heaven. The extra ecclesla 
nulla salus concept was still much too strong in Christian 
thought to allow any but the most daring thinkers to specu­
late beyond it. So, as usual, Chaucer evades the issue by 
granting Troilus the reward of ascending to the eighth sphere 
after death. This is really an ambiguous solution, however, 
since there was no allowance for such an afterlife in the 
Christian theology. But it is poetically appropriate to 
reward Troilus in this fashion for the good life that he has
led, and it is theologically shrewd to place him in a non-
10
Christian "heaven." 7 In terms of the doctrine of merit, 
Chaucer could not really have represented Troilus as re­
ceiving merltum de condigno, but he did show Troilus per­
forming good works that would merit, de oongruo. some sort
of divine favor. Thus, for the half-merit of the pagan 
Troilus, Chaucer hits upon the answer of the half-reward of
*^See Morton W. Bloomfield, "The Eighth Sphere: A Note
on Chaucer*s Troilus and Crlsevde. V, 1809," MLR. LIII (195& 
^08-^10.
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the eighth sphere* Nor was this apparently a casual choice
so far as Chaucer was concerned, for there is good evidence
that, since the stanzas describing Troilus' "salvation"
(V.18O7-27) do not appear in the alpha-text of the poem, he
only made this deoision after careful study and delibera- 
20
tlon. Such an addition also improves the structure of the 
poem, at least from the perspective of its doctrine, because 
without it there is a very clear contradiction between the 
way In which Troilus has been treated throughout most of the 
poem and Chaucer's moral conclusion. Thus, while we may not 
applaud him for any stimulating new insights into the prob­
lem of grace and merit, we must admire Chaucer's artistic 
ingenuity in solving this problem in Troilus and Criseyde.
Interesting as these speculations about poems treat­
ing good pagans may be, it is when we turn to his good 
Christians that we clearly see Chaucer's doctrine of grace 
and merit. Several of the Canterbury Tales deal directly 
with this doctrine and here, as in the poems we have already 
considered, Chaucer is always cautiously conservative.
Though he seems at times to lean toward Bradwardlne, he 
never goes to the predestinarian extremes of the Doctor 
Profundus. Chaucer evidently has no sympathy with the radi­
cal Ockhamlsts, but at the same time he avoids gravitating to 
the opposite pole in the dispute. For Chaucer, God Indeed
^®See Robinson's note, p. 912.
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must send man grace as a prerequisite for any meritorious 
works that might earn eternal salvation. Still, man has a 
responsibility to God as well, to respond freely and lov­
ingly to the gift of graoe and, with its help, both to avoid 
sin and to live a life of charity and submission to God*s 
will.
Chaucer perhaps never comes closer to Bradwardine1s 
teaching on grace than in the Man of Lawfs Tale, with its 
long description of how Custance endures unbelievable hard­
ships with Christian submission of her will to God*s provi­
dence, assisted as she is by divine grace. After the 
slaughter of the party from Rome, for example, she is put 
into an open, rudderless boat to be set out to sea, and her 
prayer sums up her attitude throughout the poem:
She blesseth hire, and with ful pitous voys 
Unto the croys of Crist thus seyde she:
"0 cleere, o welful autur, hooly croys,
Reed of the Lambes blood ful of pitee,
That wessh the world fro the olde inlquitee,
Me fro the feend and fro his clawes kepe.
That day that I shal drenchen in the depe.
Victorious tree, proteccioun of trewe,
That oonly worthy were for to bere
The Kyng of Hevene with his woundes newe,
The white Lamb, that hurt was with a spere,
Flemere of feendes out of hym and here 
On which thy lymes feithfully extenden,
Me kepe, and ylf me myght my lyf t'amenden."
(II.^9-^62)
This kind of prayer was quite common, of course, in the 
Middle Ages, and the only thing distinctive about it from 
our point of view here is that Custance, bereft of any power
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to save herself, places herself utterly In the hands of God. 
This implies an attitude toward grace and merit which goes 
beyond the immediate, literal circumstances of Custance in 
the story. She represents the type of the good Christian, 
faced with the many adversities and uncertainties of life 
in this world, who must rely on divine grace rather than 
human merit in the hope of ultimate salvation. Such a 
reading is supported by Chaucer's explanation of why Cus­
tance did not perish at sea or,earlier, at the feast:
Men myghten asken why she was nat slayn 
Eek at the feeste? who myghte hlr body save?
And 1 answere to that demande agayn.
Who saved Danyel in the horrible cave 
Ther every wight save he, malster and knave.
Was with the leon frete er he asterte?
No wight but God, that he bar in his herte.
God liste to shewe his wonderful myracle 
In hire, for we sholde seen his myghty werkis;
Crist, which that is to every harm trlacle,
By certeine meenes ofte, as known clerkls,
Dooth thyng for certeln ende that ful derk is 
To marines wit, that for oure Ignorance 
Ne konne noght knowe his prudent purvelance.
(11.470-483)
God is all-powerful, and he may extend the power of his 
grace to those whom he favors, even if this means performing 
miracles in their behalf. Further, it is unwise to specu­
late rashly about how God may execute his will— an interes­
ting comment on the many fourteenth-century speculations 
of this kind— since it is enough to know that what happens 
is a result of God's having willed it. This is all that 
concerns Custance, and this, by extension, is all that need
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concern us as well. Chaucer never says that Custance does 
not have a will of her own, or even the freedom to disobey 
God, but he does place such a heavy stress on providence and 
grace that any question of freedom and merit seems almost 
irrelevant. If this were all of Chaucer*s poetry that sur­
vived, we would probably quite reasonably describe him as a 
follower of Bradwardine today. But we do have other poems 
about Christians caught in times of extreme crisis, and 
their responses, while not in any sense diminishing the 
importance of grace, illustrate how much value Chaucer was 
willing to assign to human action.
The Tale of Mellbee is almost the direct opposite of 
the story of Custance. For the allegory of Melibeus drama­
tizes the importance of man's free choice, under the guid­
ance of Prudence, to regain Christian wisdom, or sapientla 
(Sophie). Accordingly, Prudence describes how Melibeus came 
to be attacked ahd his daughter Sophie wounded in the first 
place:
Thy name is Melibee, this is to seyn, *a man that 
drynketh hony.'/ Thou hast ydrohke so muchel hony of 
sweete temporeel rlchesses, and delices and honours 
of this world,/ that thou art dronken, and hast for- 
geten Jhesu Crist thy creatour./ Thou ne hast nat doon 
to hym swich honour and reverence as thee oughte,/ ne 
thou ne hast nat wel ytaken kep to the wordes of Ovide, 
that seith,/ 'Under the hony of the goodes of the body 
is hyd the venym that sleeth the soule.'/ And Salomon 
seith, 'If thou hast founden hony, ete of it that 
sufflseth?/ for if thou ete of it out of mesure, thou 
shalt spewe,' and be nedy and povre./ And peraventure 
Crist hath thee in despit, and hath turned awey fro 
thee his face and his eeris of misericorde;/ and also 
he hath suffred that thou hast been punysshed in the
15^
manere that thow hast ytrespassed./ Thou hast doon 
synne agayn oure Lord Crist? for certes, the three 
enemys of mankynde, that is to seyn, the flessh, the 
feend, and the world,/ thou hast suffred hem entre in 
to thyn herte wilfully by the wyndowes of thy body,/ 
and hast nat defended thyself suffisantly agayns hire 
assautes and hire temptaciouns, so that they han 
wounded thy soule in fyve places?/ this is to seyn, 
the deedly synnes that been entred into thyn herte by 
thy fyve wittes./ And in the same manere oure Lord 
Crist hath woold and suffred that thy three enemys 
been entred into thyn house by the wyndowes,/ and han 
ywounded thy doghter in the forseyde manere."/
(VII. liWO-26)
There is here, to be sure, some emphasis on grace, especi­
ally in the suggestion that Christ has withdrawn his favor 
from Melibeus. But the most important point is that Meli­
beus, a free moral agent capable of performing God's will 
to the extent that he knows it, has deliberately allowed 
himself to wallow in the "honey of the world, thereby losing 
God's support and falling into sin. In this passage by it­
self, however, there is some uncertainty over the kind of 
merit that a man may earn and the species of grace required 
for such merit. If, for example, Melibeus had defended him­
self sufficiently against temptations from the world, the 
flesh, and the devil, could he have avoided sin? Would such 
a defense have required prevenient grace, or is God's friend­
ship contingent upon man's actions? The answer to these 
questions is not long in coming: "For the victorie of ba-
tallles that been in this world lyth nat in greet nombre or 
multitude of the peple, ne in the vertu of man,/ but it lith 
in the wyl and in the hand of oure Lord God Almyghty"
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(VII,1656-57)• It is unthinkable that Chaucer give any 
other answer because all orthodox Christians since the time 
of Augustine had insisted on making all merits depend ulti­
mately on the will of God, But it is also important to 
point out that Chaucer allows man as large a measure of free­
dom as possible within the general context of grace, cer* 
tainly much more than Bradwardine allowed, or even Chaucer 
himself in the Man of Law's Tale. In fact, the whole alle­
gory of the Tale of Mellbee implicitly demands a doctrine 
of human merit based on an understanding of man as a free 
moral agent. Otherwise, it is hard to see the artistic 
function of Prudence In the tale,or even to see why such a 
story would have any reference to the virtue of prudence 
at all.
*n Friar1s Tale, too, there is a clear emphasis 
on man's freedom to make responsible moral choices, on the 
basis of which his soul will finally be saved or damned.
Again and again, the devil points out to the corrupt sum- 
moner that he may not take anyone who performs some sinful, 
or perhaps seemingly sinful, action to hell. It is neces­
sary first to determine the subjective guilt of the man, to 
learn if he really Intends to turn away from God and lose 
his soul in sin. Only if a man is subjectively, as well as 
objectively, guilty of serious sin, may the devil then claim 
his soul. This is equally true of the carter, who curses 
his horses without really intending what he says
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(111.15^2-70), and of the summoner, whom the devil tells
Now lat us ryde blyve,
For I wole holde compalgnye with thee 
Til It be so that thou forsake me.
(III.1520-22)
Thus, man's moral freedom Is preserved here: the devil may
■1
accompany the sinner only so long as the sinner himself 
allows. At any point, presumably, the summoner may "for*- 
sake" the devil and turn back toward God. But when his 
final opportunity to do so does come, he chooses to go to 
hell with the devil rather than to let the widow keep her 
pan (III.1630-33).
All this is perfectly in keeping with the teaching 
of the friars in the fourteenth century, for the Franciscans 
had always been the champions of the theology of their bro­
ther William of Ockham. But the climate of opinion had so 
developed by the end of the century that this friar, though 
clearly preaching a doctrine of man's freedom— perhaps even 
of the summoner's capacity to return to God's favor through 
wift-rl tum de congruo— feels compelled to conclude his tale 
with an orthodox description of man's ultimate need for di­
vine grace in the scheme of salvation:
Waketh, and preyeth Jhesu for his grace 
So kepe us fro the temptour Sathanas*
Herketh this word! beth war, as in this cas:
"The leoun sit in his awayt alway 
To sle the Innocent, if that he may."
Disposeth ay youre hertes to withstonde
The feend, that yow wolde make thral and bonde.
He may nat tempte yow over youre myght,
For Crist wol be youre champion and kn^jht.
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This Is probably as far as one might safely go toward af­
firming man's freedom In the stormy religious atmosphere 
of the time when Chaucer was writing this tale. Man has 
the power to resist temptation and sin, but he has this 
power because, as in Piers Plowman. Christ will be his 
knight. Finally, in terms of its position on grace and mer­
it, the Friar's Tale seems quite appropriate to the charac­
ter and religious order of its teller, thus adding another 
point in favor of the argument that there is a dramatic sui­
tability here between tale and teller.
The Summoner1s Tale, which follows immediately, also 
presents an interesting view of Chaucer's attitude toward 
grace and merit. The glib and avaricious friar in this 
story raises a point which was becoming increasingly dis­
turbing to conscientious men in the later Middle Ages. The 
friar, in his attempt to extract as much money as he can 
from the people he is visiting, asks for offerings for 
masses, trentals, and other prayers that the community of 
friars would perform on behalf of the souls of others. Up 
to a point, this practice had long been endorsed in the 
Church, but many friars had begun to claim that their pray­
ers and masses could control God's will and give the sinner 
on whose1 behalf they were said a guarantee of salvation:
The clennesse and the fastynge of us freres
Maketh that Crist accepteth oure preyeres.
(III.3833-3*0
This is obviously incompatible with the fourteenth-century 
insistence on the potentia Dei absoluta: in fact, such a 
view of man's control over God was the principal reason 
why the potentla Del absoluta became such a prominent issue 
in late medieval theology in the first place. Chaucer*s 
position here and in the Pardoner*s Prologue and Tale is 
quite characteristic of his time, as we saw in Piers Plowman 
(e.g., B.V.648-651)• and would become increasingly common ' 
in the next century, finally becoming one of the central 
arguments of the Reformation.
If all we were interested in in this chapter were 
defining and illustrating Chaucer's place in the controver­
sy over grace and merit, we might now turn to the Parson1s 
Tale and conclude our discussion. But there is an extremely 
fascinating point that remains. Chaucer uses his views on 
grace and merit in a series of the Canterbury Tales, uniting 
them in a thematic "group" similar to his treatment of mar­
riage. The tales involved— those by the Clerk, Franklin, 
Physician, and Second Nun-all present women in very adverse 
circumstances and all dramatize how these women respond to 
their suffering in ways that bear directly on the problem 
of grace and merit.
The Clerk's Tale has long been relegated by many 
Chaucer critics to that limbo where his least successful 
works have been consigned. Though there is some evidence 
that the tale is being taken more seriously in recent years,
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most readers seem embarrassed by the submission of Grisllde 
to her maniacally overbearing husband Walter. The typical
defense has been that the medieval mind would more readily
have accepted the story and more enthusiastically have
praised its heroine than we, with our modem attitudes
21toward female equality and the rights of wives in marriage. 
This is not a particularly strong argument, however, because 
even in the Middle Ages there was a strong tradition favor­
ing the equality, sometimes even the superiority, of women, 
as we may see in such diverse works as Pearl, Sir Gawaln and 
the Green Knight. The Book of the Duchess» The Parliament of 
Fowls■ Troilus and Criseyde. The Knight1s Tale. The Frank­
lin^ Tale. The Wife of Bath's Tale, and The Second Nun's 
Tale. None of the heroines in these works exhibit the same 
behavior as Grisilde, though several of them are also sub­
jected to great suffering under conditions of extreme ad­
versity. Part of the problem in understanding the Clerkfs 
Tale is, I think, that we have taken it too literally. The 
case for its place in the “marriage group” presupposes a
literal interpretation of Grisilde*s actions as the Clerk*s
22
response to the Wife of Bath, but if the tale were viewed 
in another manner, as an allegory of a Christian*s ideal
21james Sledd, “The Clerk * s Tale: the Monsters and the 
Critics," Mg,: LI (1953)* 73-82.
22This was first proposed, as far as I know, by George 
Lyman Kittredge in his famous article, "Chaucer's Discussion 
of Marriage," MP, EC (1911-12), 1*35-46?.
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behavior when faced with a conflict between God's will and 
man's desire, much of the difficulty for the modem reader
s'm
evaporates.
The evidence of the poem itself points away from 
a literal interpretation. Toward the end, after Walter has 
finally satisfied himself that Grisilde is perfectly sub­
missive, the narrator comments on the ironic difference 
between patient Grisilde and the world of everyday human 
beings:
This world is nat so strong, it is no nay,
As it hath been in olde tymes yoore.
And herkneth what this auctour seith therfoore.
(IV.1139-^1)
Grisilde is not a "real" wife who has been arduously, even 
cruelly, tested by her husband, a woman who bears cheerfully 
even the seeming murder of her children, allows Walter to 
displace her in favor of a young bride, and eagerly helps 
to make the arrangements for the wedding of his second wife. 
Such a Grisilde would be incomprehensible to "real" readers, 
medieval and modem alike. But Grisilde is, according to 
the Clerk, rather a female Job. Her significance transcends 
her circumstances: she is more than Just the suffering wife
of Walter; Grisilde is the type of the Christian struggling 
with the problem of evil and finding meaning in her world 
by submitting patiently to the potentla Del ordinata. These 
are, I realize, strong claims for Grisilde, but it is Chau­
cer himself who first invites the comparison with Job:
Men speke of Job, and moost for his humblesse,
As clerkes, whan hem list, konne wel endite,
Namely of men, but as in soothfastnesse,
Though Clerkes preise wommen but a lite,
Ther kan no man in humblesse hym acquite 
As womman kan, ne kan been half so trewe 
As womman been, but it be falle of newe.
(IV.932-938)
This reference to Job does not, of course, make Grisilde out 
to be nothing more than a stylized personification of "hum- 
blesse;" rather it indicates the theological dimensions of 
her literal actions and renders them meaningful. For if we 
cannot sympathize with a wife who lets her husband badly 
mistreat her, we can respond to her, as Christians, in terms 
of the abstract virtues that she represents. In case we 
were in doubt as to what these virtues are, they are made 
quite explicit at the end of the tale:
This storie is seyd, nat for that wyves sholde 
Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee.
For it were inportable, though they would;
But for that every wight, in his degree,
Sholde be constant in adversitee
As was Grisilde; therfore Petrak writeth
This storie, which with heigh stile he enditeth.
For, sith a womman was so pacient 
Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte 
Receyven al in gree that God us sent;
For greet skile is, he preeve that he wroghte.
But he ne tempteth no man that he boghte.
As seith Seint Jame, if ye his pistel rede;
He preeveth folk al day, it is no drede,
And suffreth us, as for oure excercise.
With sharpe scourges of adversitee
Ful ofte to be bete in sondry wise;
Nat for to knowe oure wyl, for certes he,
Er we were bom, knew al oure freletee;
And for oure beste is al his govemaunce.
Lat us thanne lyve in vertuous suffraunc^.
(lV.11^2-62)
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According to divine providence, including God's eternal 
foreknowledge of how she would act, Grisilde is tempted to 
rebel against the "sharpe scourges of adversitee.” In 
submitting to her husband, however, she is ultimately sub­
mitting to the potentla Dei ordlnata. which is responsible 
for her "exercise.” Walter is, perhaps unknowingly, the 
agent of providence in proving the moral heroism of his 
wife. Still, we are reminded several times that such "hum- 
blesse” is not ordinarily possible for women to acheive by 
their own merit (de conaruo). but only through a special 
gift of grace that gives them the capacity for such merltum 
de condlgno (e.g., IV.206-207, 395. 821-822). In this 
perspective, then, Grisilde no longer appears as a static, 
two-dimensional, unbelievable character for whom we must 
make awkward apologies. She now emerges as a potent moral 
force, idealized in her but present in the rest of us in 
some degree, through which Chaucer allegorizes his doctrine 
of providence and freedom, grace and merit.
In the Franklin's Tale. Dorigen behaves quite dif­
ferently than Grisilde. Both are similar in being good 
wives, but as a "heathen" (V.1293) Dorigen does not have the 
same grace as Grisilde to carry her through her suffering. 
Dorigen, too, is faced with evil. Her husband has gone to 
sea, and as she looks at the sharp rocks along the coast she 
fears that his ship will be lost and he drowned:
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But whan she saugh the grisly rokkes blake,
For verray feere so wolde hir herte quake 
That on hire feet she myghte hire noght sustene.
Thanne wolde she sltte adoun upon the grene,
And pitously Into the see biholde.
And seyn right thus, with sorweful slices colde:
"Eterne God, that thurgh thy purveiaunce 
Ledest the world by certeln governaunce.
In ydel, as men seyn., ye no thyng make.
But, Lord, thlse grisly feendly rokkes blake,
That semen rather a foul confusion 
Of werk than any fair creaclon 
Of swlch a parflt wys God and a stable.
Why han ye wroght this werk unresonable?
For by this werk, south, north, ne west, ne eest,
Ther nys yfostred man, ne bryd, ne beest;
It dooth no good, to my wit, but anoyeth.
Se ye nat, Lord, how mankynde It destroyeth?
An hundred thousand bodyes of mankynde 
Han rokkes slayn, al be they nat In mynde,
Which mankynde Is so fair part of thy werk 
That thou It madest lyk to thyn owene merk.
Thanne semed it ye hadde a greet chlertee 
Toward mankynde; but how thanne may It bee 
That ye swlche meenes make it to destroyen,
Whiche meenes do no good, but evere anoyen?
I woot wel clerkes wol seyn as hem leste.
By argumentz,' that al Is for the beste.
Though I ne kan the causes nat yknowe.
But thilke God that made wynd to blowe 
As kepe my lord! this Is my conclusion.
To clerkes lete I al dlsputlson.
But wolde God that alle thlse rokkes blake 
Were sonken into helle for his sake!
Thlse rokkes sleen myn herte for the feere.*1
(V.859-893)
Dorigen is very much troubled by the problem raised by di­
vine providence, for this seems to make God responsible for 
evil. She Is unwilling, or perhaps unable, to resign her­
self to the potentla Del ordlnata with the calm and resolute 
faith of Grisilde. Dorigen does not want to leave every­
thing to God; she longs to exert some control over the 
direction of her own destiny, even if this may be at odds
with eternal providence. Accordingly!, in her speech quoted 
above, in her bargain with Aurelius (v.989-998), and finally 
in her brooding over suicide as the only way out of her pre­
dicament (V,1355-1^ 56), she Judges experience by her own 
needs and desires without ever rising, as Grisilde did, to 
a higher moral vantage point from which her petty, though 
human, selfishness would appear irrelevant. She does know 
something of the laws of nature, enough at least to realize 
that Aurelius has somehow altered natural law by making 
the rocks "disappear*' (V.1345), but she has not moved beyond 
mere sclentla to the Christian virtue of aaulentla. which 
flows from sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens). For 
as Augustine taught, in a doctrine that shaped much of 
medieval thought, ^empirical knowledge is worthless unless 
a man has the wisdom, through grace, to understand the 
ultimate significance of the data being considered.2^ Put 
another way, this means that even a good person like Dori­
gen may learn a great deal about the world about her, but 
without the wisdom of Christian faith what she knows may 
be confusing, disconnected, and frustrating. It is this 
distinction, I think, that finally separates Dorigen from 
Grisilde in Chaucer*s overall view of man*s relation to God. 
Unlike Grisilde, Dorigen may not merit (de congruo> the
2^De Trlnltate. 12.15,25
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special grace of divine wisdom; this grace Is reserved for 
those who have been freely elected by God and have responded 
with the "humblesse," Idealized in the Clerks Tale, which 
constitutes merltum de condltcno.
On the other hand, Chaucer does not make of "hum- 
blesse" a merely passive resignation to fate. There is no 
real virtue where virtue has been untried, but similarly 
there is no virtue in someone who is not free to make moral 
decisions or refuses to take a responsible role when faced 
with temptation. Grisilde and Dorigen, for better and worse, 
do function as moral agents with definite values and the 
courage to try to choose what they think is right. But what 
about Virginia in the Physician’s Tale? She is virtuous in 
the way she has led her life up to the time of the story 
(VI.105-117)» but she does not appear to take a real part 
In the decision to sacrifice her rather than let her fall 
into the hands of Aplus. When her father announces his de­
cision, she simply asks,
"Goode fader, shal I dye?
Is ther no grace, is ther no remedye?"
(vi.235-236)
And when he replies that there is no other remedy but to 
kill her, she simply requests a few minutes to grieve and 
then submits herself to his will:
"Blissed be God, that I shal dye a maydet
Yif me my deeth, er that I have a shame;
Dooth with youre wyl, a Goddes name!"
(VI.2^8-250)
It is important to observe here that she does her father*s 
will, not her own, because this clearly sets Virginia apart 
from Grisilde and Dorigen. Further, there is a curious in­
consistency in the morality in the tale. The narrator con­
cludes with the following comment on the villains:
Heere may men seen how synne hath his merite.
Beth war, for no man woot whom God wol smyte 
In no degree, ne in which manere wyse 
The worm of conscience may agryse 
Of wlkked lyf, though it so pryvee be 
That no man woot therof but God and he.
For be he lewed man, or ellis lered,
He noot how soone that he shal been afered.
Therfore I rede yow this consell take:
Forsaketh synne, er synne yow forsake.
(VI.277-286)
This Is conventional enough as an affirmation of man's 
ability to avoid sin by resolute use of his free will.
What does seem odd, however, is that Chaucer makes such an 
affirmation at the end of a poem which portrays the almost 
total passivity of Virginia. Oddly, too, Chaucer never 
praises her as a Christian, even though her allusion to 
Jephthah's daughter would have been impossible for a pagan 
Roman (VI.240), and in spite of the fact that her speech 
quoted above (VI.248-250) appears explicitly Christian. 
Perhaps Chaucer avoids elevating her to the status of a vir­
gin martyr because of the dubious morality of her sacrifice. 
While the Church has always cherished her martyrs, no ortho­
dox thinker has ever condoned, or even allowed, suicide as 
a legitimate means of avoiding sin. Virginia tries to give 
her sacrifioe validity by drawing a parallel between herself
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and Jephthah's daughter, but this does not really absolve 
her because the Church Fathers sternly condemned Jephthah's
2ij
action as thoughtless, irresponsible, and seriously sinful. 
So, finally, we are faced by Virginia, who has, like other 
Chaucerian heroines, been thrust into severely trying 
circumstances by divine providence, has the capacity as a 
Christian to face her trial courageously, as pointed out 
in the conclusion to the tale, and passively cooperates in 
her own voluntary death. It is Impossible to say that 
Virginia achieves merltum de condlgno. nor does Chaucer or 
his narrator claim that she does. As a consequence, we may 
be left dissatisfied with this tale, for which we need 
attempt no apology, because of its sterile characterization 
and muddled morality.
The Second Nun's Tale is another attempt to portray 
a virtuous Christian woman beset with the cruelties of 
living in pagan Home, and here the moral vision of the 
Canterbury Tales once again clears. The story itself is 
quite unremarkable as an example of the medieval genre of 
a saint's life. Cecile, we learn early in the tale, is 
"fulfild of Goddes yifte" (VIII.275), and this is what gives 
her the power she has to convert her husband and his brother 
so easily. Later, when she is faced with a choice between 
renouncing her faith or embracing martyrdom, she Joyfully
24,,Richard L. Hoffman, "Jephthah's Daughter and Chaucer's 
Virginia," Chaucer Review. II (196?), 25-26.
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accepts her death and even preaches to her oppressors a
sermon describing their idolatry of false gods:
"Ther lakketh no thyng to thyne outter yfin
That thou n'art blynd; for thyng that we seen alle
That it is stoon,— that men may wel espyen,—
That like stoon a god thow wolt it calle.
I rede thee, lat thyn hand upon it falle,
And taste it wel, and stoon thou shalt it fynde,
Syn that thou seest nat with thyne eyen blynde.
II It is a shame that the peple shal
So scome thee, and laughe at thy folye;
For communly men woot it wel overal 
That myghty God is in his hevenes hye;
And thise ymages, wel thou mayst espye,
To thee ne to hemself mowen noght profite,
For in effect they been nat worth a myte."
(VIII.498-511)
Like Dorigen, these pagans cannot pierce beyond empirical 
knowledge to apprehend the reality of God through Christian 
wisdom. Ceoile does, of course, have this grace, and the 
grace also to face horrible torture and eventual death with 
extraordinary courage. This is evidently a special gift 
from God, as we see in his suspension of natural law, de 
uotentla Del absoluta. in order to preserve her from the 
flames (VIII.519-522). After her death, Pope Urban offici­
ally recognizes her special favor from God, an implicit 
recognition that her merlta de condltmo were sufficient to 
earn her salvation, by elevating her to the rank of a saint 
and erecting a church in her honor (VIII.547-553)• What 
emerges from this tale of a great virgin martyr, then, is 
what'Chaucer seems to have been describing in the Clerk’s 
Tale, the Franklin^ Tale, and, less successfully, the
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Physicians Tale. Man exists under the ultimate governance 
of divine providence, hut from a Christian point of view he 
has both the freedom and the responsibility to do his best, 
with the grace that God grants him, to avoid sin and perform 
works of positive merit. Grisllde and Ceclle thus repre­
sent the ideal response to God's will, while Dorlgen wil­
fully tries to take things into her own hands, and Virginia 
is so blankly passive that she becomes an accomplice in her 
own slaughter.
Finally, nonetheless, we must come to the Parsonfs 
Tale for Chaucer's clearest, most definitive statement about 
the problem of grace and merit. Man has used his natural 
powers to rebel against God, the Parson tells us, and this 
is why no man may redeem himself unless he is first sacra­
mentally united with Christ (X.260-282). This presupposes 
that fallen man is not capable of meritum de condlgno with­
out prevenient grace:
And heerof seith Seint Peter: "Ther is noon
oother name under hevene that is yeve to any man, 
by which a man may be saved, but oonly Jhesus."/ 
Nazarenus is1 as muche for to seye as "florisshynge," 
in which a man shal hope that he that yeveth hym 
remissioun of synnes shal yeve hym eek grace wel 
for to do. For in the flour is hope of fruyt in 
tyme comynge, and in fdryifnesse of synnes hope 
of grace wel for to do./ "I was atte dore of thyn 
herte," seith Jhesus, "and cleped for to entre.
He that openeth to me shal have foryifnesse of 
synne./ I wol entre into hym by my grace, and 
soupe with hym," by the goode werkes that he shal 
doon, whiohe werkes been the foode of God; "and he 
shal soupe with me," by the grete Joye that I shal 
yeven hym.
(X.287-290)
God calls out to man in an Invitation to share in the divine
life (lnltlum fidel), and the man who answers the call may
merit (de congruo) the further grace (gratia gratum faciens)
to perform good works, “which werkes been the foode of God"
(merltum de condlgno), earning his salvation by meeting the
full standard of God's justice (ex deblto lustlclae). But
if a man should not accept the invitation of grace, or
should fall back into sin after receiving It, then his good
works that he performed both in and out of the state of sin
are impotent to save him:
Soothly, the goode werkes that he hath lost, outher 
they been the goode werkes that he wroghte er he fel 
Into deedly synne, or elles the goode werkes that 
he wroghte while he lay in synne,/ Soothly, the goode 
werkes that he dide bifom that he fil in synne been 
al mortefled and astoned and dulled by the ofte 
synnyng./ The othere goode werkes, that he wroghte 
whil he lay in deedly synne, thei been outrely dede, 
as to the lyf perdurable in hevene.
(X.232-23**)
This closes the possibility of a man achieving "lyf perdur­
able in hevene" through merltum de congruo alone, as many 
Ockhamlsts argued was possible, de potentla Del absolute.
It is also interesting that Chaucer's Parson expresses com­
plete confidence in the potentla Del ordlnata. in terms of 
which he may be sure of the doctrine of grace and merit 
that he is teaching. On the other side, however, Chaucer 
avoids polarizing the argument so that a denial that meri­
ting de congruo may earn salvation contains also, as in 
Bradwardine, an implicit denial of the value of merltum de
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congruo Itself. For the Parson goes on to qualify his posi­
tions
For certes, In the werkynge of the deedly synne, 
ther Is ho trust to no good werk that we han doon 
blforn; that is to seyn, as for to have therby 
the lyf perdurable In hevene./ But nathelees, the 
goode werkes quyken agayn, and comen agayn, and 
helpen, and availlen to have the lyf perdurable In 
hevene, whan we han contrlcloun./ But soothly, the 
goode werkes that men doon whil they been in deedly 
synne, for as muche as they were doon in deedly 
synne, they may nevere quyke agayn./ For certes, 
thyng that nevere hadde lyf may nevere quykene; 
and nathelees, a*l be it that they ne availle noght 
to han the lyf perdurable, yet availlen they to abregge 
of the peyne of helle, or elles to geten temporal 
rlchesse,/ or elles that God wole the rather enlumyne 
and llghtne the herte of the synful man to have 
repentaunce;/ and eek they availlen for to usen a 
man to doon goode werkes, that the feend have the 
lasse power of his sould./ And thus the curtels 
Lord Jhesu Crist ne wole that no good werk be lost; 
for in somwhat it shal availle.
(X,2^0-246)
Therefore, while a man*s works, good though they might seem, 
are "dede" if performed in a state of sin, we also have the 
assurance that "no good werk be lost; for in somwhat it shal 
availle." The Parson is defining an extremely subtle line 
here between two complementary positions: on one side, he
wishes to stress the need for sanctifying grace to earn 
merltum de condlgno. but on the other side he tries to 
give as much scope to merltum de congruo as possible without 
drifting into Ockhamlsm. He solves the problem very neatly 
by allowing that a sinner may, because Christ is so perfec­
tly "curteis," hope that he will be rewarded in some way—  
perhaps by attracting further grace— though not in his
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present $tate having the capacity to earn his salvation.
In this way, Chaucer, through his Parson, does succeed In 
affirming the orthodox tradition on grace and merit, diffi­
cult though this was In the uncertain theological milieu of 
the fourteenth century.
Chaucer's interest in the controversy is, as we have 
seen, beyond any reasonable question. But at the same time, 
Chaucer was not one to enter upon the more dangerous and 
exciting speculations that we have found in the works of 
the Pearl-poet and Langland. This does not mean, of course, 
that he was a coward, lacking the moral fiber to choose 
between the conservatives and radicals of his time. Chaucer 
did not hesitate to point an aocusing, often mocking, finger 
at people and Institutions in his society that he found 
hypocritical or corrupt. In religious matters, he frequen­
tly satirized a venal friar or the downright criminality of 
summoners and pardoners. But he never seems, at least in 
his surviving poetry, to have seriously questioned the 
doctrinal foundations on which his faith was built. For 
him, as for many another in the moderate, orthodox late 
medieval Church, it was enough that God had revealed his 
instructions to man. And for Chaucer, as for FitzRalph 
before him, this was a source of confidence and security, 
not the bewildering, sometimes terrifying sense that one 
gets from reading the fourteenth-century theology of God's
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potentla absoluta. Though the boldness of other thinkers 
was at times more exhilarating* it would be a mistake to 
conclude that Chaucer and those like him did not also con­
tribute significantly to late medieval thought* Chaucer 
had no grandiose pretensions about his role* however* and 
he summed up his own aims in the modest words of his Parson:
And Jhesu* for his grace, wit me sende 
To shewe yow the wey, in this vlage,
Of thilke parfit glorious pilgrymage 
That hlghte Jerusalem celestial.
(X.48-51)
Chapter V: Conclusions
After pursuing the argument of this dissertation 
through four chapters, I would now like to look hack over 
the material covered and try to draw some general conclu*- 
slons. Before doing so, however, there is a question of 
methodology that must be clarified. A great deal of facile 
nonsense chokes the learned journals every year with claims 
that one writer or “source" has in some important way “in­
fluenced" another writer's work, while little or no consi­
deration is given to the implications that underlie such 
a judgment. It is necessary, of course, for the literary 
historian to construct patterns by which the relation be­
tween one poet and another may be understood, but we badly 
need criteria for deciding what is going to count as evi­
dence of such a relation. It is not possible, I submit, 
to “prove" this kind of a connection by any conclusive 
logical demonstration. All inferences regarding causal 
connections are probable at best, even when clearly based 
on observable phenomena, and the risks Increase when the 
subject matte^ under investigation does not submit to objec­
tive verification, as in virtually all literary studies.
17*
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This does not mean that because there are risks in literary 
history and oritismv we should therefore avoid these dis­
ciplines altogether, but rather that we should be aware of 
their tentative nature. In drawing my conclusions here, 
therefore, I make no claim that they are in any sense final, 
though their probability has, I think, been established by 
the evidence that we have seen.
The first chapter, describes the origins and deve­
lopment of the late medieval controversy over grace and 
merit. Ultimately, this controversy is rooted not only in 
dogmatic theology, which is obvious enough, but just as im­
portantly in the eplstemologlcal dispute of the time. For 
the nominalists, who insisted that only sense experience is 
"real” knowledge, and all attempts to move beyond it are 
only probable at best, theology as a rational, scientific 
discipline ceased to have value. According to this position, 
it is impossible to have any certain knowledge about God, 
except what he has revealed to man, and even this is open 
to question when the concept that God can overturn his or­
dinances by his absolute power is introduced, as it was in 
the fourteenth century. The result of this uncertainty, 
as we have seen, was that several thinkers began to argue 
that this very uncertainty left man with a free hand to try 
to appeal to God by his own merit, even without the help of 
sanctifying grace. All of this appeared ominously heretical 
to conservative followers of Augustine, however, because
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they Insisted that all truth Is Immutable since It emanates 
from the divine mind, that God would never violate his 
covenant with man, and that no truly meritorious actions 
could be performed by fallen man without the uplifting In­
fluence of prevenlent grace. Heresy charges flew wildly 
through the overheated religious atmosphere of the time, 
and scarcely any important writer in England or on the Con­
tinent failed to get drawn Into the conflict and to take 
some kind of stand, if only by Implication. To be more spe­
cific, radicals such as Ockham, Buckingham, Adam of Woodham, 
and Uthred of Boldon were investigated by various ecclesi­
astical authorities for Pelaglanism in supporting nominalist 
doctrines; conservatives such as Bradwardine and Wycllf went 
so far in the opposite direction that they bordered on heresy 
themselves; and those who wished to find some safe ground 
in the middle chose, like FitzRalph, to reiterate a safely 
traditional doctrine that added nothing original to the con­
troversy, but did have the value of providing security in 
a rather insecure age.
Among the literary figures of the time, the Pearl- 
poet employed the question of grace and merit as the central 
doctrinal theme of Pearl. The debate between the dreamer, 
who has obvious Ockhamist tendencies, and his conservative 
Pearl leads ultimately to the conclusion, convincing even 
the dreamer, that the "grace of God is gret inoghe." Human
merits cannot, without God's prevenient grace, make a direct 
claim on salvation; only God may choose who will be saved, 
as well as the nature and time of this salvation. Still, 
this doctrine of grace is complemented by the corresponding 
doctrine of merit in Purity, the next poem in the Cotton 
Nero A.x manuscript. For Purity dramatizes man's power to 
respond to God, to exercise his moral freedom to earn God's 
favor, as in the allegory of the clothes that the wedding 
guests must wear to the feast. But lest this seem to give 
too much prominence to man's own merits and his own natural 
powers, there is the reminder in Patience that man may mis­
use these powers, as Jonah did, and that God finally con? 
trols the destinies of all men through his absolute power, 
which transcends mere human understanding. This is in turn 
balanced by the final poem in the manuscript, Sir Gawaln and 
the Green Knight. Here we learn that man's will is capable 
of choosing evil by virtue of its freedom, but it is not 
also capable of choosing the good without the assistance of 
divine grace. Gawain did, after all, commit serious sin 
with Lady Bercllak, even though he had sufficient grace to 
avoid his sin. God chose, however, to save Gawain from fur­
ther sin, even thottgh the knight did not merit such grace. 
Still, Gawain did cooperate with this grace and reinstate 
himself in God's favor through sacramental confession, though 
the resolution 6f the social "sin” of keepings the green gir­
dle is reserved for the meeting between Gawain and Bercllak
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at the end. Finally, St. Erkenwald presents a special 
difficulty In using the Trajan-Gregory legend, which ordi­
narily argued for merltum de congruo as a means to salvation 
(as In Piers Plowman)and rejecting such merit here In favor 
of a muddled doctrine of merltum de condlgno. As an extreme­
ly conservative reaction against Ockhamist theology, St. 
Erkenwald represents still another alternative in the dis­
pute over grace and merit.
Piers Plowman, on the other hand, 'brilliantly dram­
atizes the complicated moral struggle of Will, man’s faculty 
for moral action, in his search for the means to salvation.
In the Vlslo, Will learns how to gain Piers * pardon, and 
this first section of the poem serves to define the doctri­
nal problem, raising the basic questions that the Vita will 
try to answer. After the pardon scene„ the search for Dowel 
is essentially an attempt to find out how a man may merit 
salvation, with meritum de congruo receiving the principal 
attention. In the section on Dobet, the search focusses 
more on meritum de condlgno. though we are never permitted 
to forget the value of man’s free response to divine grace. 
Finally, Dobest illustrates the best way for a Christian to 
eafn salvation (de condlgno) through his active participa- 
tuon in the Church, whose authority comes from God, de 
uotentla ordlnata. Taken as a whole. Piers Plowman, inclu­
ding its revisions, is an extended dialectic in which var­
ious positions on grace and merit are examined in an effort
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to struggle toward some resolution to this difficult problem.
Not all poets reflect their Interest In the contro­
versy In the same way, however, and Chaucer takes a posi­
tion similar to that of FitzRalph in reaffirming a safe, 
middle-of-the-road orthodoxy without contributing any of 
the exciting, sometimes dangerous, speculations of the Pearl- 
poet or Langland. For Chaucer, as seen most clearly in the 
Parson's Tale, rejected both the extremes of Ockham and 
Bradwardine, though his doctrinal conservatism made him more 
sympathetic to Bradwardine than the radical "Modern Pela­
gians." Again and again, in such diverse works as Trollus 
and Crlsevde. the Knights Tale, the Man of Lawfs Tale, the 
Clerk's Tale, the Franklin's Tale, and several other lesser 
poems, Chaucer stresses his confidence in God’s providence, 
the need for grace to merit salvation, and his assurance 
that God will not violate the covenant with man through 
potentla Del absolute. Although this may not have the flair 
or the boldness of some of the more radical medieval think­
ers, we must remind ourselves that this, too, contributed 
significantly to the controversy over grace and merit. For 
Chaucer's position was the one which was ultimately to pre­
vail, at least in the Catholic theology of the Council of 
Trent, as well as in some of the more moderate Protestant 
systems such as that of Arminius. Without the many writers 
of Chaucer's doctrinal persuasion, this moderate tradition 
might have died, drowned in tte storm of religious strife in
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the next tiro centuries.
It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the de­
bate over grace and merit went far beyond the academic halls 
of the universities or the monastic cloisters. Serious men 
of ideas, sensitive to the theological issues of their time, 
could not ignore this debate or fail to participate in it 
in some way. The Pearl-poet, Langland, and Chaucer were not 
professional theologians or university professors, but they 
became involved in this great issue nevertheless. Because 
they were poets, they chose to enter imaginatively into 
the various doctrinal positions and to dramatize the impli­
cations of each as it might be “lived*1 in the world of poe­
tic fiction. In adopting this mode of expression, they lost 
some of the precision of scholastic logic, of course, but 
they also gained something that the schoolmen might not 
otherwise have achieved: these poets made it possible to
feel the abstractions of theology, rather than merely think 
them. As a consequence, the Pearl-poet, Langland, and 
Chaucer made a great contribution to the serious thought of 
their time by articulating, each in his own way, a profound 
interest in the great debate over grace and merit.
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Appendix: A Glossary of Medieval Theological Terms
Since many of the terms used in late medieval theo­
logy once had clear, precise meanings that are no longer 
familiar except to specialists in doctrinal history, the 
following glossary has been added to facilitate understanding 
the technical terms used in this dissertation. I do not, 
however, claim to offer a comprehensive listing here, and 
readers who wish to pursue these and other definitions fur­
ther should consult Heiko A. Oberman’s "A Nomlnalistic Glos­
sary" in his Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass., 
1963), pp. ^59-^76, and the relevant articles in the Dlc- 
tlonnaire de Th£ologle Cathollque.
Aoceptatlo ("acceptation"): God’s free act of electing a
sinner (Justification), who may then perform works that 
earn merltum de condlgno.
C(h)arltas creata ("created grace"): the Holy Spirit's gift
of sanctifying, or Justifying, grace.
C(h)arltas increata ("uncreated grace"): the Holy Spirit.
Ex deblto iustlclae ("owed according to Justice"): the prin­
ciple that once God has freely bound himself, de poten­
tla Del ordlnata. to accept a sinner, this man's good 
works will earn merltum de condlgno according to the 
covenant to which God has bound himself.
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Ex natura rel deblta ("owed according to the nature of the
act"): the principle that some acts, prompted initially
by divine grace, have such Intrinsic value that they 
will always earn merit of some sort, whether the agent 
is in a state of grace (cf. meritum de condlgno) or not 
(cf. merltum de congruo).
Ex purls naturalibus ("through purely natural abilities"): 
the concept that man has the natural power to perform
jt^ certain actions without any special gift of grace,
though it never excludes the general influence of divine 
providence.
Gratia gratis data ("grace given gratuitously"): according
to some writers, this is a state of grace that precedes 
and invites the sinner to move toward sanctifying grace 
through earning merltum de congruo, which will in turn 
be likely to persuade God to accept the sinner; other 
theologians use this term only to designate the gift 
by which God gives some the power to convert others to 
the faith; in both oases, this grace can coexist with 
sin in the soul of the recipient.
Gratia gratum faclens ("grace making one worthy of favor"): 
this is the state of sanctifying grace which makes a 
sinner fully acceptable to God and motivates the reci­
pient to do good (de condlgno) works; this grace cannot
190
exist together with sin in a man's soul.
Habitus gratlae ("habit of grace"): the state of sanctifying
grace which justifies the sinner and makes him accep­
table to God.
Inltlum fldel ("beginning of faith"): a term in Augustine's
theology to designate the time when, after a long 
struggle, the sinner receives the gift of grace which 
impels him to embrace the Christian faith.
Merltum de condlgno • ("full merit"): merit which meets the
full requirement of divine justice because it has been 
earned in a state of gratia gratum faclens.
Merltum de congruo ("partial merit"): merit which may at­
tract God's generosity, even for a man in a state of 
sin, to the extent that God may choose to give the sin­
ner a gift of justifying grace.
Potentla Del absoluta ("the absolute power of God"): the
omnipotence of God which, regardless of the ordained 
moral order, is completely free of all restrictions 
except the law of contradiction.
Potentla Del ordlnata ("the ordained power of God"): the
power of God that is known to man through natural law 
and divine revelation, including the covenant with man
to which God has bound himself.
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